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Abstract: 
 
Over the past two decades crime rates appear to have undergone a statistical 
decline in a number of predominantly Western countries. Representing a 
discernible break from the not too distant past, this remarkable reversal has 
unsurprisingly generated significant scholarly interest and spawned a 
voluminous literature seeking to explore and explain this purported ‘international 
crime decline’. However, the evidence upon which claims of this apparent 
reversal are based appears less than robust and raises a number of questions 
regarding the validity of the ‘crime decline’ discourse. Accordingly, this research 
aims to critically interrogate the dominant data source at the heart of this 
discourse and begins to offer an alternative view of the reality of crime and 
harm by drawing upon original empirical research. To this end the thesis 
examines the wider socio-economic and politico-cultural context within which 
this decline is said to have occurred, highlighting the changing nature and 
landscape of crime and its ever deepening recalcitrance to precise 
measurement.  
 
With a view towards reframing the ‘crime decline’ discourse a more accurate 
account of crime and harm is provided by drawing upon an ontologically 
grounded harm perspective. In doing so attention is drawn to a range of non-
criminalised harms that do immeasurable damage to the wider social body yet 
remain absent from the optimistic claims of statistical reductions in crime. 
Moreover, in what marks a positive contribution towards the development of an 
empirically robust and theoretically persuasive account of the purported ‘crime 
decline’, a new empirically informed theoretical framework is advanced. Utilising 
this new framework this thesis may begin to explain why, despite its lack of 
aetiological affirmation, the ‘crime decline’ discourse has been so readily 
accepted. It is concluded that crime may not have simply ‘declined’ but mutated 
in ways that current indicators have been unable to capture. Ultimately, it is 
argued that rather than taking undue comfort in baseless claims of optimism we 
must participate in a gesture of refusal to enjoy the comforting myth of the 
‘crime decline’.       
Justin Kotzé  PhD Thesis 
2 
 
Acknowledgements: 
 
I would like to start by acknowledging a huge debt of gratitude to my 
supervisory team, Professor Steve Hall, Professor Georgios Antonopoulos and 
Dr. Anqi Shen. Thank you all for your continuous and unfaltering support, 
encouragement, advice, guidance and understanding during this difficult but 
hugely rewarding process, you have all been instrumental in the completion of 
this thesis. Secondly, thanks must go to those who kindly agreed to take part in 
this research, your candidness and patience is deeply appreciated. I have been 
incredibly fortunate to have benefited from the kindness and expertise of a 
number of scholars at Teesside University. In particular I would like to thank 
Philip Whitehead, Simon Winlow, Avi Boukli, Anthony Lloyd, Robert Crow, 
Pauline Ramshaw, Louise Wattis and Georgios Papanicolaou. I would also like 
to thank my fellow PhD students David Temple, Kevin Price and Eileen Barker 
whose friendship and support have been invaluable and without whom the PhD 
experience would undoubtedly have been a lesser one. Finally, I must extend 
my deepest gratitude to my wife Claire. You are my sternest critic and most avid 
supporter and without you this thesis and the greatest moments in my life would 
not have been possible. Words fail to convey my appreciation and any attempt 
to do so would fall hopelessly short, so all I can offer is thank you.       
Justin Kotzé  PhD Thesis 
3 
 
Contents: 
 
Abstract ............................................................................................................. 1 
 
Acknowledgements .......................................................................................... 2 
 
List of Figures and Tables................................................................................ 5 
 
Introduction: A Picture in Search of a New Frame ......................................... 6 
Structure and Content ...................................................................................... 9 
 
Chapter One – Literature Review: Constructing the Statistical Quilt for the 
Comfortable Dream: Exploring the ‘International Crime Decline’ .............. 15 
The International Crime Victims Survey ......................................................... 18 
Practical Limitations and Methodological Issues of the ICVS ........................ 21 
Reframing the ‘International Crime Decline’ Discourse .................................. 31 
Criminal Obsolescence and the Mutation of Crime ........................................ 34 
Constructing the Statistical Quilt .................................................................... 43 
 
Chapter Two: Research Context .................................................................... 47 
Contextualising Lake Town ............................................................................ 49 
Neoliberalism and Economic Globalisation .................................................... 57 
Globalising the Illicit ....................................................................................... 63 
The ‘Glocal’ Connection ................................................................................. 69 
 
Chapter Three: Invisible Crimes and Non-Criminalised Harms .................. 79 
The Hidden Landscape of Global Crime ........................................................ 80 
The Hidden Landscape of Everyday Crime ................................................... 82 
Zemiology and the Exploration of Non-Criminalised Harms .......................... 90 
Criminology or Zemiology? Yes, Please! ..................................................... 100 
Finding ‘Harm’s’ Ontological Reality ............................................................ 103 
 
Chapter Four: Research Methodology ........................................................ 109 
Ontological and Epistemological Considerations ......................................... 109 
Research Design and Methods ................................................................... 119 
Research Process ....................................................................................... 128 
 
Justin Kotzé  PhD Thesis 
4 
 
Chapter Five: Research Findings ................................................................ 139 
‘You Should Have Called it Skid Row’ ......................................................... 140 
‘The Frontline is All-Around’ ......................................................................... 146 
‘Well That’s Just Normal Now’ ..................................................................... 153 
‘You’ve Got Like Police Recorded Crime and Then You Have Crime’ ......... 159 
‘Crime’s Changing, it’s Evolving’ .................................................................. 162 
‘People Believe What They Want to Believe’ ............................................... 168 
 
Chapter Six: Paradigmatic Dominance and Eyes Wide Shut: Beyond 
Positivism and Constructionism ................................................................. 175 
Positivism and Constructionism ................................................................... 177 
Critical Realism; Beyond Positivism and Constructionism ........................... 181 
The Turn to Speculative Realism and Transcendental Materialism ............. 186 
Managed Deaptation through the Pseudo-Pacification Process .................. 194 
 
Chapter Seven: Dreaming Comfortably: Theorising the ‘Crime Decline’ 
and Modernity’s Dream Myth ....................................................................... 203 
Analysing Modernity’s Dream Myth ............................................................. 204 
The Myth-Sustaining Dream ........................................................................ 206 
The Myth of the ‘Crime Decline’ ................................................................... 211 
A Multipurpose Dream Myth ........................................................................ 216 
Degrees of Assimilation ............................................................................... 219 
 
Conclusion .................................................................................................... 229 
 
References..................................................................................................... 242 
 
Appendices.................................................................................................... 284 
Appendix 1: World map showing countries (excluding Europe) that have 
participated in the ICVS at least once between 1989 and 2010 .................. 284 
 
Appendix 2: World map showing European countries that have participated in 
the ICVS at least once between 1989 and 2010 .......................................... 285 
 
Appendix 3: World map showing available ICVS trend data from countries that 
have participated in at least three sweeps of the ICVS between 1989 and 
2010 ............................................................................................................. 286 
  
Justin Kotzé  PhD Thesis 
5 
 
List of Figures and Tables: 
 
Figure 1: The ‘Crime Decline’ Tunnel of Vision………………………………..39 
 
Figure 2: Technology-Mediated Criminal Transference ………………………42 
 
Table 1: The Three Ontological Domains of Reality…………………………..112 
 
Table 2: The Four Ontological Domains of Reality……………………………118 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justin Kotzé  PhD Thesis 
6 
 
Introduction: 
 
A Picture in Search of a New Frame. 
 
During the past two decades we seem to have witnessed the emergence of a 
phenomenon commonly referred to as the ‘crime decline’ or ‘crime drop’ 
(Knepper 2012; Farrell et al 2014; Rizk and Bettaïeb 2015). Initially detected in 
the USA and lauded as the ‘Great American Crime Decline’ (Zimring 2007), 
traces of the phenomenon’s underlying current have subsequently been found 
elsewhere as an emerging swell of evidence attests to its ‘international’ 
character (Knepper 2012; Baumer and Wolff 2014; van Dijk et al 2007; Tseloni 
et al 2010; Tonry 2014a; Farrell et al 2010). Accordingly, there now appears to 
be a growing belief amongst a number of scholars that “crime rates for all 
traditional violent and property offences are falling in all developed Western 
countries” (Tonry 2014b:viii). This unexpected turn of events has been dubbed 
“the most important criminological phenomenon of modern times” (Farrell et al 
2014:421). Consequently, and perhaps unsurprisingly, it has stimulated a great 
deal of scholarly interest and spawned a voluminous literature intent on 
explicating its aetiological complexities.  
 
Staking its claim as the methodological champion of the ‘international crime 
decline’ discourse, the International Crime Victims Survey has become both a 
standard source of cross-national information pertaining to trends in crime 
(Barkan 2012) and a common feature of numerous ‘international crime decline’ 
studies (Mayhew and van Dijk 2012). Indeed, it has been instrumental in 
helping to fashion claims of a “universal drop in crime” purported to have 
occurred from about the mid-1990s (van Kesteren et al 2014:65). So conclusive 
are these statistically driven proclamations professed to be, that any who dare 
disagree risk intellectual chastisement, for it is argued that no ‘informed’ person 
would do so (Tonry 2014a). However, there is little by way of convincing 
explanations accounting for this puzzling ‘criminological bombshell’ to warrant 
such resolute acceptance (Farrell et al 2010; van Kesteren et al 2014). 
Certainly, this perplexing reversal of hitherto upward trends in international rates 
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of crime presents for the discipline of criminology both a theoretical and an 
empirical challenge (Tseloni et al 2010; Knepper 2012). However, in its current 
condition, marred as it is by an unsettled identity (Lippens and Crewe 2015), 
constraining paradigmatic forces, intense political pressures and the 
entrenchment of policy-driven research (Hall and Winlow 2015; DeKeseredy 
2012), it is likely to be a monumental uphill struggle. Nevertheless, there is 
undoubtedly a need for serious theoretical work capable of sorting out the 
statistical grit that continues to agitate any articulation of a persuasive 
explanation for the alleged ‘crime decline’ (Knepper 2015). 
 
Convincing and certain as it may appear, “the ‘crime-decline’ thesis is not at all 
watertight” (Hall and Winlow 2015:122). Accordingly, it may not be 
unreasonable to question the validity of the ‘crime decline’ discourse without 
having one’s credibility thrown into disrepute. Nor does it seem unreasonable to 
query the range and depth of the crime decline story and the wider socio-
economic and politico-cultural context within which it is being told (Krivo 2014). 
Perhaps there is more to this complex phenomenon than there appears at first 
sight. Indeed, it’s almost pre-packaged readiness to be appropriated by 
politicians and scholars alike as a monolithic signifier of ‘success’ should signal 
that at least some degree of cautious scepticism is warranted (Hall 2010). In 
fact any ‘informed’ person might actually consider the ‘international crime 
decline’ trumpet to have been prematurely sounded.   
 
Consequently, the purpose of this research is to pose these uncomfortable 
questions and begin to provide answers to them. More specifically, the study’s 
principle aims are to investigate and analyse the validity of this alleged 
‘international crime decline’, and in doing so it will seek to determine whether 
the dominant data source underpinning the ‘international crime decline’ 
discourse is robust enough to truly support such an assertion. Congruently, it 
will examine the extent to which the proponents of this discourse have, in the 
Nietzschean sense, simply heard only those questions for which they are in a 
position to find and offer answers (O’Hara 2004). Of particular importance is its 
aim to examine the wider socio-economic context within which this and 
concomitant claims of unprecedented peacefulness are said to have occurred. 
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Moreover, the thesis aims to explore both change and continuity in crime and 
harm and ultimately propose a new theoretical framework through which to view 
and understand the multifaceted complexities of the purported ‘crime decline’ 
and congruent assertions.  
 
Consistent with the anticipated achievement of the aforementioned aims, this 
thesis is expected to make a number of original contributions to social scientific 
knowledge in general and to the ‘crime decline’ literature in particular. Among 
the most salient is the novel approach taken towards an analysis of the alleged 
‘crime decline’, in as much as it constitutes the first substantive piece of 
research to explore this phenomenon via an innovative melding of cutting edge 
criminological theory, zemiology, critical realism and transcendental 
materialism. Whilst numerous studies authored by scores of interested scholars 
have crunched the numbers and plotted the statistical patterns and trends, few 
studies have sought to pierce the quantitative crust of the discourse in this way 
and peer beneath the limited statistical representations of selected forms of 
crime to investigate the lived reality of crime and harm in an age of ‘declining 
rates of crime’. There is undeniably a paucity of rigorous qualitative research 
that has sought to explore and explain this alleged reduction in crime with 
robust empirical data and rich theoretical insights. Certainly, the relative 
absence of such work has undoubtedly contributed towards criminology’s 
current failure to offer an adequate answer to the crime decline conundrum 
(Tonry 2014a; Winlow 2014b).  
 
Reflecting upon this identified “failing of criminological theory and empirical 
study” (Farrell et al 2010:24), this thesis intends to contribute towards the 
development of an empirically robust and theoretically persuasive account of 
the purported ‘crime decline’. This will be achieved by drawing upon the 
aforementioned philosophical and theoretical frameworks as well as original 
empirical research and theorising, in order to get beyond the poorly 
conceptualised and limited statistical readings that have been so emphatically 
applauded, to explore experiential lived realities of crime and harm. Ultimately, it 
is anticipated that this research will help to construct a possible explanation as 
to why we may be seeing statistical reductions in some forms of crime and 
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explicate the reason why such a profound assertion, currently devoid of 
aetiological affirmation, has been so readily sold by governments and scholars 
alike as a comforting cognitive commodity for public consumption (Hall and 
Winlow 2015). This thesis will therefore contribute towards a growing body of 
more cautious and critically informed scholarly work that continues to question 
the validity of claims espousing the increased engagement of the ‘better angels 
of our nature’ (Pinker 2011) and miraculous ‘universal’ reductions in 
international rates of crime (van Kesteren et al 2014).  
 
The significance of this work thus lies in its expected ability to reframe the 
‘crime decline’ discourse by applying to this familiar homily the researcher’s 
developing theory of the dream myth. In doing so it is anticipated that a more 
accurate account of this important yet somewhat puzzling phenomenon can be 
articulated. Indeed, it is hoped that when viewed through a refocused 
criminological lens capable of capturing a more holistic picture of crime and 
harm, a theoretically persuasive and empirically grounded explanation to the 
elusive ‘crime decline’ mystery can be offered. However, before the thesis 
begins in earnest, it is perhaps instructive to offer an indication of what is to 
come in the following pages by providing brief outlines of the forthcoming 
chapters. 
 
Structure and Content:  
Chapter one traces the contours of the alleged ‘international crime decline’. It 
sets out to chart a course through what has now become an imposing and 
voluminous sea of ‘crime decline’ literature. In doing so the chapter conducts a 
thorough review of this growing body of work and discerns the dominant voices 
behind the ‘crime decline’ discourse. Having identified such voices and what 
can perhaps be considered the dominant data source underpinning this 
optimistic discourse, they become the focus of thorough scrutineering. 
Following a critical interrogation it is revealed that this dominant source of data 
is not robust enough to support claims of an ‘international crime decline’ 
proposed by what can only be described as an embedded congregation of 
scholars (van Duyne 2011).  
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Accordingly, this first chapter attempts to offer a more accurate account of this 
so-called ‘international crime decline’. This is achieved by first removing from 
the discourse its self-appreciating and overgeneralised trimmings before 
providing an alternative view as to why we may be seeing statistical reductions 
in some forms of crime. In doing so, the chapter introduces the idea of a ‘crime 
decline tunnel of vision’ and the concept of ‘technology-mediated criminal 
transference’ in an effort to advance the position that rather than simply 
declining, a co-evolutionary process of technologically driven criminal 
innovation, mutation and obsolescence has changed both the nature and broad 
landscape of crime in ways that our current indicators have been unable to 
adequately capture (Maxfield et al 2007; Farrell et al 2010). Finally, the chapter 
begins to consider the political utility of asserting and perpetuating inaccurate 
claims of internationally declining rates of crime and concomitant liberal 
progressive proclamations of unprecedented peacefulness.  
 
The primary focus of the next substantive chapter is to outline the overarching 
socio-structural and politico-economic context within which this research is 
situated. To this end chapter two provides a thorough overview of the research 
location, charting its industrious rise to prominence and subsequent rapid 
descent into a hollowed out site languishing in a state of permanent recession 
and host to little more than a range of burgeoning criminal markets (Lloyd 2013; 
Hall et al 2008). Moreover, its position as a ‘glocal node’ deeply connected to 
the wider neoliberal global economy is explicated with a view towards weaving 
together more holistically both the micro and macro contexts with which this 
research has concerned itself. Accordingly, this chapter draws attention to the 
pervasive process of neoliberal economic globalisation and the concomitant 
globalisation of the illicit, exploring how such activity manifests itself and often 
culminates in what is referred to in this thesis as deviant glocalization. 
Essentially, having provided a small glimpse of the contemporary global context 
of crime and harm and their glocal manifestations, this chapter paints a more 
accurate picture of our current condition and the reality of life on the precipice. 
More to the point, it offers an analytically generalizable view of an economically 
fallow wasteland within which large numbers of economically redundant 
humans reside and regularly confront a raft of social issues, uncharacteristic of 
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an area purported to be part of a conglomeration of countries experiencing 
declining rates of crime and unparalleled peace (Bauman 2004; van Kesteren et 
al 2014; Pinker 2012). 
 
Treading deeper into terrain uncharted by the data source that supports the 
prematurely triumphant ‘crime decline’ discourse, chapter three briefly explores 
the hidden landscape of global crime before excavating the equally neglected 
hidden landscape of everyday crime. Concerned primarily with the latter, the 
first part of this chapter endeavours to capture and convey the pervasive and 
almost inured mundanity of crime and victimisation in areas such as the one in 
which this research was conducted. Indeed, it illuminates the reality of living in 
areas where a mixture of ‘social’ and ‘asocial’ forms of crime form common 
constituents of everyday life seamlessly woven into the very social fabric itself 
(Hall et al 2008). Within such areas a plethora of unreported, unrecorded and 
unpublicised flows of crime form a persistent undercurrent to many lives marked 
by a constant vigilance to remain faithful to the all-important ‘code of the street’ 
(Anderson 2000). Yet outside the range of the statistical radar, such 
experiences fail to register amongst those trumpeting statements of incautious 
optimism. Conversely, this chapter brings into focus the ‘shocking truth’ of crime 
and victimisation occurring throughout the hidden landscapes conveniently kept 
out of focus (Davies 1997).  
 
The second part of chapter three draws attention to numerous social harms 
excluded from the ‘crime decline’ discourse. Existing outside the orbit of official 
criminalisation these socially injurious events and absences are divorced from 
all consideration, as those who baselessly celebrate a job well-done continue to 
maintain a narrow focus upon ‘conventional crimes’ and ‘ideal victims’ (van Dijk 
and Shaw 2009; Carrabine et al 2009). Accordingly, the chapter utilises a harm 
perspective in order to explore these otherwise ignored social issues. Moreover, 
this chapter introduces the concept of ‘the Anthropocene of harm’ and argues in 
favour of positioning the study of harm as a serious focal concern at the heart of 
the criminological enterprise, whilst cautioning against the advancement of false 
alternatives between zemiology and criminology. In an effort to help facilitate 
the harm perspective’s ability to re-engage criminology’s dialectical energy, the 
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last substantive section of chapter three attempts to provide the concept of 
harm with a firm ontological anchorage grounded in the reality of our times.  
 
Introducing the methodological parameters of the study, chapter four begins by 
intricately delineating the ontological and epistemological considerations that 
have informed the research process. Subsequently, the chapter explores the 
use of a unique methodological framework that innovatively combines the harm 
perspective of the new zemiological movement and the philosophical doctrines 
of critical realism and transcendental materialism. Whilst this particular chapter 
necessarily focuses upon the methodological value of utilising such an intricate 
framework, its broader analytical efficacy is explicated throughout the thesis. 
Further demarcation of the underlying threads informing this research derives 
from a detailed examination of what the researcher refers to as ‘soft positivism’. 
Used to avoid the wholesale rejection of positivist inspired social scientific 
research, the concept encourages the proper utilisation of positivism as an 
initial analytical method of identifying interesting phenomena to be investigated 
more thoroughly by contextually sensitive qualitative research. Indeed, the 
position is advanced that when used in this capacity ‘soft positivism’ offers a 
potential avenue of significant promise.  
 
As is customary for a chapter on research methodology, the rationale behind 
the selection of research design, methods and instruments employed is then 
outlined in detail. Moreover, in addition to conveying the procedural 
manoeuvres undertaken during the data collection phase of this research, other 
pertinent considerations such as data analysis and the steps taken to ensure 
the validity and reliability of the research findings are thoroughly explicated. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, towards the end of the chapter the 
necessary precautions taken to ensure the ethical integrity of the research are 
clarified.   
 
Chapter five presents the research findings from the empirical component of 
this study. The original qualitative data offers an alternative view of crime and 
harm than the one enthusiastically articulated by the ‘crime decline’ discourse 
and its congregation of embedded scholars. Essentially, the chapter provides a 
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glimpse into experiential lived realities of individuals who find themselves in 
uncomfortable proximity to the worst effects of the dominant sociosymbolic 
order’s actualised structures and processes. It is revealed that despite claims of 
statistical reductions in crime, everyday life for many participants continues to 
be characterised by various forms of crime, un-criminalised harms and almost 
perpetual cycles of victimisation. Accordingly, the evidence presented within this 
chapter suggests that there are a number of very convincing reasons not to 
believe the ‘crime decline’ discourse. However as the last section of this chapter 
demonstrates, there are numerous complexities to consider when trying to 
determine why such a demonstrably erroneous assertion has amassed such a 
large and accepting audience. With a view towards developing a new 
theoretical framework capable of addressing this conundrum, the chapter 
begins to lay the empirical foundation upon which the researcher’s theory of the 
dream myth is subsequently built in chapter seven.  
 
The need for developing new theories capable of providing empirically informed, 
theoretically rich and generally more persuasive accounts of the ‘crime decline’, 
and the multifaceted complexities of crime and harm more broadly, is explicated 
in chapter six. Initially, attention is drawn to the constraining presence of the 
dominant and subdominant paradigmatic forces that currently monopolise the 
mainstream criminological canon. In doing so, the chapter briefly highlights the 
current condition of contemporary criminology, noting its affinity towards 
aetiological entropy and the marginalisation of intellectual curiosity (Hall and 
Winlow 2012). The focus of the chapter then moves towards transcending these 
constraining influences by exploring the use of alternative positions capable of 
facilitating a more accurate and holistic examination of crime, its purported 
decline and social harms which remain otherwise opaque to the mainstream 
criminological canon. This is achieved by drawing upon the philosophical 
traditions of critical realism and transcendental materialism as well as the theory 
of the pseudo-pacification process. Together these positions help to explicate 
the creation and perpetuation of criminogenic subjectivities and clearly illustrate 
why liberal progressive assertions of a more peaceful society experiencing 
declining rates of crime is untenable. In short, they provide insights capable of 
furnishing us with a greater understanding of the current condition of our 
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sociosymbolic and politico-economic terrain, revealing how it is anything but 
conducive to an ‘international crime decline’ and unprecedented peacefulness.  
 
Having already laid its empirical foundations, chapter seven sets out in detail 
the researcher’s theory of the dream myth and begins to apply this new 
theoretical lens to the analysis of the alleged ‘crime decline’. This 
developmental formulation explores and explains how, why and to what extent 
individuals have come to act as if they believe in such a demonstrably 
erroneous assertion. Accordingly, by drawing upon a range of perspectives, 
including contemporary psychophysiological dream science and the study of 
political myths, the theory of the dream myth offers insights into how the 
discourse of the ‘crime decline’ has been sustained and to what end. 
Essentially, by applying the theory of the dream myth, this last substantive 
chapter explicates the persistent longevity of inaccurate liberal progressive 
assertions in general and the ‘crime decline’ in particular. Crucially, before the 
chapter draws to a close it offers a potential avenue through which we may 
begin to move forward. The position being advanced within these closing stages 
is that before ambitious socio-structural and political-cultural transformations 
can be accomplished, we must first take a good look at the world as it really is 
and participate in a gesture of refusal to enjoy the comforting myths we have 
constructed. 
 
By way of recapitulating the main arguments articulated throughout the various 
chapters, the conclusion provides a summary of the thesis. Moreover, and 
perhaps most importantly, it reaffirms the importance of taking a good look at 
the worst without descending into despair (Becker 1975; Jeffery 2011). 
Fundamentally, its final objective is to promote a move from a state of denial to 
one of acceptance by helping to mobilise a willingness to confront the reality of 
our times. Subsequently it is hoped that in time this might aid the stimulation of 
genuine emancipatory enthusiasm and human flourishing (Wood 2012; Žižek 
2011). 
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Chapter One – Literature Review: 
 
Constructing the Statistical Quilt for the Comfortable 
Dream: Exploring the ‘International Crime Decline’. 
 
In the years following the Second World War, statistical crime trends in the 
overwhelming majority of Western nations followed a seemingly relentless and 
unyielding upward trajectory that lasted almost four decades, from 
approximately 1955-1960 to around the mid-1990s (van Dijk et al 2012). The 
effects of this post-war crime boom were so pervasive (Sacco 2005) that crime 
rates, particularly on both sides of the Atlantic, continued to escalate during the 
most affluent post-war periods (Young 1986), presenting an empirical anomaly 
which Young (1988a:159) referred to as “the aetiological crisis”. Evidently, 
despite the attempted wholesale improvement of social conditions (Young 
1988a), any sign of some imminent reprieve or amelioration was nowhere to be 
seen as “the processes that had driven crime up during the 1960s and 1970s all 
continued” (Reiner 2007:95). This continuation resulted in a veritable ‘crime 
explosion’ during the 1980s that reached its peak in the early to mid-1990s 
(Reiner 2007; van Dijk and Tseloni 2012). Whilst all available indicators pointed 
towards the perpetuation of this upward trend, contrary to all expectations crime 
rates in a number of predominantly Western countries appear to have declined 
during the past two decades (Knepper 2012), a perplexing conundrum which 
Young (2011:111) refers to as “the second aetiological crisis”.  
 
Such an unprecedented reversal has unsurprisingly generated significant 
scholarly interest and spawned a voluminous literature which has sought to 
explore and explain the aetiological complexities surrounding this purported 
‘international crime decline’ (van Dijk 2008; van Dijk et al 2012; Farrell et al 
2010, 2011; Tseloni et al 2010). However, whilst there appears to be some 
agreement that crime rates began to fall first in the USA and then in Europe 
from around the early to mid-1990s (Knepper 2012; Farrell et al 2011; 
Rosenfeld and Messner 2009; Baumer 2010), there is little consensus amongst 
scholars regarding the precise causal factors thought to have stimulated and 
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maintained the international decline in crime rates (Tseloni et al 2010; Barker 
2010). Indeed, despite the urgency with which plausible explanations have been 
sought, predominant causal hypotheses informed largely by research primarily 
focused upon the USA (Tseloni et al 2010; Rosenfeld and Messner 2009), 
remain rather unconvincing and have been found generally wanting (Farrell et al 
2010). Amongst the most lauded hypotheses are those purporting that crime 
was driven down by strategic developments in policing, more punitive 
sentencing practices and mass incarceration, socio-demographic change, rising 
civility and self-control, the legalisation of abortion, the stabilisation of drug 
markets and the introduction of unleaded petrol (Baumer 2010; Farrell 2013).  
 
It must be acknowledged that the aforementioned hypotheses are partial at best 
and by and large appear to lack any degree of external validity, rendering them 
inadequate as valid cross-continental explanations of declining crime trends 
(Farrell et al 2010; Tseloni et al 2012; van Dijk 2010). However it is important 
not to underestimate the significance of a growing convergence between nation 
states’ criminal justice and penal policies, exemplified by the adoption in a 
number of industrial countries of what have been described as ‘US-style’ zero 
tolerance policing strategies, as well as harsher sentencing policies which are 
undoubtedly becoming “increasingly ‘global’ in character” (Jones and Newburn 
2004:123). Nevertheless, there remains within the crime decline literature a 
paucity of adequate explanations capable of withstanding rigorous analysis 
whilst proving flexibly nuanced enough to account for subtle cross-national 
trend variations (Farrell et al 2010, 2011). Such an absence undoubtedly 
reflects the theoretical poverty of the discipline, or perhaps more accurately 
what Farrell et al (2010:24) aptly describe as both “a failing of criminological 
theory and empirical study”.  
 
Contributing in no small part to this failing is the fact that many of the causal 
hypotheses listed above have been informed by data gleaned from official 
national crime statistics and/or national victimisation surveys (Barker 2010; 
Rosenfeld and Messner 2009). Rather than promote a broader contextual view 
such data sources unhelpfully encourage methodological nationalism, as they 
frame the choice of issues to be studied and the means by which they should 
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be investigated within a scholarly scope that remains focused upon national 
contexts (Aebi and Linde 2010; Knepper 2012). Indeed it has been well 
documented that both official national crime statistics, particularly those collated 
by the police, and national victimisation surveys are replete with inherent 
practical and methodological limitations that render them unsuitable for cross-
national comparative research (Westfelt and Estrada 2005; Mayhew 2008; 
Lewis 2012; van Dijk et al 2007). For instance, with regards to official criminal 
statistics, it is widely acknowledged that the general characteristics of the 
judicial process adopted by individual countries and the legal offence definitions 
employed often vary considerably, as do the ways in which different world 
regions mobilise their statistical counting rules (Aebi 2011; Mugellini 2008; 
MacDonald 2002). These rules not only determine what is and is not counted 
but also how and at what stage they are counted (von Hofer 2000), all of which 
evidently make cross-national comparisons using official criminal statistics 
fraught with significant pit-falls.  
 
Similarly, national victimisation surveys fare little better as suitable sources of 
comparative data. Not only are they conducted in a limited number of countries, 
making their data less prevalent than that provided by official criminal statistics, 
but they also tend to undercount certain types of offences, such as those of a 
sexual or domestic nature (Mayhew 2008). Compounding matters further they 
often exclude homeless, institutionalised and socio-economically disadvantaged 
people, inevitably resulting in severe underestimations regarding the overall 
level of crime (Lynch 2006; Currie 2009). Moreover, the comparability of 
national victimisation surveys is seriously compromised by distinct differences 
regarding methodology and other design features, which are compounded 
further by various political and financial constraints involved in their individual 
fielding (van Dijk et al 2007; Lynch 2006). Since neither official national crime 
statistics nor national victimisation surveys are adequate for cross-national 
comparative research, it is argued that “international comparisons of crime 
levels should as a rule be confined to findings of international victim surveys” 
(von Hofer 2000:77). 
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The International Crime Victims Survey:   
Indeed it was these acknowledged inadequacies, coupled with the expressed 
need for better standardised measurements of crime and victimisation, that 
prompted a number of European criminologists familiar with the methodological 
intricacies of crime surveys to develop a purportedly ‘fully standardised’ criminal 
victimisation survey (Mayhew and van Dijk 1997; van Dijk et al 2007; van Dijk 
2007a). Beginning development in 1987 following a Council of Europe meeting 
on crime prevention and the subsequent formation of a Working Group, the first 
International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS) was conducted in 1989, in fourteen 
countries drawn predominantly from Western Europe and North America (van 
Dijk et al 1991; van Kesteren et al 2014; van Dijk and Mayhew 1992; van Dijk 
2007a).  
 
Essentially modelled after the Dutch, British and Swiss national surveys, the 
ICVS adopts many of their standard features (van Kesteren et al 2014). For 
instance, its main focus is to use a ‘standardised’ questionnaire to interview a 
sample of around 2,000 householders. This is achieved by randomly selecting 
one respondent aged sixteen or over from each household and asking those to 
respond to questions regarding their recent experiences of eleven types of 
conventional crime using the Computer Assisted Telephone Interview (CATI) 
technique (van Dijk 2011). In countries where this method is unsuitable due to 
insufficient national telephone penetration, face-to-face interviews are 
conducted with samples of between 1,000-1,500 respondents in the main cities 
(Mayhew and van Dijk 2012; van Dijk 2011). After being asked a series of 
screener questions using a five-year recall period, the respondent is asked to 
focus on the past twelve months and reply on behalf of the household regarding 
experiences of household property crimes (van Kesteren et al 2014). The 
respondent is then asked about personal crimes which the individual may have 
experienced, thereby providing an ‘overall’ measure of victimisation relating to 
the previous year (Mayhew and van Dijk 2012; van Dijk 2011; van Dijk 2007a).  
  
Since its first fielding in 1989 the ICVS has, with some adjustments, 
subsequently been conducted in 1992 (van Dijk and Mayhew 1992), 1996 
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(Mayhew and van Dijk 1997), 2000 (van Kesteren et al 2000), 2004-05 (van Dijk 
et al 2007), and 2010 (van Dijk and Tseloni 2012). During this time it has 
purportedly conducted interviews with over 300,000 people in approximately 78 
countries over a period of more than twenty years (van Dijk et al 2007; van Dijk 
2008; van Dijk and Tseloni 2012). It must therefore be acknowledged that both 
the range and coverage of the ICVS is considerable (see appendix 1 and 2 of 
this document). Thus it is considered by some to be “without a doubt the most 
advanced survey instrument for measuring the extent, nature, and responses to 
conventional crime across different societies” (van Dijk and Shaw 2009:261). 
Consequently it has now become a standard source of cross-national 
information regarding trends in crime and victimisation (Barkan 2012). It is 
perhaps for this reason that it has formed the methodological linchpin of 
numerous contemporary studies that have sought to explore declining rates of 
crime with a broader scope than that associated with earlier ‘crime decline’ 
research (Mayhew and van Dijk 2012).  
 
Whilst there has been important work done by those who draw more heavily 
upon other data sources (Aebi and Linde 2010, 2012a, 2012b; Westfelt and 
Estrada 2005), the vast majority of studies which comprise the international 
crime decline literature have used the ICVS to varying degrees. What is more, 
these studies have by and large been authored by an embedded congregation 
of scholars (van Duyne 2011) who now constitute the dominant voices in the 
‘international crime decline’ discourse. It is this collection of voices that has 
emphatically claimed the existence of a “universal drop in crime” (van Kesteren 
et al 2014:65), or a “near universal drop in volume crime” (van Dijk et al 
2007:16) as it is sometimes a little more accurately described. The evidence in 
support of such a claim is purportedly to be found in the fact that most countries 
in the developed world for which there is available trend data, of which there are 
said to be fifteen, have shown distinct downward trends in the level of criminal 
victimisation since 1995 or 2000 (van Dijk et al 2007; van Dijk 2007a). More 
specifically, some ICVS informed studies suggest that based upon available 
trend data from North America, Australia and nine European countries, 
victimisation by what is termed common crime has markedly declined, a trend 
mirrored it would seem, by two main cities in South Africa and Argentina (van 
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Dijk 2008; van Dijk and Tseloni 2012). The curvilinear trends in volume crime 
appear strikingly uniform among nearly all developed countries which show a 
curved trend since the mid-1980s, with peaks between 1995 and 2000 and 
declines thereafter of up to 50% or more (van Dijk 2008). In light of such 
uniformity it is thought that “a similar set of factors has been pushing up crime 
till 1995-2000 and pulling it down afterwards across the Western world” (van 
Dijk 2007a:129), with possibly similar factors at play within the surveyed South 
African and Argentinian cities (van Dijk 2008).  
 
However, before such factors may be examined it must be acknowledged that 
whilst similar patterns are observable in relation to these international declines, 
it seems that not all offence types declined at the same time (van Dijk and 
Tseloni 2012). Indeed Tseloni et al (2010) have concluded, based upon an 
analysis of five main crime types from information gathered in 26 countries that 
participated in at least three sweeps of the ICVS, that burglary and car theft 
appear to have declined first towards the end of the 1980s. This was followed 
by dramatic international declines in theft from a car and theft from the person 
since 1995, whereas the decline in assaults only began towards the end of the 
1990s. Although the downward trend of each crime type analysed by Tseloni et 
al (2010) are shown to be approximately the same across countries from the 
1990s, reductions in property crimes relating to vehicles and burglary appear to 
be the most pronounced (van Dijk et al 2007; van Kesteren et al 2014). This is 
thought to indicate that the set of factors suspected to have initiated the crime 
decline impacted first upon burglary and car theft (Tseloni et al 2010).  
 
Given the apparent uniformity with which analysed international crime trends 
have declined, causal explanations must be framed within an international 
perspective (van Dijk 2007a). Consequently, the position has been advanced 
that idiosyncratic or country-specific explanations, which characterise many of 
the most popular crime decline hypotheses reviewed by Farrell et al (2010) and 
others, should give way to more universally applicable explanations (van Dijk 
and Tseloni 2012). One such explanation which has garnered considerable 
support throughout much of the international crime decline literature is what has 
been termed the ‘security hypothesis’. This postulation purports that “changes in 
Justin Kotzé  PhD Thesis 
21 
 
the quantity and quality of security have played a major part in driving crime 
falls in most industrial societies” (Farrell et al 2011:151) by limiting the 
opportunities for the commission of certain forms of crime. Lending some 
credence to this position, ICVS trend data has revealed over the past few 
decades a widespread growth in responsive securitisation, a term used to 
denote the increased willingness of individuals, businesses, manufacturers and 
governments to invest in both the procurement and use of security measures 
capable of providing property protection (van Dijk 2008; van Kesteren and van 
Dijk 2010; van Dijk 2010). This process purportedly reduces the pool of criminal 
opportunities and eventually discourages new offenders from entering the 
criminal market (van Kesteren et al 2014).  
 
Accordingly, it has been suggested that increased levels of improved security 
may have been “the determining force behind downward trends in volume 
crime” (van Dijk 2006:18), particularly burglary and vehicle-related crime (van 
Dijk et al 2007). As these are considered to be ‘debut crimes’ and ‘key-stone’ 
crimes, in that they encourage and facilitate involvement in other forms of crime 
(Farrell et al 2011), it is thought that:  
The international drops in all types of crime, then, might have been 
triggered by early improvements in car and household security, 
resulting in drops in car theft and burglary with subsequent knock-on 
effects for other, more serious types of crime. (van Kesteren et al 
2014:56-57)  
Whilst such arguments and associated claims of a universal drop in crime are 
undoubtedly compelling, closer scrutiny of the foundations upon which they are 
based is warranted as there are numerous areas of contention worth 
investigating.  
 
Practical Limitations and Methodological Issues of the ICVS: 
Although the ICVS shares many of the same limitations familiar to all 
victimisation surveys (Coleman and Moynihan 1996; Jones 2009), the potency 
of such drawbacks and the effects they may have upon the results obtained or 
conclusions drawn is undoubtedly compounded by its international and 
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comparative dimensions (Lynch 2006; Mayhew and van Dijk 2012; Walklate 
2007). In particular, due to fiscal constraints the ICVS relies upon small sample 
sizes of between 1,000-2,000 respondents aged sixteen and over. This 
inevitably “produces country-level crime estimates with significantly greater 
margins of error than those of surveys with much larger samples” (Tseloni et al 
2010:378). Such restricted sampling limits its comparative capabilities to certain 
types of crime and precludes any investigation of victimisation experienced by 
those below the set age limit, thereby severely hampering its investigatory 
scope (van Kesteren et al 2000; Lynch 2006; Zvekic 1996). Moreover, in 
addition to estimates of relatively rare criminal events being made unreliable by 
such small samples, cross-national comparisons, particularly between 
developing and developed countries, are highly problematic. This is due to the 
fact that samples from developing nations are drawn from a single city whereas 
samples from developed countries are by and large nationally representative 
(Lynch and Pridemore 2011; Neapolitan 1997).  
 
Similarly, the ICVS often yields relatively low response rates, with some 
countries in particular returning alarmingly low rates (van Dijk et al 2007; Travis 
et al 1995). This severely limits the confidence we can have in the accuracy of 
the findings for “a low response rate could induce a downward bias in crime 
rates if it resulted in further underrepresentation of hard-to-reach populations 
who experience more crime” (Tseloni et al 2010:377). This is a scenario which 
seems highly possible for two main reasons. Firstly, the ICVS has an 
acknowledged tendency to exclude certain population groups who may be more 
vulnerable to victimisation, because they are residentially unstable and difficult 
to locate (Winslow and Zhang 2008; van Dijk et al 2007). Secondly, not much is 
known about the contexts of non-respondents (Walklate 2008). 
 
However, the issue of low response rates cannot be divorced from the inherent 
limitations associated with the CATI technique and Random Digit Dialling (RDD) 
sample design employed by the ICVS, which tend to omit large sections of the 
population who are most likely to be victimised (Neapolitan 1997; DeKeseredy 
forthcoming 2016). Coupled with this there is growing evidence to suggest that 
interview fatigue has begun to set in as a result of what Maxfield et al 
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(2007:304) term “survey saturation”, whereby the increased demand for 
respondents by market researchers and public surveyors has made people less 
compliant and more apathetic towards the demands of survey participation. 
Furthermore, with the rate at which fixed landline-only households are declining 
in conjunction with an ever growing proportion of households that only utilise 
mobile phones, “RDD surveys cannot rely any longer solely on landline 
samples, as this would fatally underrepresent the groups most at risk of crime” 
(Maxfield et al 2007:305).  
 
One must also consider the logistical challenges and inevitable inconsistencies 
involved in recruiting, training and closely monitoring interviewers so as to limit 
the extent to which the subjective qualities of these ‘hired hands’ impact upon 
the responses given (Zvekic 1996; Roth 2004). Compounding matters further is 
the fact that telephone interviews do not facilitate lengthy and in-depth 
investigations for they are by necessity brief and artificial (Mayhew 2008; Fattah 
1997). Additionally, pertinent concerns have been raised regarding the extent to 
which recruited participants are willing to divulge their experiences of 
victimisation over the phone (Pakes 2010). Whilst such concerns are often 
downplayed by those within the ICVS fold (Pakes 2010), external commentators 
such as Young (2003:36) have lamented the “maverick results” produced by its 
methodological naivety in expecting individuals to inform strangers about 
serious and sensitive victimisation experiences over the phone. It is however 
perhaps worth mentioning that in an effort to overcome some of the 
aforementioned CATI limitations, a series of pilot studies testing the viability of 
using Computer-Assisted Web Interviewing (CAWI) were undertaken in 2010, 
with disappointing results (van Dijk 2012).  
 
It is highly likely that the types of victimisation underreported in surveys like the 
ICVS are the same as those underreported in official criminal statistics and for 
many of the same reasons (Fattah 1997; Neapolitan 1997; DeKeseredy 
forthcoming 2016). For instance, many individuals who experience criminal 
victimisation are involved in crime themselves and are therefore reluctant to 
approach the authorities or participate in surveys (Currie 2009). Similarly, 
victims of sexual offences who do not report such occurrences to the police “are 
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also unlikely to report to a stranger administering a survey” (van Dijk and Shaw 
2009:263). The failure of the ICVS to adequately capture experiences of 
victimisation by sexual offences is blatant, unsurprising and particularly well 
documented (van Kesteren et al 2000; Travis et al 1995; Westfelt and Estrada 
2005). Aside from the problematic wording of the ICVS questions relating to 
sexual offences (Travis et al 1995) and the obvious reluctance participants may 
feel in answering questions of such a sensitive nature over the phone, the issue 
largely centres around the fact that the ICVS is event-oriented in that it 
conceptualises crimes as discrete and measurable incidents (Genn 1988).  
 
Fundamentally, this itemised counting frame of reference isolates identified 
incidents of victimisation from the respondent’s broad continuum of lifetime 
experiences, and therefore underestimates all that is involved in the process of 
victimisation (Goodey 2000). Moreover, it fails to acknowledge that experiences 
of sexual assault, violence, abuse and many other forms of crime may form a 
‘normal’ part of a respondent’s day-to-day life and cannot therefore be easily 
identified and counted as an incident with a distinct beginning and end (Genn 
1988; Spalek 2006). Simply put, survey methodologies are incapable of 
capturing the intricacies of what are often prolonged and habitual processes of 
victimisation (Walklate 2008; Genn 1988).  Additionally, it is worth noting that 
cultural differences in definitions and meanings of what constitute sexual 
offences vary among respondents both within and across nations, and cannot 
necessarily be overcome by carefully wording or correctly translating the survey 
questions (Neapolitan 1997; Naudé 2009; Pakes 2010).    
 
Whilst difficulties relating to successfully transcending differential cultural 
meanings and adequately translating offence definitions are particularly acute 
for sexual offences, they are by no means confined to them. Indeed, despite 
claims that the ICVS uses “universally common definitions of main types of 
crime” (van Dijk 2008:41), there is evidence to suggest not only that no such 
universally common definitions exist but that the ICVS has struggled to 
overcome the methodological hurdles associated with “the problem of the 
cultural relativity of victimisation” (Fattah 2010:51). For instance, the ICVS 
questionnaire, which is said to have been translated by country co-ordinators 
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into more than thirty different languages, has proven incapable of faultlessly 
crossing linguistic barriers, for terms such as ‘bribery’, ‘stranger’ and ‘robbery’, 
among others, are shown to be particularly difficult to translate (Mayhew and 
van Dijk 2012). Interestingly, despite claims that ICVS data provides supporting 
evidence for the view that “victims across the world assess the relative 
seriousness of different types of crime very similarly” (van Kesteren et al 
2014:65), and therefore share similar understandings of common types of 
criminality (van Kesteren et al 2014; van Dijk and van Kesteren 1996), the term 
‘seriousness’ was found to be among those which proved difficult to translate 
(Mayhew and van Dijk 2012).  
 
Accordingly the ICVS appears to show little appreciation of cross-national 
meanings and subjective interpretations of criminal victimisation, for in its drive 
to secure linguistic conversion it assumes that the same terms carry the same 
meanings in different languages, cultures and settings (Travis et al 1995; 
Crawford 2011). It is seemingly blind to the fact that not only may one term 
carry a myriad of very different meanings but that in certain contexts direct 
translation may be an unobtainable chimera (Crawford 2011). Moreover, where 
cultural customs preclude individuals from being recognised as victims either by 
themselves or by others having endured certain experiences, the relativity of 
victimisation takes on a new salience (Naudé 2009; Pakes 2010; Strobl 2004). 
The consequences of such oversights are by no means benign since the 
accuracy of any cross-national findings depends greatly upon the adequacy of 
the questions posed and the reliability of the translations to which they are 
subjected (Kury 2002). When such concerns are written out of consideration for 
cross-national empirical research the results obtained are likely to be shallow 
and misleading, with greater chance of revealing cultural variations in definition 
than in the incidence of crime (Travis et al 1995; Carrabine et al 2009).  
 
Another salient concern is raised by the fact that the sample of countries 
involved in the ICVS has varied considerably from one sweep to the next, with 
only three countries having participated in all six sweeps, which essentially 
renders the results from the ICVS relatively unsuitable as a source from which 
to compare trends over time (Tseloni et al 2010; van Dijk and Tseloni 2012; 
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Westfelt and Estrada 2005). However, the issue which perhaps casts one of the 
biggest shadows of doubt over the ICVS and concomitant claims of a ‘universal 
drop in crime’ is the fact that available trend data, which is what is needed in 
order to substantiate such claims, is confined to fifteen Western developed 
countries that participated in at least four different sweeps of the ICVS (van Dijk 
et al 2007; van Kesteren and van Dijk 2010). Such Occidentalism is not 
ameliorated by the analysis conducted by Tseloni et al (2010), for it was 
acknowledged that the countries that met the criteria for inclusion significantly 
over-represented North America and Northern Europe. Their analysis provides 
trend data on five types of crime for 26 countries, deemed to have met the 
criteria for inclusion if they participated in at least three rounds of the ICVS, of 
which one had to be the 2000 sweep (Tseloni et al 2010). 
 
This overrepresentation is illustrated in appendix 3, where the researcher has 
plotted the 26 countries for which there is available trend data on a world map, 
showing the number of countries to have participated in three to six sweeps. It 
should be noted that slight augmentations were made to the number of sweeps 
that certain countries have participated in, based upon recent data provided by 
van Dijk and Tseloni (2010) from the sixth round of the ICVS. This delineation 
makes it strikingly clear that claims of a “universal drop in crime” (van Kesteren 
et al 2014:65), or indeed even a “near universal drop in volume crime” (van Dijk 
et al 2007:16), should be significantly revised in light of the fact that 26 
countries do not constitute a global perspective much less a ‘universal’ one. 
Essentially, and at its most basic, the ICVS presents a picture of the ‘universal’ 
that excludes the global. To further illustrate the point it is worth noting that out 
of the 54 countries on the African continent only ten have participated in the 
ICVS (van Dijk 2008), or thirteen depending on who you read (Naudé et al 
2006; Naudé 2009). What is more, despite a great deal of crime occurring in 
rural areas (Parenti 2011), all were surveyed only at the main city level (van Dijk 
2008; Alvazzi del Frate 2009). This not only leads to misrepresentations of the 
distribution of crime within a particular country but, as has already been 
articulated, makes cross-national comparisons difficult if not altogether 
impossible (Lynch and Pridemore 2011).  
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Consequently, based upon the forgoing criticisms and the evidence presented 
thus far, two important conclusions may be drawn. Firstly, it can be successfully 
argued that the ICVS has a general tendency to undercount the extent of crime 
within participating countries (van Dijk et al 1991; van Kesteren et al 2000; 
Mugellini 2008). Secondly, due to the limitations of its geographical reach, it 
severely underestimates the extent and magnitude of the world’s “true crime 
story” (Zvekic 1996:15) and thus cannot substantiate claims of a ‘universal’ drop 
in crime. Moreover, and contributing in no small part to its inability to sketch 
even a rough outline of the global crime picture, the lens through which the 
ICVS views the ‘crime problem’ is regrettably both narrow and one-dimensional. 
That is to say it disproportionately focuses upon the measurement of 
‘conventional’ crimes at the expense of any meaningful investigation of ‘non-
conventional’ crimes (van Dijk and Shaw 2009) and non-ideal victims 
(Carrabine et al 2009). Thus “many offences, which produce a tremendous 
amount of social harm, therefore are usually not identified” (Pakes 2012:70).  
 
Such salient limitations are perhaps in part the result of what has been termed 
the ICVS’s “drive for standardisation” (Walklate 2008:211). Essentially, whilst 
the ICVS has undoubtedly failed in its endeavour to achieve a state of full 
standardisation (Mayhew and van Dijk 2012; van Dijk et al 2007; van Dijk 
2007a), its incessant desire to secure its attainment has rendered much of the 
crime problem’s multifaceted complexities invisible to its view (Walklate 2008, 
2007; Heidensohn 2008). Contributing to such myopia is its positivistic 
underpinnings and deep-rooted Occidentalism which frame what can be asked 
and how, as well as what conclusions can be drawn from the data obtained 
(Walklate 2008). 
 
Indeed, the ICVS’s static and non-dynamic definition of victimisation and its 
equally static ‘measurements’ of crime have made it incapable of capturing 
global crimes, such as the plethora subsumed within the broad edifice of 
organised crime (van Dijk 2007a). Nor does it appear capable of capturing new 
forms of crime such as those aided by the rapid expansion of technological 
facilitators like the internet (Kirchhoff 2010; van Dijk 2007a), much less the 
rapidity and fluidity of today’s mutating forms of crime and emerging criminal 
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markets (Hall 2012b; Reiner 2007). Consequently, the ICVS is marred by a 
fundamental failure to engage critically with that which cannot be easily 
measured. Not only does it omit from its investigatory remit any thorough 
investigation of non-conventional crimes and the complexities surrounding 
mutating forms of crime, emerging criminal markets, shifting motivational drives 
and evolving manoeuvres, but it overtly ignores numerous hidden and non-
criminalised social harms which often do considerable damage to individuals 
(Pakes 2012; Pantazis and Pemberton 2012).  
 
Accordingly, as with most methods of ‘counting crime’, a healthy scepticism 
regarding the adequacy and accuracy of the ICVS and its findings is both 
advisable and warranted (Mosher et al 2002). Whilst the ICVS and its findings 
are widely used by the most dominant voices in the ‘international crime decline’ 
discourse, the media and by what Heidensohn (2008:210) calls “comparative 
bureaucrats”, such scepticism is perhaps beginning to take root within some 
sections of the criminological community who often greet the findings of the 
ICVS with “dismay and a general gnashing of teeth” (Young 2003:36). For 
instance, some commentators have criticised the ICVS for its methodological 
naivety and “positivistic oversimplification” (Heidensohn 2008:210) which has 
persistently led to the production of various “embarrassing findings” (Young 
2004:20) and bizarre results, defying “any attempt at interpretation or 
explanation” (Reiner 2007:105). These shortcomings have earned the survey 
the dubious honour of being labelled “one of the crudest examples of 
criminological empiricism” (Matthews 2010:132).  
 
When pared back and viewed with a more critical eye capable of sifting through 
the debris of self-appraisal, selective critique and unintelligible assertions, it 
becomes clear that many of the claims based upon information gleaned from 
the ICVS are not adequately supported by the data, thereby consigning much of 
what the ICVS has produced to the realm of “so what? criminology” (Matthews 
2010:125; DeKeseredy forthcoming 2016). We should therefore exercise 
considerable caution when drawing conclusions regarding the ‘international 
crime decline’ (Nikolić-Ristanović 2012) based upon ICVS data. Indeed, it has 
been shown to have been complicit in painting a misleading picture of ‘global’ 
Justin Kotzé  PhD Thesis 
29 
 
crime trends by falling foul of the tendency to overgeneralise observed 
reductions in some property crime trends in some Western countries to other 
offences and other regions of the world (Aebi and Linde 2012b). Undeniably, 
the favoured ICVS inspired axiom, ‘declining property crime trends in North 
American and Northern European countries means ‘universally’ declining trends 
in all volume crime everywhere’, seems to have attained a level of common 
acceptance only via what Aebi and Linde (2012b:134, original emphasis) refer 
to as “proof by assertion”.  
 
However, whilst there are those who more reservedly refer to these purported 
reductions in international crime trends as a “cross-Atlantic phenomenon” 
(Knepper 2012:363), it appears evident that even this more cautious assertion 
requires refined qualification. There are numerous examples of crimes within 
even some of the relatively well surveyed countries of North America and 
Europe that show no sign of declining but rather, in some instances, show 
discernible increases that fly in the face of claims of a ‘universal’ drop in crime 
(Aebi and Linde 2010, 2012a, 2012b; Killias 2010). For instance, in Canada 
incidents of self-reported victimisation by personal property theft and violent 
crime are said to have increased since 1999 (Moulton 2013). Similarly, Italy has 
been shown by Arcidiacono and Selmini (2010) to have experienced almost 
uninterrupted increases in property crimes from the 1970s and throughout the 
1990s, with a second peak in ‘total crime’ higher than that registered in 1991 
recorded in 2007.  
 
Moreover, Killias (2010) notes that when countries are grouped together into 
categories demarcating those with either increasing or decreasing trends based 
upon ICVS data from 1989-2005, there are as many countries with increasing 
trends in robbery as there are with either decreasing or stable trends. Killias 
(2010) also highlights that where rates of assault are concerned countries with 
increasing rates represent the clear majority. Finding its way into the category of 
countries with increasing trends on both accounts it is of interest to note that 
Belgium has been identified by van Dijk and Tseloni (2012:16) as being “the 
only European country where levels of crime have not shown a decrease up to 
2004-2005”. The same work by van Dijk and Tseloni (2012) also reveals that, 
Justin Kotzé  PhD Thesis 
30 
 
based upon data from the sixth round of the ICVS, Denmark, the Netherlands 
and Sweden were found to have experienced an increase in threats and 
assaults between 2005 and 2010. Van Dijk et al (2007) have also 
acknowledged that trends in personal theft have increased in England and 
Wales, Northern Ireland and Norway, whilst van Dijk (2008) has noted that 
overall victimisation rates have increased markedly in both Ireland and Northern 
Ireland.  
 
Additionally, trends in burglary, threats and assault increased in Switzerland 
between 2005 and 2010 (van Dijk 2012), whereas violent crime in general, 
according to police, victimisation and insurance data, is said to have increased 
almost constantly over the last two decades (Killias and Lanfranconi 2012). 
These movements, along with other findings, lead Killias and Lanfranconi 
(2012:276) to conclude that there is strong evidence to support “those who 
doubt that the crime drop was a universal, uniform and ‘inevitable’ 
development”. Sharing this sentiment Aebi and Linde (2012a:70, original 
emphasis) have argued that “one cannot talk of a general crime drop in Europe” 
for they find no evidence to suggest that crime in Western Europe has followed 
a homogeneous trend. Indeed, the authors confirm that rape, assault and drug 
offences have increased constantly from the mid-1990s to 2007 according to 
official statistics, with such findings garnering support from evidence provided 
by police statistics and victimisation surveys (Aebi and Linde 2010). 
Consequently, based upon data gleaned from both police statistics and 
victimisation surveys (Aebi and Linde 2010:272) as well as from conviction 
statistics (Aebi and Linde 2012b:140, original emphasis) it has been concluded 
that “there is no general crime drop in Europe”.  
 
These countervailing findings should be viewed alongside the fact that violent 
crime is increasing in many developing countries, particularly in some parts of 
Africa and Latin America (van Dijk 2008). Additionally, there appears to be no 
indication of declines, similar to those of some forms of common crime 
experienced in certain Western countries, for non-conventional crimes such as 
organised crime and corruption (van Dijk 2007b). All this of course is not to 
suggest that these alternative trends or the sources from which they derive 
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more reliably reveal or capture the true state of crime and harm, but merely to 
demonstrate that there are often insurmountable variations in purported crime 
trends. Such variations not only belie any notion of ‘universal’ declinations in 
crime, but perhaps indicate that there may be more than one side to the 
‘international crime decline’ story.  
 
Reframing the ‘International Crime Decline’ Discourse: 
Having critically reviewed the many limitations of the ICVS, as well as the 
misleading image of a ‘universal’ or ‘near universal’ decline in volume crime 
painted by some of its most ardent proponents, what can honestly be said about 
the phenomenon of declining rates of crime? Fundamentally, when pared back 
and stripped of its self-appreciating and overgeneralised trimmings, the ICVS 
and its proponents do in fact provide part of the answer to what lies at the heart 
of the ‘international crime decline’ discourse. Indeed, and as the discussion 
above has no doubt intimated, when viewed with a more critical eye it appears 
that much of the discourse is built upon the fact that the ICVS has identified a 
number of predominantly Western developed countries that have experienced 
reductions in certain volume crimes, of which the most pronounced appear to 
be vehicle-related crimes and burglary (van Dijk et al 2007; van Kesteren et al 
2014).  
 
As previously mentioned these far from ‘universal’ declinations are said to have 
been driven by the widespread growth in responsive securitisation. Purportedly 
this has not only facilitated the ‘hardening of suitable targets’, but has by 
extension diminished the pool of potential offenders by blocking access to the 
‘debut’ and ‘key-stone’ crimes that would have otherwise launched their criminal 
careers, thereby stimulating reductions in other forms of crime (van Dijk 2008; 
van Kesteren et al 2014; Farrell et al 2011). However, whilst the plausibility of 
this security based hypothesis should not be underestimated, close scrutiny of 
its purported uniformity and adequacy as a suitably holistic explanation is 
warranted.  
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The notion of responsive securitisation has been built upon ICVS data, 
predominantly gathered by asking respondents questions regarding their 
ownership of common household security measures (Mayhew and van Dijk 
2012), which purportedly points to “a universal growth in the possession and 
use of security measures over the past few decades” (van Kesteren and van 
Dijk 2010:155). First and foremost it should be acknowledged that the very 
basis upon which this notion is predicated is highly questionable, in light of the 
fact that the ICVS question designed to solicit information relating to the 
ownership and use of common household security measures has proven 
problematic (Mayhew and van Dijk 2012). Indeed, it has been admitted that 
some respondents may purposely exaggerate about the amount and 
sophistication of security measures they possess since: 
Being asked [over the phone] by unknown interviewers whether you 
have high-quality locks, a burglar alarm, or the number of hours (and 
even which hours) the house is left empty provokes a wary response 
from many respondents. (Mayhew 2008:252) 
 
Moreover, the purported universality and uniformity of such responsive 
securitisation is, to put it politely, misleading for it has been well documented 
that there are numerous socio-economic differentials in the ability of individuals 
to access crime-reducing security measures (Tilley et al 2011; Hope 2007; van 
Kesteren and van Dijk 2010). For instance, it has been found that although the 
protection benefits offered by increased levels of enhanced security are 
undoubtedly greater for those who can least afford its procurement (Tilley et al 
2011), greater take-up of available security measures has been registered 
amongst the more affluent members of society, particularly those in developed 
countries (Hope 2007; van Kesteren et al 2014; van Kesteren and van Dijk 
2010).  
 
Congruently, and in light of the role security technologies are thought to have 
played in driving down crime rates (Knepper 2012), there is ample evidence to 
suggest that the more affluent have benefitted greatly from the ability to shield 
themselves from property crimes by privately consuming enhanced security 
measures. Yet those from the lowest income quartile who can ill afford 
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expensive security measures have benefited far less from the purported falls in 
property offences (van Kesteren et al 2014). Furthermore it is likely that as the 
security gap increases between the affluent haves and the poor have nots (van 
Kesteren et al 2014) the disparity of benefits from this ‘unequal crime decline’ 
(Parker 2008) will continue to widen. Inevitably this will amount to a further 
deepening across different communities already observed levels of uneven 
criminal victimisation (Tilley et al 2011), thereby further disadvantaging those 
upon whom such victimisation disproportionately falls (Knepper 2012).  
 
Whilst the notion of responsive securitisation and the broader security 
hypothesis provide potentially plausible yet geographically limited cross-national 
explanations for the declining rates of certain volume crimes (van Dijk et al 
2007; van Dijk 2008), it can be successfully argued that such hypotheses 
encourage greater recourse towards a strategy of “responsibilization” (Garland 
1996:452, 2001:124, original emphasis). Essentially this equates to a scenario 
“whereby individual citizens are expected to become active partners in the 
prevention and reduction of crime” (Tierney 2010:318). However, such 
undifferentiated expectation is undoubtedly a heavy burden to bear for those 
least capable of initiating or maintaining the implementation of high quality 
security measures (Knepper 2012; Hope 2007). Nevertheless, such incapability 
often results in victims being blamed for ‘failing’ to take the precautions 
necessary in order to prevent criminal victimisation (Rock 2002; Wright and Hill 
2004). Additionally, it is worth emphasising that the explanatory scope of both 
responsive securitisation and the broader security hypothesis remain 
questionable beyond their capability to account for reductions in certain property 
and vehicle offences (Farrell et al 2011; Tonry 2014a). However, attempts have 
been made to extend the explanatory scope of such hypotheses by arguing that 
early security driven reductions in ‘debut’ and ‘key-stone’ crimes have facilitated 
the removal of the “low rung on the offending ladder” (Farrell et al 2011:164), 
therefore stalling or discouraging new offenders from beginning criminal careers 
(van Kesteren et al 2014). Yet such extensions should perhaps be revised since 
many other crimes provide “potential testing grounds” for both novices and 
those more committed to developing a criminal career (Winlow 2001:170).  
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Although the ICVS inspired notion of responsive securitisation and the broader 
security hypothesis undoubtedly provide part of the answer to the ‘international 
crime decline' enigma, they by no means provide a holistic explanation. Indeed, 
they largely fail to acknowledge that alongside the introduction of 
technologically informed security innovations there are the co-evolutionary 
processes of the mutation of crime and perpetual criminal innovation-to-
obsolescence cycles, which also may have contributed towards observed 
reductions in such offences (McQuade 2006). Accordingly, a more holistic 
explanation of apparent declinations in certain property offences requires a dual 
acknowledgement of the role security technologies have played. Although they 
may have played a significant role in reducing such offences, it must be 
acknowledged that the very introduction of such technologies may have 
accelerated the co-evolutionary process of the mutation of crime and 
concomitant criminal innovation-to-obsolescence cycles (McQuade 2006; 
Felson and Boba 2010). 
 
In order to grasp such an explanation it is necessary to move beyond simplistic 
‘measurements’ provided by current indicators such as the ICVS, which 
arguably capture crimes already entering stages of obsolescence (Farrell et al 
2010), yet nevertheless continue to constitute the objects of focus within the 
narrow tunnel of vision concentrated upon by the ‘international crime decline’ 
discourse. Transcending this narrow tunnel of vision enables a more holistic 
appreciation of the roles the mutation of crime, the move of certain crimes into 
stages of obsolescence and the emergence of new criminal markets have 
played in facilitating the production of a potentially distorted and misleading 
image of what appears, at first sight, to be a downward trajectory in international 
crime trends. It is to the delineation of such an appreciation that this chapter 
now turns. 
 
Criminal Obsolescence and the Mutation of Crime:  
The technologically competitive realms of crime and the methods of agencies 
charged with its prevention are inextricably linked and co-evolving, for 
innovatory technological advances made within one realm stimulate 
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concomitant, although often unequal, advances in the other (McQuade 2006). 
Such co-evolutionary technological innovation has been likened by McQuade 
(2006:35) to “a civilian arms race”, which is arguably being won by criminal 
factions who have proven to be more flexible, agile and technologically adroit 
than the policing and security enterprises of many nation-states, who appear 
incapable of outmanoeuvring their criminal competitors (Thachuk 2007). Indeed, 
as articulated in the next chapter, it has been well documented that criminals 
have by far been the greater beneficiaries of the entrepreneurial opportunities 
created by the technological advances that have both driven and emerged out 
of the process of globalisation (Shelley 2011). Not only have such advances 
created new commodities and markets which inevitably open up opportunities to 
commit new and/or adaptive forms of crime, but they have increased the 
efficiency, effectiveness and profitability of criminal entrepreneurs (Thachuk 
2007; Kennedy 2010; Viano 1999).  
 
Accordingly, it can be argued that as a result of technologically driven changes 
in the modus operandi of various forms of crime, alongside the development of 
new criminal markets and additional opportunities for the committal of crime 
(Sutton 2007), we are witnessing both an evolutionary mutation of certain forms 
of crime and the simultaneous move of other crime types into stages of 
obsolescence (Hall 2012b; Walsh 1994). As a coalescence of factors primarily 
associated with the process of globalisation have stimulated various criminal 
opportunities and given rise to new types of crime and new ways of committing 
old offences, so too have they functioned to suppress or systematically block off 
certain forms of ‘ordinary’ or conventional crime (Hall 2012b; Reiner 2007; 
Walsh 1994).  
 
Fundamentally crime, with its evident capacity for adopting and adapting 
technological advances for illicit purposes, should not be conceived as static but 
should be viewed as a fluid and dynamic entity, capable of creating new and 
favourable contexts for itself as it moves through its own innovation-to-
obsolescence cycles (Findlay 1999; McQuade 2006). Essentially, this co-
evolutionary process of technologically driven criminal innovation, mutation and 
obsolescence occurs when ordinary or conventional crimes evolve, via the 
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incremental implementation and utilisation of technological variations of the 
techniques associated with its application, into what has been termed adaptive 
crime (McQuade 2006). This then renders older and more traditional variations 
increasingly obsolete, with further advances creating entirely new forms of 
crime which have the potential to induce the waning into obsolescence of both 
some forms of ordinary crime and certain adaptations (McQuade 2006; Sacco 
2005).  
 
If we inverse the ‘technology crime wave’ illustrated by McQuade (2006) it 
becomes apparent that perceived downward trends in certain forms of 
conventional crime could be the result of traditional means of committing these 
relatively well-measured crimes beginning to enter stages of obsolescence. 
Particularly as applied technological innovations facilitate the mutation of their 
modus operandi making them harder for law enforcement agencies to identify 
and counter. Further downward trends are mistakenly observed when radical 
innovative use of technology creates new forms of crime, which not only quickly 
stimulate considerable interest amongst the criminal fraternity but are hardly 
recognised let alone adequately understood by law enforcement agencies 
(McQuade 2006; Aebi and Linde 2010; Williams and Wall 2013). This process is 
particularly well illustrated by the plethora of adaptive and new forms of crimes 
which have emerged as a result of the introduction and proliferation of the 
internet which, as it happens, is thought to have roughly coincided with the 
onset of the ‘crime decline’ (Farrell et al 2011).  
 
Indeed, many forms of conventional crime have migrated from the real-world 
into cyberspace (Brenner 2007). This migration, or perhaps more aptly termed 
mutation, transforms these conventional crimes into adaptive crimes, or 
‘computer assisted’ crimes in the lexicon of the cybercrime literature, where in 
the realm of cyberspace they find a renewed lease of life (Jewkes and Yar 
2010). Examples of such adaptation include money laundering and fraud, in 
addition to cyberstalking, bullying and the dissemination of hate speech, which 
have undoubtedly proliferated following the introduction of Web 2.0 social 
networking sites such as Twitter and Facebook (Yar 2006; Jewkes and Yar 
2010; Wall 2010, 2013). Other examples include the selling and purchasing of 
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drugs and counterfeit pharmaceuticals online where more efficient distribution 
networks than those associated with street dealers can be organised (Hall 
2012b; Hopkins Burke 2014), as well as using online auction sites like eBay to 
sell and buy stolen and counterfeit products. Such criminal ventures in particular 
serve to highlight the wider changes that are currently reshaping the traditional 
criminal marketplaces (Treadwell 2011).  
 
The successful negotiation of these new illicit terrains does not necessarily 
require the sophisticated esoteric knowledge of a computer programmer, for 
they can by and large be navigated by anyone who has a relatively firm grasp of 
and access to social networking sites (Williams and Wall 2013). Alongside this 
attractive feature of the new criminal terrain, criminal entrepreneurs are inclined 
to utilise the “(cyber)bazaar” (Treadwell 2011:187) for other practical reasons. 
For instance, not only does it enable offenders to operate anonymously (Sutton 
2007) but it drastically reduces the requirement of physical proximity between 
the offender and the victim, facilitates a one-to-many victimisation ratio and is 
undoubtedly difficult for the authorities to monitor and control (Brenner 2007).  
 
Congruently, the establishment of the internet has spawned new forms of crime, 
or what is referred to in the cybercrime literature as ‘computer-focused’ crime, 
which not only emerged in tandem with the internet but cannot exist in isolation 
from it (Yar 2006). Examples of such new computer-focused crimes include the 
dissemination of malicious software, denial of services attacks and spamming 
(Jewkes and Yar 2010; Wall 2010). The proliferation of such crimes is reflected 
in the near-pervasiveness of the internet as an artefact of everyday life (Jewkes 
and Yar 2010). Indeed, as poor as current indicators may be shrouded by the 
massive dark figures of under-reporting and under-recording (Yar 2006), they 
point towards the rapid and continued growth of cybercrime (Lovely 2011) to the 
point where it has been registered in some countries as “impacting on more of 
the public than traditional acquisitive crimes such as burglary and car theft” 
(Williams and Wall 2013:247). This has lead even the most ardent ICVS 
supporter to acknowledge that observed drops in certain volume crimes have 
been offset by the rise of such new types of crime (van Dijk 2008).  
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Evidently, both the nature and broad landscape of crime is changing in ways 
that current indicators are incapable of capturing (Maxfield et al 2007). 
Consequently, “it is possible that crime has not dropped overall but that it has 
changed form in ways that current indicators have not adequately captured” 
(Farrell et al 2010:33). It can therefore be argued that indicators such as the 
ICVS have not identified a downward trajectory in some international volume 
crime trends. Rather, it is perhaps more plausible to suggest that, constrained 
by its narrow conception of crime and victimisation (van Dijk 2007a; van Dijk 
and Shaw 2009), it has instead simply captured the waning into obsolescence 
of those crimes upon which it disproportionally focuses, whilst omitting from its 
view those which have mutated and transcended their terrestrial boundaries.  
 
Whilst such myopia is particularly acute within the ICVS it is by no means 
restricted to it, for it is shared by both national victimisation surveys (Sutton 
2007) and police recorded statistics (Zvekic 1999). The overall net result of this 
collective myopia is a form of ‘crime decline tunnel vision’, whereby only that 
which can be easily measured and quantified are explored at the expense of 
any meaningful investigation of actions which fall outside this limited criteria 
(Lomell 2010). Subsequently these remain persistent silhouettes resigned to the 
mere periphery of this narrowly focused ‘crime decline’ tunnel of vision, of which 
a visual representation is presented below in figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justin Kotzé  PhD Thesis 
39 
 
Figure 1: The ‘Crime Decline’  Tunnel of Vision.   
 
What the above illustration essentially shows is that the narrow range of 
recorded crime upon which the ‘crime decline’ discourse focuses its attention 
represents merely the tips of two icebergs. Yet whilst the areas of criminality 
which exist outside of these recorded tips remain largely unacknowledged, 
many of the identifiable volume crimes that are recorded are relatively well 
controlled by what can perhaps be called the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ machines of the 
state (Young 1975). Put simply, the ‘hard’ machine comprises those institutions 
which endeavour to control crime via overt coercion such as the police, the 
probation service, the courts and the prison. Whilst these institutions cannot be 
credited with causing observed reductions in international volume crime trends 
on account of their aforementioned lack of external validity, it has been 
acknowledged that strategic developments in policing and sentencing policy 
have undoubtedly contributed in some marginal way to such reductions 
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(Rosenfeld and Messner 2009; Hall 2012b; Zimring 2007). Augmenting such 
marginal contributions however, are those institutions and organisations which 
comprise the ‘soft’ machine, such as education, healthcare (Knepper 2012) and 
the repressive regulatory welfare system (Quinney 1977; Piven and Cloward 
1993). To these, one could add the crime-reducing potential of voluntary-
charitable third sector organisations such as the Stockton Town Pastors (Kotzé 
and Whitehead 2011) and Community Chaplaincy (Kotzé 2013).  
 
Whilst the orchestrated ‘squeezing’ of both the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ machines has 
stimulated reductions in certain property offences by accelerating their move 
into obsolescence, it must be acknowledged that in the new space created by 
the repressive effects of these machines have emerged new forms of crime, 
criminal markets, adaptive manoeuvres and evolving criminal motivations. This 
should not however be misconceived as a simple ‘hydraulic model’. Whilst the 
pressure collaboratively exerted by the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ machines creates the 
space within which new and adaptive forms of crime may occur, it does not 
necessarily determine what occurs in this space. In other words, the context for 
displacement is created but the dynamics of movement are still predicated upon 
the actualisation of agentic energy.   
 
Fundamentally, the combined effects of the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ machines coupled 
with the introduction of applied technological advances have contributed, 
however unwittingly, towards stimulating and facilitating the acceleration of 
innovatory criminal momentum, by blocking off traditional opportunities for the 
committal of conventional crime whilst simultaneously opening up new 
opportunities (Rizk and Bettaïeb 2015). Consequently, those capable of 
navigating the technologically sophisticated contours of new lucrative criminal 
avenues are able to successfully achieve upward socio-criminal mobility. 
Conversely, those who are either unwilling or incapable of attaining the requisite 
levels of technological complexity necessary for such upward mobility, either 
risk greater chances of detection (McQuade 2006) or create successful 
techniques of circumvention appropriate to the committal of crimes associated 
with downward socio-criminal mobility. What is more, they must do this all whilst 
traversing the borders of complete descent into the realms of depressive 
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hedonia, soft narcosis (Fisher 2009) and ‘frustrated violence’ (Parker 2008; 
Taylor 2013). 
  
In terms of exploring the parameters of the purported ‘international crime 
decline’ this delineation of the above illustration may help to explain why 
reductions in certain volume crimes have been observed. Quite simply, it has 
been shown that as many conventional forms of crime have been ‘squeezed’ 
into stages of obsolescence, simultaneous criminal movements in either an 
upward or downward direction have occurred. However, rather than attempt to 
chart the rapidity and fluidity of such movements, current indicators, upon which 
the discipline of criminology increasingly depends for the construction of its 
knowledge, by and large continue to measure criminal obsolescence, thereby 
potentially rendering much of this criminological knowledge out-of-date (Nelson 
et al 2014). Indeed with reference to police recorded statistics and surveys such 
as the ICVS in particular, it is evident that the plethora of crimes and social 
harms subsumed within these divergent movements continue to exist outside of 
their narrow ‘crime decline’ tunnel of vision. Certainly, the technologically 
facilitated crimes associated with upward socio-criminal mobility prove 
particularly difficult to identify, detect and measure (Brenner 2007). Likewise, 
the crimes and social harms associated with downward socio-criminal mobility, 
such as the normalised distribution of stolen and counterfeit goods amongst 
community beneficiaries, remain neither reported to nor seem to be of concern 
to the police or the ICVS (Reiner 1996; Treadwell 2011; Hall 2012b).  
 
Presented in figure 2 below is a process that could perhaps be termed 
‘technology-mediated criminal transference’.  This facilitates further explanation 
as to how and why the processes of criminal innovation, mutation and 
obsolescence contribute towards the perceived observation of downward trends 
in certain conventional crimes. 
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Figure 2: Technology-Mediated Criminal Transference.  
 
Fundamentally, the above illustration shows the perceived downward trend in 
the relatively well-measured volume crimes included within the narrow ‘crime 
decline’ tunnel of vision. However, as alluded to previously these crimes might 
not have declined simply due to the successful application of security 
technologies. Instead, they may have entered stages of mutation or 
obsolescence as a result of the combined effects of the innovative application of 
available technological advances and the pressure collaboratively exerted by 
the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ machines. Accordingly, as the criminal terrain evolves with 
certain ordinary crimes becoming obsolete whilst others mutate into adaptive 
crimes, and entirely new forms of crime begin to emerge as the continuum of 
technological innovation expands (McQuade 2006), a process of technology-
mediated criminal transference occurs. 
 
Again, rather than being understood in ‘hydraulic’ terms, it should be 
acknowledged that this process is mediated by agentic energy and individual 
levels of technological complexity. Essentially, it involves individuals becoming 
increasingly involved in either adaptive or new forms of crime which are poorly, 
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if at all, measured by conventional indicators and therefore exist outside the 
‘crime decline’ tunnel of vision (McQuade 2006; Treadwell 2011). Consequently, 
it is highly probable that what appears at first sight to have been a sustained 
downward trajectory in rates of certain volume crimes could in reality be nothing 
more than a statistical artifice. In fact it may simply be a reflection not only of the 
tendency of criminology’s current indicators to measure crimes which may 
already be entering stages of obsolescence (Farrell et al 2010), but of their 
reluctance to engage with the plethora of hard-to-measure crimes and social 
harms that exist outside of their narrow field of vision. 
  
However, particularly with regards to the ICVS, such myopic tunnel vison is not 
necessarily the result of ignorance towards the existence of these 
unacknowledged forms of crime and social harm, for the ICVS literature is 
replete with selective criticisms and caveats warning of its inherent limitations 
and drawbacks in this area (van Dijk 2007a; van Dijk and Shaw 2009; van Dijk 
2011; Mayhew and van Dijk 2012). Rather it appears to emanate from a kind of 
methodologically oriented ideological fantasy akin to that described by Žižek 
(1994a:316) as “they know that, in their activity, they are following an illusion, 
but still, they are doing it”. Accordingly, this permits the committal of a form of 
Giffen’s paradox, whereby after positioning within the work a brief cautionary 
note explicating the inherent limitations and drawbacks of their methodology 
and research design, they proceed to utilise the data gleaned from such 
research with abandon (Young 2004). Yet to be answered however is why and 
to what end has this misleading image of declining crime trends identified by 
those who utilise the ICVS, which itself is firmly politically framed within the 
Anglo-American axis (Walklate 2007), been so widely and uncritically 
perpetuated by numerous nation states and their media enterprises? Whilst no 
definitive answer to this question can be provided here, the remainder of this 
chapter will focus upon exploring the basis for one possible explanation.  
 
Constructing the Statistical Quilt:  
Fundamentally, we now occupy an age of unrestrained global finance where the 
once “complex and convoluted” governmental task of maintaining an ‘orderly 
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state’ (Bauman 1998:120) has been severely narrowed down to the task of 
fighting crime, primarily as a means of providing “a ‘safe environment’ for 
market forces to operate in a global economy” (Chan 2005:343). Therefore, the 
argument being advanced here is: what better way to validate such a narrowing 
governmental focus, whilst simultaneously disguising or downplaying the fact 
that “the global capitalist system is approaching an apocalyptic zero-point” 
(Žižek 2011:x), than to posit the existence of an ‘international crime decline’? 
There undoubtedly exists within Westernised capitalist nations a vested interest 
and potent drive amongst governments to ensure that its citizenry continue to 
participate in the capitalist driven culture of conspicuous consumption, whilst 
striving for the attainment of the immortality symbols conferred only via the 
unquestioning committal to the dominant sociosymbolic order (Becker 1975; 
Winlow and Hall 2013). Only such commitment permits the uninterrupted 
access to subjects’ fundamental fantasy-constructions (Myers 2003) and 
encourages them to embrace further a capitalist culture in denial of its problems 
(Stiegler 2010). Ultimately, this facilitates the maintenance of a fetishized 
fantasy vison of “the idyllic image of Western civilisation” (Žižek 2008a:75) in 
general and of liberal-capitalism in particular as being the least worst of all 
possible economic systems (Hall and Winlow 2015).  
 
It can be argued that the misleading image of the purported ‘international crime 
decline’ has been utilised expediently by governments to polish their image and 
reaffirm their position amongst the electorate (Hall and Winlow 2015). Certainly, 
this convenient discourse constitutes a valuable commodity for those eager to 
divert the citizenry’s’ gaze from the deeply rooted and ever exacerbating 
inequality, perpetual instability and destructiveness of the current dominant 
sociosymbolic order (Hall 2012a). This politically useful distraction appears to 
have revolved around disproportionately crediting a number of factors, 
seemingly within nation states’ control, with spurring the genesis of this 
unprecedented decline in crime. Chief amongst them of course is the states’ 
‘monopoly of force’ (Elias 2000) which has supposedly, via the orchestrated 
mobilisation of institutions and organisations which comprise the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
machines, effectively controlled crime and created pacified social spaces free 
from acts of criminality. Since “the capacity of government to reduce crime is an 
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article of faith that is hardwired into the mission and organisation of many 
government organisations” (Zimring 2007:34), this ‘victory’ over crime by those 
agencies whose principal occupation is geared towards its control and 
containment has the potential to revive public faith in the efficacy of nation 
states’ political and administrative framework. Consequently, there is an 
acknowledged tendency not only to overreact to ‘good’ crime news but to 
attribute such good news to governmental intervention (Zimring 2007).  
 
Similarly, and perhaps more broadly, it has been posited by the conglomeration 
of cross-party ‘capitalist realists’ who serve to bolster and maintain the liberal-
capitalist system itself (Hall and Winlow 2015), that the unprecedented 
downward trajectory in crime, and violence in particular, is simply an inevitable 
by-product of capitalism’s current dominant configuration (Pinker 2012; De Wolf 
2012). Simply put, it is argued that the widespread permeation of the ‘innately 
peaceful’ activity of ‘gentle commerce’ has fostered an era of peace by 
substituting trade for force, encouraging empathy and amity between 
individuals, and placing a premium upon the use and development of reason 
(De Wolf 2012). Congruently, alongside capitalism’s purported ability to 
productively channel otherwise potentially destructive feelings of self-interest 
and competitive individualism into a collective ambition to “make money, not 
war” (De Wolf 2012:127), its associated commerce is said to encourage an 
empathetic social psychology, capable of cultivating a greater exercise of 
reason via the negotiated exchange of ideas. Ultimately, this is thought to 
culminate in a more reasoned and smarter society and by extension a less 
violent world (De Wolf 2012; Pinker 2011). 
 
Despite the existence of significant countervailing evidence (Winlow 2014a; 
Rose 2013), the message being advanced is deceptively clear and simple; due 
primarily to the Western world’s current socio-economic and politico-cultural 
configuration “we may be living in the most peaceable era in our species’ 
existence” (Pinker 2012:xix). This is a message within which the ‘international 
crime decline’ is poised to look as though it fits comfortably. However, as this 
chapter has shown, great care should be taken when drawing such conclusions 
for the evidence upon which they are based is often weak at best and at worst 
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distorted, deceptive and entirely misleading. Yet it is salient to note that such 
‘delusions of peace’ (Gray 2011) in the twilight of global capitalism’s fast 
approaching zero-point are not necessarily the simple result of some politically 
knitted ideological illusion “masking the real state of things” (Žižek 1994a:316) 
from the wider citizenry. Rather, they could be said to emanate from the state of 
“collective fetishistic disavowal” (Žižek 2011:x) within which many of us now 
live.  
 
Could it be that this collective fetishistic disavowal of the reality of crime and 
harm in today’s world is a symptom of our inclusion within modernity’s ‘dream 
myth’? That is to say within a fantasy-construction that — bolstered by its 
intricate statistical quilt, which draws its strength from “the high levels of 
innumeracy among members of the general public” (Sacco 2005:58), and the 
associated inclination of many to “simply accept every statistic they hear, or 
accept what they have heard many times” (Dorling and Simpson 1999:3) — 
allows us to maintain access to our ‘sense of reality’, enabling the unhindered 
continuation of the internalised ideological rituals of life within capitalist society 
(Myers 2003). Whilst this question is at this stage obviously rhetorical, it is 
hoped that as this thesis progresses the distance towards a possible answer will 
be significantly reduced. However, before endeavouring to cover such 
untrodden ground it is pertinent to position this thesis in terms of the broader 
socio-economic and politico-cultural milieu within which it is located. 
Accordingly, it is to this positioning that the thesis now turns its attention.     
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Chapter Two: 
 
Research Context. 
 
Despite the development of what has now become a voluminous body of 
research literature endeavouring to explore the aetiological complexities of the 
purported ‘international crime decline’, there remains a considerable void in this 
scholarship. This is characterised by a paucity of rigorous theoretical and 
empirical research that has sought to peer beneath the statistical quilt and move 
beyond the socially decontextualized and occidental statistical quantification 
that characterises much of the current ‘crime decline’ literature, and the ICVS in 
particular (Walklate 2007, 2008; Fattah 2010; van Dijk and Shaw 2009). Indeed, 
the vast majority of the embedded congregation (van Duyne 2011) of scholars 
whose research efforts constitute a considerable proportion of the crime decline 
literature (see for example van Dijk et al (2007, 2012), Farrell et al (2010, 2011), 
Tseloni et al (2010) and Tilley et al (2011)), utilise with precipitous zeal the array 
of methodological techniques associated with positivism proper. Referred to in 
this thesis as ‘hard’ positivism, this practice arguably yields “quantitative 
accounts of crime, criminality and criminalisation that re-produce numerical life 
rather than everyday life” (Presdee 2004b:41).  
 
Fundamentally, such quantitative accounts represent, in their failure to measure 
the true extent of crime (Muncie 2001), a “pale shadow of the total volume of 
illegalities” present in society (Pearson 1983:218). Moreover, they serve to 
obfuscate research participants’ lived social realities by maintaining a narrow 
and one-dimensional conceptualisation and analytical focus upon ‘ideal’ victims 
and the measurement of ‘conventional crimes’. In doing so they often remain 
recalcitrant in acknowledging that the category of ‘crime’ excludes many serious 
harms (Young 2011; Hillyard and Tombs 2007) which may represent, in 
contrast to those legally defined as criminal, a larger “number of the total harms 
that we experience” (Pantazis and Pemberton 2012:43).  
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Consequently, the position can be advanced that such embedded scholarship, 
characterised by its distanced research practices and unyielding fidelity towards 
the ‘fetishism of numbers’ (Young 2011), facilitates the maintenance of a 
pragmatically oriented administrative ‘fact factory’ (Presdee 2004a). The 
primary task of this booming industry is the manufacture and distribution of 
‘suitable’ statistical facts (Presdee 2004b), pre-packaged and wholeheartedly 
accepted by official bodies and academics alike who remain wedded to the 
“tacit assumption that counting crime somehow is the inevitable step towards 
understanding it” (Pakes 2012:70). However, it has been argued that such 
unchecked ‘hard’ positivism in fact serves only to strip from our investigatory 
remit any understanding of the myriad complex meanings surrounding the 
commission of criminal acts (Pakes 2010; Levitas and Guy 1996). Inevitably this 
precludes the ability to investigate in any meaningful way individuals’ beliefs, 
meanings, understandings, accounts and lived experiences of crime and harm. 
Indeed, it is only by engaging in verbal exchanges with those who are frequently 
subject to the real effects of actualised structures and processes — and who 
are recruited at the emotional/material level and assimilated into the ideological 
base of the very sociosymbolic order that produces harmful effects to human 
communities (Winlow and Hall 2013) — that we can begin to better understand 
the complex nature of crime and harm in today’s world. Such a critical realist 
and transcendental materialist informed approach has, as of yet, evidently not 
been applied to the theoretical and empirical exploration of the purported 
‘international crime decline’. 
 
It is within this neglected scholarly milieu that the current study is located and 
marks the first substantive piece of research that has sought to fill this void, by 
utilising a combined zemiological, critical realist and transcendental materialist 
framework in order to explore and analyse change and continuity in crime and 
harm. The research is a preliminary exploratory overview of the way in which 
the ‘international crime decline’ has been misleadingly represented. It does not 
provide a definitive answer to whether or not crime is declining, but rather 
serves to set the scene for ongoing research on a technologically sophisticated 
new generation of crime and harm and contribute towards the generation of a 
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greater willingness to explore and theorise the ‘dark figure’ of crime that exists 
in today’s world.  
 
Since context is essentially essence unpacked, the purpose of this chapter is to 
explore both the local and global context within which this research is located. 
The chapter will delineate the socio-economic rise and fall of an area referred to 
in this thesis as ‘Lake Town’ and the wider conurbation of which it is a part. It 
then seeks to explicate its position as a ‘glocal node’ within the wider neoliberal 
global economy, with a view towards weaving together more holistically both the 
micro and macro contexts with which this research has concerned itself. Before 
this is done however, it must be acknowledged that whilst the findings of this 
research are generalizable at the theoretical or analytical level, as will be 
explained in chapter four, there nevertheless remains a need for such research 
to be replicated within similarly small locales or regions. This will enable us to 
approach a more holistic view of the ‘real world’ harms endured by those who 
find themselves in uncomfortable proximity to the negative effects of the 
dominant sociosymbolic order’s actualised structures and processes. It will also 
go some way towards helping us avoid reductionism and/or the ecological 
fallacy (Bachman and Schutt 2014).   
 
Contextualising Lake Town: 
The title of this section is perhaps a little misleading in as much as a great deal 
of the contextualising that is to be done here focuses not only upon Lake Town 
but also the area known as Teesside. There are two main reasons for this. First 
and foremost, in order to protect the identity of the town to which the researcher 
has ascribed the pseudonym ‘Lake Town’, many of the socio-economic and 
other contextualising details must of necessity remain relatively vague. 
Nevertheless, they may still be articulated through reference to the somewhat 
reflective context of Teesside. Secondly, and perhaps rather conveniently, the 
history of Lake Town is in fact intimately connected with the wider industrial 
development of Teesside. A contextualisation of the latter therefore implicitly 
entails contextualising the former but in a safer and more covert way, ensuring 
that Lake Town and its residents’ anonymity is maintained.  
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Situated in the North East of England and positioned within the conurbation 
which constitutes a locality known as Teesside, an area which itself is 
recalcitrant to precise delineation (Pailor 2002), Lake Town has a relatively brief 
yet turbulent history. Much of this is owed to both the industrial development 
that spurred the genesis of this very locality and the wider socio-economic 
changes in the global economy that facilitated its rapid decline. In contrast to 
many of the other towns which make up the Teesside conurbation, many of 
which possess a market town heritage predating the onset of nineteenth-
century industrial expansion (Beynon et al 1994), Lake Town was literally born 
of industry. It was a direct product of the industrial revolution and the 
accompanying consolidation of a capitalist mode of production which facilitated 
its rapid and powerful economic inception, ultimately breathing life into what 
became a fast-growing town at “the heart of industrial Teesside” (Beynon et al 
1994:11; Foord et al 1985; Shildrick et al 2012).  
 
Traditionally Teesside has been dominated by heavy industry, and such 
domination has predominantly taken both a physical and social form to which its 
vast and striking industrial landscapes, as well as its mainly working-class 
character, can pay testament (Foord et al 1985). It is perhaps difficult to believe 
that much of the physical area itself did not exist prior to the industrial boom of 
the mid-nineteenth century, when Teesside was literally created from scratch 
with some industries seemingly emerging overnight (Beynon et al 1994; Gleave 
1938). Built as a series of distinct settlements, or what Beynon et al (1994:23) 
refer to as “company towns” and eventually amassing a considerable labour 
force via a system of employer-controlled immigration, Teesside developed into 
a major industrial conglomeration (Beynon et al 1994). Its steam-powered heart 
beat in accord with the connective sinews provided by the ever extending rails 
of the Stockton and Darlington Train Company (Pailor 2002). Evidently, 
Teesside originally forged its contours in iron and steel alongside the 
development of engineering and shipbuilding industries, but following World 
War One, however, a new industrial entity emerged on Teesside in the form of 
the chemicals industry (Foord et al 1985; Beynon et al 1994).  
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Essentially, an ironworks industry developed on Teesside because it was a 
suitable site for the assembly of the necessary raw materials (Gleave 1938). At 
its epicentre, and benefiting from the extension of the Stockton and Darlington 
Railway (Pailor 2002; Beynon et al 1994), Lake Town was discovered to be part 
of a conglomeration that offered outstanding geographical and technological 
advances that made it a particularly well suited site for the production of iron, 
transforming it into an industrial hub (Appleton 1929; Beynon et al 1994; Lloyd 
2013). Consequently, such geo-technological potential became the basis for the 
development of a powerful industry that would see Lake Town become one of 
the leading iron ore towns in England (Gleave 1938; Lloyd 2013).  
 
However in a process implicating Lake Town, technological advances made 
during the latter part of the nineteenth and early twentieth century facilitated the 
partial displacement of iron with steel as the new product of interest on 
Teesside (Gleave 1938; Beynon et al 1994). Indeed, a number of seemingly 
unique geographical advantages meant that Teesside’s steel production 
advanced apace with the fabrication requirements of constructional engineering 
and the shipbuilding industry’s need for plates and angles providing a 
dependent market (Gleave 1938). However, this demand was not solely 
reserved for steel as the rapid expansion of the engineering and shipbuilding 
industries ensured that Teesside’s iron and steel remained in high demand, 
prompting a number of significant mergers in the area’s iron and steel industry 
from around the turn of the century (Beynon et al 1994). Whilst these mergers 
were stimulated by an increasing scale of production, they were also in part due 
to a downturn in the shipbuilding industry (Beynon et al 1994). Despite being 
deeply affected by the national economic depression following the First World 
War Teesside’s steel companies, with their unique proximity to the river Tees, 
the “lifeblood of the Tees Valley” (Woodhouse 2002:99), continued to adapt and 
survive by remaining competitive via various processes of rationalisation, 
diversification and continuous technological advances (Gleave 1938; Beynon et 
al 1994). However fleeting, such adaptive survival meant that in 1938 Teesside 
was deemed to be Britain’s main steel producer (Gleave 1938).  
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With similar cogency the chemical industry positioned itself vigorously upon 
Teesside (Beynon et al 1994; Hudson 1989), an industry with which Lake Town 
has been involved since around the mid-nineteenth century (Tomlin 2002). The 
primary stimulus triggering the purposeful production of chemicals on Teesside 
however proved to be the First World War, when chemicals were sought to 
produce explosives and weaponised chemical compounds such as Mustard 
Gas (Beynon et al 1994; Tomlin 2002). Subsequently, with the emergence of 
Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) in 1929, Lake Town contributed significantly 
in leading the industry in the production of chemicals (Lloyd 2013). Congruent 
with the First World War, the Second World War provided an industriously 
productive stimuli provoking the development of new chemicals, as well as 
increasing the demand for existing products elevating production levels to new 
heights (Beynon et al 1994). Thereafter, with the continued development of its 
interlinked plants, ICI created on Teesside a chemicals industry of considerable 
significance (Beynon et al 1994) and one which Lake Town undoubtedly 
benefited from. Indeed, as Lloyd (2013:12) notes, “petrochemicals had replaced 
iron and steel as the engine of the local economy and there was virtually full 
employment in the town at the end of the 1960s”.  
 
Evidently, these core industries provided the predominantly male workforce in 
Lake Town, and Teesside in general, with relatively well-paid and secure 
employment to such an extent that they became “associated with the idea of a 
‘job for life’” (Beynon et al 1994:186). This was true not simply for one but for 
multiple generations of sons who would pursue with almost preordained 
success similar occupational roles their fathers had adopted (Winlow 2001; 
Winlow and Hall 2006). Based upon the assumption that these industries would 
remain and continue to offer meaningful, stable and secure employment 
workers, along with their families, developed a deep commitment to the area 
(Beynon et al 1994). Fundamentally, as a result of a tacit recognition of the 
shared hardships of hard manual labour and the beneficial prospects of 
developing close-knit communal ties built upon interdependency, mutuality, 
reciprocity and collective identity, a strong working-class culture and community 
was forged (Hall et al 2008; Lloyd 2013). The internal logic of these 
communities was seamlessly interwoven with every timely beat of the industrial 
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heart around which Teesside and Lake Town in particular grew up (Lloyd 2013), 
consequently “the character of the industry left its impression upon local social 
and cultural life” (Beynon et al 1994:16).  
 
This industrially facilitated solidification of a working-class habitus was a 
process common to many other North East English towns and cities during the 
period of industrial modernity (Winlow 2001; Hall et al 2008; Lloyd 2013). 
Indeed Hall et al (2008) advance the position that regardless of the numerous 
local and regional variations assumed by the working-class habitus, there 
existed a basic form that would guide the majority of individuals along a clearly 
marked trajectory. Following such coordinates would often result in the 
attainment of a well identified and somewhat predictable biography with which 
individuals could pursue meaningful lives, even “in the face of their ongoing 
subjugation to and exploitation by those who owned and controlled the means 
of production” (Hall et al 2008:21). Accordingly, working-class communities that 
forged their collective contours around the development of specific heavy 
industries, such as those that emerged in Lake Town, internalised cultural 
characteristics which were at their very core formed around a rationale geared 
towards productive work (Winlow and Hall 2006). In fact such work produced an 
overwhelmingly influential orbit encompassing virtually every facet of their 
residents’ lives (Winlow and Hall 2006). For these individuals the expectation 
that such work would continue to be available remained an unquestionable 
certainty, a seemingly timeless fact of life that, by the time deindustrialisation hit 
the area in the 1970s, had become doxic (Winlow and Hall 2006; Lloyd 2013). 
 
From its inception Teesside has been intimately interwoven with the changing 
nature of the global capitalist economy (Beynon et al 1994). As a result the 
region, following the global economic crisis which began in the early 1970s, 
suffered dramatically from the rapid internationalisation of its narrowly ranged 
core industries (Shildrick et al 2012). The resulting retrenchment of local 
employment affected the local population considerably as virtually full male 
employment gave way to widespread unemployment (Shildrick et al 2012; 
MacDonald and Marsh 2005). Indeed, despite the previous optimism with which 
the Teesside Survey and Plan advocated the modernisation and diversification 
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of the region’s economy, unemployment and insecurity became the new 
distinguishing features characterising the old ‘job for life’ heavy manufacturing 
industries (Foord et al 1985; Brown 1995). This new culture of uncertainty and 
insecurity was used expediently by employers, who had been forced by global 
economic competition to streamline their operations, in order to increase the 
intensity of work performed by what was now a significantly smaller and more 
flexible workforce (Brown 1995; Lloyd 2013).  
 
This transformation must however be seen within a wider context as part of a 
milieu within which the Keynesian compromise was swiftly displaced by a new 
neoliberal social order, for which the Labour government had laid the initial 
foundation and upon which Thatcher’s Conservative government built their 
destructive policies (Duménil and Lévy 2005; Hudson 1989). Indeed, armed 
with a rationale underpinned by the doctrine of monetarism, the Conservative 
government pursued wholeheartedly the abandonment of governmental 
responsibility for the maintenance of full employment, which had hitherto been a 
fundamental feature of the post-war Keynesian consensus (Armstrong et al 
1984). Fundamentally, we have since the late 1970s witnessed the reorientation 
of capital accumulation as it has become directed towards manufacturing the 
consumable objects of our desire rather than catering to our needs (Lloyd 
2013). This dramatic reorientation has freed it from its previous dependency 
upon massed labour and full employment, a process which has proven to be 
devastating to the local labour markets of places like Teesside (Lloyd 2013; 
Harvey 2007). Evidence of such devastation lies in the fact that a large 
“proportion of the area’s population has become permanently surplus to the 
requirements of employers” (Beynon et al 1994:194), as approximately 100,000 
jobs in Teesside’s industries where lost between 1971 and 2008 (Shildrick et al 
2012).  
  
In order to fill this deindustrialised void service sector employment grew rapidly 
in Teesside changing markedly the employment structure of the area 
(MacDonald and Marsh 2005; Brown 1995). However much of this employment 
growth was in low-paid, low-skilled, precariously flexible, unstable and insecure 
forms of work. Characterised by the short-term or zero-hour contracts of 
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temporary, part-time or casual work, such employment exists on the precipice 
as a peripheral employment sector within which employees have no rights or 
benefits (Brown 1995; Reiner 2007). Nevertheless, these hyphenated forms of 
employment now provide the majority of jobs on Teesside (MacDonald and 
Marsh 2005). Individuals now increasingly find themselves “drafted into the 
ranks of a new downgraded and depoliticised workforce” (Hall et al 2008:24), 
vying against each other in a gladiatorial contest of competitive individualism for 
the chance to secure “even the most tenuous or unsuitable scraps of work” 
(Southwood 2011:11). Rather than providing a spring board into higher paying 
jobs, these peripheral and precarious forms of employment serve to trap those 
who are (un)lucky enough to secure them in a deleterious low-pay, no-pay cycle 
as they spend their life surfing between various low-paid and insecure jobs 
(Shildrick et al 2012). Often this experience is punctuated only by what can 
sometimes prove to be lengthy periods of unemployment and welfare benefits 
claiming (Shildrick et al 2012). Consequently, in the face of such endless 
precarity the distinction between employment and unemployment has become 
increasingly arbitrary, for under the conditions of short-term and insecure 
employment the work of the career jobseeker is never ending (Southwood 
2011).  
 
Evidently Teesside, and Lake Town in particular, have struggled to come to 
terms with and recover from the effects of a swift and ruthless process of 
deindustrialisation and the myriad social and economic problems which have 
subsequently besieged the area (Lloyd 2013; Shildrick et al 2012; Beynon et al 
1994). As a result Lake Town is positioned within the top 10% most deprived 
local authorities in England (Department for Communities and Local 
Government 2015) and exhibits, in congruence with most areas of deprivation, 
a broad range of overlapping issues (Bounds 2013). For instance whilst labour 
market statistics should be read cautiously, for they are often replete with blurry 
and ambiguous definitional boundaries (Green 1999), they reveal that Lake 
Town often exhibits unemployment rates noticeably higher than the national 
average (Shildrick et al 2012). The latest figures for example, show that 11.0% 
of the economically active population were unemployed from October 2014 to 
September 2015, whereas the national figure was much lower at 5.4% (ONS 
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2016a). Similarly, in February 2016 4.9% of the working age population in Lake 
Town were claiming out-of-work benefits, which is more than double the 
percentage for Britain as a whole (ONS 2016a). Lake Town also had a higher 
number of hospital stays for alcohol related harm per 100,000 of the population 
in 2013-2014 than the English average, and could thus be noted as being 
amongst the worst in the country (Public Health England 2015). Furthermore, 
both the estimated number of users of opiates and/or crack cocaine in 2011-
2012, and the rate of self-harm induced hospital stays in 2013-2014, were also 
amongst the worst in England (Public Health England 2015).  
 
Unfortunately, rather than representing any glimpse of imminent reprieve or 
amelioration it appears that the austerity measures implemented by the last 
Coalition government have affected Lake Town, particularly its most vulnerable 
and disadvantaged residents, disproportionally. Yet the deleterious effects and 
likely results of such systemic violence were arguably known in advance as 
Lake Town was thought to be “the least resilient to planned government cut-
backs” (Shildrick et al 2012:47). Whilst Lake Town has already been 
characterised for some time as an area languishing in a state of permanent 
recession blighted by unemployment and a burgeoning criminal market, with a 
rate of crime that already well exceeds the national average (Hall and Winlow 
2005a; Hall et al 2008; Lloyd 2013), it can be argued that the Coalition’s 
austerity measures have served only to further exacerbate its precarious 
position. 
 
Yet in line with the progressive picture painted by the ICVS, both national and 
local level crime data purportedly continue to show a downward trajectory. 
Indeed, according to the Crime Survey for England and Wales crime covered by 
the survey follows a similar curvilinear trend to that identified by the ICVS. The 
data suggests that crime increased steadily from 1981, reached a peak in 1995 
and then followed an overall downward trend thereafter. Despite some year to 
year fluctuations the general underlying trend is said to have continued 
downwards (ONS 2016b). Similarly, local level crime data appears to mirror this 
general downward trajectory with seemingly little year to year fluctuation (Tees 
Valley Unlimited 2013). Considering the numerous and often similar 
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methodological issues exhibited by such data sources discussed at length in the 
previous chapter, this ‘international’, national and local statistical parity is 
perhaps unsurprising. What such parity appears to infer, despite severe and 
highly visible socioeconomic dislocation, is that there is no statistically 
significant spatial mismatch between these macro and micro contexts. This 
therefore serves to imply that the ‘crime decline’ is indeed an ‘international’ 
phenomenon that has manifested itself not only at the national but local level. 
However, as this thesis will continue to demonstrate, the reality of the situation 
in Lake Town is very different from the progressive world view portrayed by the 
‘international crime decline’ discourse; as is the case for many characteristically 
similar locales and regions around the world. 
 
Indeed, although Lake Town, and the wider conurbation of which it is a part, has 
suffered greatly from the socio-economic fallout of the industrial decline which 
began in the 1970s (Beynon et al 1994; Shildrick et al 2012), it is by no means 
unique in this way as its plight mirrors that of “numerous other towns and cities 
throughout the industrialised West” (Lloyd 2013:25). Consequently, as will be 
explicated in chapter four, the study of Lake Town as an exemplifying case 
facilitates, through a process of analytical generalizability, an analysis of the 
wider socio-economic and political context of which it is a part. It is primarily for 
this reason that the researcher chose to focus his empirical research efforts 
within this location. 
 
Neoliberalism and Economic Globalisation:  
Evidently, and as alluded to above, the plight of Lake Town should not be 
understood as emanating from some innate or inevitable internal failing of its 
industrial heart. Rather such failing emanated from the forceful puncturing of its 
essential socio-economic organs by globalising forces, of which neoliberalism 
has become the primary motor (Cowling 2012; Passas 2000). Whilst it has been 
acknowledged that “capitalism was globalising from the start” (Kiely 2009:46), it 
can be argued that contemporary economic globalisation, although similar in 
some respects, is qualitatively different from earlier periods of global capitalism 
(Held and McGrew 2002). Indeed in its contemporary guise modern economic 
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globalisation is dominated by neoliberalism (Shaikh 2005), an economic 
doctrine which has successfully positioned itself “as the reigning policy 
discourse for globalisation since the early 1980s” (Scholte 2005:39). 
Fundamentally, as the Bretton Woods agreement gave way to the so called 
Washington Consensus (Kiely 2009; James 2008), “the neoliberal project of 
globalisation” (Schirato and Webb 2003:26) sought to ensure the globalisation 
of Western capitalism, by dismantling barriers to trade and investment and 
reducing international regulations (Stiegler 2010; Shelley 2011).  
 
Purportedly, this liberalisation of global economic trade, investment and finance 
was pursued under the guise of the neoliberal axiom that unrestrained markets 
would have the potential to serve global economic needs and generate full 
employment for those who wished to work, thereby producing economic growth 
that would seemingly benefit the whole world (Shaikh 2005). Such an axiom 
was predicated upon the notion of successful global economic convergence, 
whereby every individual element of the social body would be able to find or 
establish a suitable market niche. In turn this would supposedly create a highly 
competitive free-market economy, from which even those inhabiting the furthest 
reaches of the globe would benefit from the “trickle-down effects of wealth 
creation” (Passas 2000:23). Such an optimistic appraisal, coupled with 
associated developments driven by the compression of time-space, which has 
been facilitated by the rapid advances in information and communication 
technologies (Hall 2012b; Schirato and Webb 2003), undoubtedly contributed 
towards the previously unimagined acceleration of the globalisation process 
(Scholte 2005).  
 
Rather than producing the even playing field intimated by notions of 
convergence, the solidification of a fully-blown global capitalist economy 
established in the twilight of the twentieth century has served only to accentuate 
divergence (Schirato and Webb 2003). Indeed, being braver with Bauman’s 
(1998:2) assertion that “globalisation divides as much as it unites”, one could 
perhaps advance the position that it divides more than it unites, particularly in 
light of the fact that “the spread of global capital has helped to produce what 
could be termed ‘the globalisation of inequality’” (Schirato and Webb 2003:93). 
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Such divergence and the inevitable inequality that accompanies this uneven 
global economic development is not however confined to a simple disparity 
between distant geographical regions and countries. Rather it manifests itself in 
complex ways opening up great chasms between social groups within countries 
and local regions (Kennedy 2010).  
 
Fundamentally, substantial and severe economic inequality within and between 
nation states is but one of the many significant consequences of what James 
(2008) terms selfish capitalism. This is a form of political economy akin to what 
Kennedy (2010:56) equally aptly refers to as “predatory capitalism”, a doctrine 
based upon the hegemony of neoliberal economic globalisation. The argument 
being advanced here is that in comparison to the recent past global capitalism 
has assumed a more demanding and less accountable demeanour, whereby a 
minority are conferred lavish rewards and elevated to social levels seemingly 
beyond reproach at the expense of an increasingly insecure and superfluous 
majority (Kennedy 2010).  
 
Rather than endeavouring to revive Keynesian measures capable of ensuring 
the social and economic stability of the wider social body, maximising returns 
and profits for business leaders and their conglomeration of shareholders has 
become the zeitgeist. For Kennedy (2010:56) this “partly explains the rapidly 
changing and perhaps worsening employment and work conditions experienced 
by people more or less everywhere”. This malaise is emblematic of the forceful 
displacement of the Fordist social contract by the post-Fordist regime of 
accumulation ushered in by neoliberal globalisation (Scholte 2005). In essence 
this regime of accumulation, replete with its mass of ironically termed ‘labour-
saving’ technologies, facilitated the attainment of ‘jobless growth’ within both 
manufacturing and service industries alike, therefore eliminating any possibility 
of ever achieving full employment (Scholte 2005). By reversing the flows of 
trade and capital in what could perhaps be considered the most audacious 
move in economic history, neoliberal economic globalisation secured the means 
to jettison the need for a mass industrialised workforce in the West (Winlow and 
Hall 2013; Varoufakis 2011). However, it simultaneously managed to maintain 
profitable levels of manufacture and investment by successfully relocating to 
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low-wage sites in the East and South labour-intensive systems of production, 
whilst introducing credit and intensifying the consumption of commodified goods 
in the West (Scholte 2005; Winlow and Hall 2013).   
 
The upshot of this is that the Hegelian master-slave dialectic, or put more 
contemporarily the capital-labour relation, no longer holds sway over the 
capitalists’ narcissistically self-affirmed achievement of ‘special liberty’ (Hall 
2012b). Indeed, within a world where the global economy now requires only 
twenty percent of the world’s population to perform all necessary work, 
effectively rendering eighty percent of the population economically redundant 
and surplus to capitalist requirement (Žižek 2011), capitalists no longer need 
labourers, or their recognition, in the way they once did (Hall 2012b). 
Accordingly, as businesses and corporations continue to further globalise their 
operations by moving from older Northern industrial centres, such as Lake 
Town, to more recently developed sites in the East, South and elsewhere in 
pursuit of still lower wage rates (Scholte 2005; Kennedy 2010), the competition 
for employment takes on a new salience for much of the world’s population. 
Many find themselves embroiled within a gladiatorial contest in which only those 
who can quickly assimilate the neoliberal ideals of competitive self-interest and 
egoistic individualism are deemed fit enough to compete for even the most 
tenuous, insecure and impractical forms of work (Reiner 2007; Southwood 
2011). Further tipping the balance of power in favour of the predatory capitalists 
is the fact that their employer bargaining power over such work has been 
considerably boosted (Scholte 2005). 
  
Consequently employers, relieved of the burdensome requirements of mutuality 
and reciprocal recognition, do not hesitate to demand an increasingly mobile, 
competitive and ever accessible workforce capable of producing greater outputs 
for lower wages (Southwood 2011). Yet the social benefits and economic 
security once associated with the status of active employment are 
simultaneously reduced as employers pursue greater flexibility and leanness 
(Southwood 2011; Kennedy 2010). Such pursuits manifested themselves most 
sharply within the service and retail industries that rapidly arose as a deceptive 
panacea as deindustrialisation swept across much of the globe’s industrial 
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heartlands (Armstrong et al 1984; Hall 2012c). However, they have undoubtedly 
become embedded components of nearly all forms of work spread throughout 
the post-industrial landscape (Cederström and Fleming 2012). Security of 
tenure has become but a memory of a bygone age as “‘flexibility’ becomes the 
watchword with respect to labour markets” (Harvey 2007:75). Such flexibility 
has become accepted as constituting the core component of the predominant 
forms of post-industrial working arrangements, characterised by insecure and 
precarious part-time, temporary, short-term and zero-hour contract employment 
(Edgell 2006). Moreover, it has become internalised at the psychosocial level by 
an increasingly individualised and depoliticised post-Fordist workforce who have 
little choice but to be ‘flexible’ in accepting both short and long hours, low 
wages, poor benefits and dubious health and safety standards as well as 
loosened laws regarding hiring and firing (Hall et al 2008; Scholte 2005).   
 
All this has congealed to form a global state of precarity whereby large masses 
of the world’s populations uncomfortably oscillate between states of 
underemployment and unemployment, embroiled in treacherous ‘low-pay no-
pay cycles’ (Hall 2012c; Shildrick et al 2012). For whilst the solidification of 
neoliberal economic globalisation has freed the predatory capitalists from their 
localised constraints, allowing them to move freely through deregulated market 
space in pursuit of profits, labour has become increasingly fractured and 
forcefully localised (Schirato and Webb 2003; Bauman 1998). Indeed, it 
appears that neoliberal economic globalisation “has promoted the free 
movement of everything but labour” (Passas 2000:33). Prevented from following 
with commensurate ease capital’s unrestricted cross-border movements 
(Scholte 2005), many individuals find themselves locally bound, cut off and left 
behind (Bauman 1998). As a result they experience the fading and vanishing of 
their livelihoods as local economies once capable of sustaining their inhabitants 
are destroyed by economically driven globalising forces, producing in their wake 
“the exclusion of millions incapable of being absorbed by the new global 
economy” (Bauman 1998:75).  
 
As alluded to previously, this duel process of capital flight and the enforced 
localisation of less skilled labour are characteristic of deindustrialised Lake 
Justin Kotzé  PhD Thesis 
62 
 
Town, an area whose inhabitants would perhaps agree with Bauman’s (1998:2) 
assertion that “being local in a globalised world is a sign of social deprivation 
and degradation”. Unable to follow the alluring path to prosperity so 
convincingly lauded by the advocates of neoliberal economic globalisation they 
are “locals by fate rather than choice” (Kennedy 2010:178). As a result they are 
forced to compete for what little employment remains in a process which itself 
further disrupts diminishing solidarities and reciprocal links to social capital 
(Kennedy 2010). Whilst the ‘winners’ of this competitive race to the bottom 
achieve only spasmodic economic security, the ‘losers’ simply contribute to the 
localised stockpile of what Bauman (1998, 2004:5) refers to as “‘human waste’, 
or more correctly wasted humans”.  
 
However, the globalised production of human waste has not simply resulted in 
the confinement of individuals to their locale’s ghettoised waste-disposal sites 
(Bauman 2004). Rather it has contributed to the forceful ejection of large 
sections of the world’s population as they are driven from their homes and 
uprooted from places now incapable of offering sustenance, cultural quilting 
points (Žižek 2008a), or in fact any glimpse of socio-economic stability or 
promise (Bauman 2004). Accordingly, as Schirato and Webb (2003:152) 
cogently note, “for the most part people are moving unwillingly, and arriving 
unwelcomed”, as they attempt to navigate, or if necessary circumnavigate, the 
guarded borders of the promised lands (Passas 2000).  
 
Condemned to vagabondage these individuals’ status is reduced to nothing 
more than constituting the world’s mobile human waste, “the ‘excessive’ and 
‘redundant’, that is the population of those who either could not or were not 
wished to be recognised or allowed to stay” (Bauman 2004:5). The reference to 
recognition in this context is significant, for, as will be explained in the next 
chapter, the experience of being denied recognition in terms of the modes of 
recognition identified by Honneth (1996) constitutes social harm (Yar 2012). 
Accordingly, rather than guaranteeing economic convergence and a better 
quality of life for the world’s population, the solidification of neoliberal economic 
globalisation has facilitated the polarization of whole groups of individuals into 
either extreme wealth or poverty (Hall 2012b). In doing so it has contributed 
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significantly towards the mass production of human waste, which is perhaps 
one of the clearest indicators revealing the extent to which “industrialised 
capitalism disadvantages and damages the mass of humanity” (Taylor 
2013:22).  
 
Existing in the deluge of such damaging disadvantage, these wasted humans, 
“the so-called losers of globalisation” (Thachuk 2007:3), undoubtedly find it 
increasingly difficult to survive by legitimate means within the highly competitive 
licit economy. Some are therefore often forced to pursue deviant solutions to 
resolve structural problems (Passas 2000). In essence, globalisation and its 
neoliberal motor appear to have, upon first glance, triggered a condition of 
global anomie by activating criminogenic asymmetries which simultaneously 
facilitate the generation of criminal motivation and the weakening of social 
controls (Passas 2000). However, upon closer inspection it can be argued that 
rather than generating a state of complete ‘normlessness’, the process of 
neoliberal globalisation has cultivated fragile and differentiated pseudo-pacified 
normative strategies, which on balance stimulate capitalism’s toxic competitive 
drive, values and practices more than foster its attenuating or insulating 
faculties (Hall et al 2008). Inevitably this promotes a latently criminogenic socio-
cultural milieu within which there exists increasingly favourable opportunities for 
illicit conduct, to which large populations have become equally susceptible for 
criminal recruitment and/or victimisation (Hall et al 2008; Passas 2000). 
Consequently, as Findlay (1999:1) points out, “globalisation creates new and 
favourable contexts for crime”. 
 
Globalising the Illicit:  
The very same politico-technical forces which helped secure the neoliberal 
economic globalisation of Western capitalism, by creating more porous borders 
through which liberalised financial trade and investment flows could move 
largely uninhibited, also facilitated the globalisation of crime and criminal 
markets (Kennedy 2010; Galeotti 2005). Indeed as Shelley (2011:3) lucidly 
articulates, “globalisation has increased the opportunities for criminals, and 
criminals have been among the major beneficiaries of globalisation”. However, 
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the globalisation of crime, or what Gilman et al (2011:2) term “deviant 
globalisation”, should not be viewed as simply representing the dark, cancerous 
and victimising side of an otherwise healthy and positive globalising process. 
Instead, it is necessary to note not only the inextricably linked and bounded 
nature of deviant and mainstream globalisation but acknowledge that the former 
may in fact represent the real nature of the latter (Gilman et al 2011; Aas 2013). 
Congruently, the position has been advanced that deviant globalisation can be 
understood as “the purest expression of free-market capitalism” (Gilman et al 
2011:15). Therefore any attempt to explore the two as being opposite and 
antagonistic entities articulated within a binary discourse of duality and 
diametric opposition, is in danger of failing to capture the multifaceted and 
complex nature of globalisation in all its guises (Hall 2012).  
 
Essentially there are no plain, clear and simple lines of delineation to be drawn 
between mainstream and deviant globalisation. Indeed, the latter is no simple 
by-product or side effect of the former but rather an aspect of its 
operationalization, complete with similar features and flows which make it 
almost indistinguishable from its more visible mainstream counterpart as it 
comfortably operates in the shadows of the licit global economy (Gilman et al 
2011; Hobbs 2013). To further complicate matters, these two inseparable 
streams of globalisation undulate between licit and illicit, visible and hidden, as 
well as conventional and rogue activities (Gilman et al 2011; Hall 2012). 
Nowhere are these nebulous undulations more visibly evident than within the 
realm of transnational organised crime. Actors who operate within this 
contentious criminal category often solicit the establishment of competitive yet 
symbiotic relationships with economic and political officials of ‘weak’, 
‘collapsed’, ‘rogue’ or other forms of parapolitical states willing to compete in 
illegality (Dick 2009; Cribb 2009; Ruggiero 2009).  
 
Corruption undoubtedly plays its part as a conduit through which the volatile 
currents of transnational organised crime can flow in and across suborned 
states of convenience, no-go zones and zones of ambiguity, in ways which 
serve to further undermine and destabilise nation states and their ability to 
prevent the sale of human misery (Thachuk 2007; Williams and Baudin-
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O’Hayon 2002; Hobbs 2013; Messner and Rosenfeld 2000). However, one 
would be remiss not to acknowledge the extent to which the illicit trade of 
numerous criminal enterprises, associated with the vast expanse of 
transnational organised crime, functions as a critical source of revenue for 
otherwise sagging economies (Thachuk 2007). Consequently, in light of the 
fiscal benefits which accompany the infiltration of the legitimate economy by 
illicit trade and commerce, governments are reluctant to pursue and ensure 
control of such illicit dealings beyond the mere tokenistic measures necessary 
to protect their public image, as to do otherwise would negate their fiscal 
interests (Hall 2012c). Perhaps one of the clearest examples of such 
governmental benefit is that of local Chinese governments. Incentivised by the 
acquisition of revenue from tax placed upon tobacco leaves, they encourage 
farmers to produce quantities of tobacco beyond set quotas, thereby producing 
a surplus of raw tobacco for the manufacturing of counterfeit cigarettes (Shen et 
al 2010). Not only are such governments evidently reluctant to pursue the 
closure of counterfeiting businesses utilising locally grown tobacco, they actively 
protect the illegal production of cigarettes in order to maintain access to a 
lucrative source of tax revenues (Shen et al 2010; von Lampe et al 2012).  
 
What the deviant globalisation literature makes strikingly clear is that alongside 
the growth in various licit opportunities, globalisation has provided 
unprecedented opportunities for criminal enterprises and entrepreneurs (Shelley 
2011). It has undeniably afforded them the opportunity to operate more 
effectively by increasing their profitability and destructive impact. It also enables 
them to move increasingly undetected with relative ease, as they cross borders 
and expand their activities in new regions by exploiting with competitive vigour 
the severe declines in regulatory border controls (Williams and Baudin-O’Hayon 
2002; Viano 1999; Shelley 2011). Indeed, as it responds to the same pressures 
and opportunities “the global underworld is evolving every bit as rapidly as its 
legal, ‘upperworld’ counterpart” (Galeotti 2005:4). 
 
Facilitated by rapid economic and technological change and furnished with 
innovative tools and techniques, criminal entrepreneurs have successfully 
capitalised upon both the demand for goods and services otherwise 
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unobtainable from the licit economy, and the almost unlimited supply of ‘suitable 
victims’ created by the “wasteful, rejecting logic of globalisation” (Bauman 
2000:205; Galeotti 2005; Gilman et al 2011; Aas 2013). Consequently, various 
forms of trafficking and smuggling, alongside numerous other types of crimes 
subsumed within the broad edifice of transnational organised crime, have 
become booming industries (Thachuk 2007; Shelley 2011). For instance, with 
its ability to produce huge amounts of profit, human trafficking has become one 
of the fastest growing and most lucrative criminal enterprises in the world 
(Steele 2014; Galeotti 2005).  
 
Traffickers respond to the growing demand for persons suitable for cheap 
labour and prostitution by exploiting the increasingly available supply of 
individuals desperate to circumnavigate strict immigration regulations and 
militarised border controls in search of better lives (Aas 2013; Aronowitz 2011; 
Williams and Baudin-O’Hayon 2002). This lucrative enterprise is facilitated by 
the growth of global transportation networks and the expedient use of 
intermodal shipping containers, some of which have been outfitted with 
sophisticated atmospheric controls and odourless waste disposal systems 
(Nordstrom 2007). Similarly, the illegal trade in human organs is a business 
opportunity that has been quickly seized by criminal entrepreneurs who have 
taken advantage of its largely hidden and insufficiently controlled nature 
(Gilman et al 2011; Ambagtsheer et al 2013).  
 
Perhaps the most profitable and globally expansive criminal business however 
is the illegal narcotics trade, which generates half of all profits made by both 
organised and non-organised crime, equating to 1.5% of the world’s GDP 
(Galeotti 2005; Fabre 2009). Operating in a more networked and business-like 
fashion the illicit global ‘narcobusiness’ has greatly diversified and intensified 
the production of its products (Galeotti 2005). Moreover, it has become 
increasingly adept at utilising with great effect an incredibly feverish shipping 
industry capable of inspecting “a maximum of only 5% of the cargo passing 
through customs” (Nordstrom 2007:118) in order to successfully connect 
expanding zones of production, transit and distribution (Hall 2012b).  
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One should also give consideration to the largely invisible and often ignored 
trade in counterfeit pharmaceuticals, for which there is comparatively little 
empirical data (Nordstrom 2007). However, what little has been documented 
reveals that “an estimated 10% of all the medicines traded globally are 
counterfeit” (Thachuk 2007:15). Although with levels of trade rising markedly as 
the consumer demand for cheaper medicine increases, estimates of scale and 
scope are more than likely to be under-representative (Kennedy 2010). It is 
salient to note that the threat of harm to individuals who consume counterfeit 
pharmaceuticals is considerable and should not be underestimated, for the 
products often contain only a very small proportion of the active pharmaceutical 
ingredients essential for addressing the consumer’s ailment (Thachuk 2007; 
Kennedy 2010). This not only nullifies the effectiveness of treatment but can 
potentially result in the consumer’s death (Hopkins Burke 2014).   
 
As with the counterfeit pharmaceutical trade, which has developed an efficient 
and lucrative online dimension capable of augmenting traditional trafficking 
methods (Hopkins Burke 2014), other factions of innovative and adaptive 
criminal organisations, as well as individual criminal entrepreneurs, have 
become increasingly adept at utilising technologies which have both driven and 
emerged out of the process of globalisation (Thachuk 2007). The most pertinent 
of which is perhaps the internet, which has facilitated “the mutation of analogue 
to electronic and digital forms of deviance and crime on a transnational scale” 
(Sandywell 2010:42). Indeed, the near global permeation of internet facilities 
has both accelerated and simplified the distant communication of intelligence 
and the coordination of activities. This has itself been a driving factor in 
establishing looser and more flexible cross-border criminal networks to which 
various ethnic groups now associate (Kennedy 2010; Galeotti 2005). Moreover, 
criminal proceeds generated from such cross-continental collaborations are 
often ‘cleaned’ via sophisticated money-laundering techniques, capable of 
retaining the money’s virtual form of bits and bytes before being electronically 
“transferred across multiple jurisdictions with speed, ease and often with 
anonymity” (Williams and Baudin-O’Hayon 2002:132).  
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Fundamentally, the sheer pervasiveness and embedded nature of new digital 
information technologies has rapidly transformed the operational structure and 
remit of both organised and non-organised crime to the point where “our normal 
categories of crime and criminality seem wholly inadequate” (Sandywell 
2010:39). Indeed alongside the waning of certain crimes into stages of 
obsolescence has been an evolutionary mutation of technologically enabled 
adaptive and new forms of crime, to which both criminal justice agencies and 
criminologists have been considerably slow to react (McQuade 2006; Thachuk 
2007). It can be successfully argued that criminal factions are considerably 
more adroit in assimilating the schematic knowledge required to navigate the 
technologically sophisticated contours of a globalising world, proving to be 
“smart adversaries with a capacity for learning, high levels of adaptation, and a 
ruthlessness and nimbleness that governments are rarely able to replicate” 
(Williams and Baudin-O’Hayon 2002:141).  
 
It is perhaps worth noting that transnational organised crime in particular is 
evolving at a rapid pace. Those who operate within its fold are particularly quick 
to capitalise upon technologically sophisticated and highly profitable criminal 
facilitators which allow them to fluidly embrace new markets, transgress 
traditional hierarchies and in some cases ultimately move entirely beyond 
physical transgressions against easily identifiable victims (Galeotti 2005; 
Albanese 2011; Findlay 1999). Evidently, “transnational organised crime is not 
stagnant, but is an ever-changing industry, adapting to markets and creating 
new forms of crime” (Hopkins Burke 2014:423). Considering the range of illicit 
activities pursued by transnational organised crime groups, as well as the 
frequent emergence of extremely profitable new and adaptive forms of crime, it 
is perhaps unsurprising to note that there have in fact been considerable 
increases in crimes deemed to be transnational in nature (Kennedy 2010; 
Hopkins Burke 2014; Gilman et al 2011). 
 
However, as with globalisation in general, the explosive increase in 
transnational organised crime as well as crimes associated with looser and 
more transient networks (Hopkins Burke 2014; Kennedy 2010; Gilman et al 
2011), should not be simply viewed as an external problem ‘out there’ but as an 
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‘in here’ phenomenon “that impacts on community experiences of crime and 
victimisation at the local level” (Goodey 2005:225; Giddens 1999). This is a 
salient point worth reiteration for there still remains a tendency to view 
transnational organised crime in particular as an external threat enunciated with 
all the lexical vigour of an alien conspiracy theory (Hobbs and Antonopoulos 
2013). Yet this only serves to perpetuate the articulation of unhelpful and 
dichotomous discourses within which a disproportionate focus upon the 
transnational serves only to obscure the local view, subsequently precluding 
any thorough exploration of the complexities surrounding the interplays between 
macro and micro contexts (Edwards 2005; Hobbs and Antonopoulos 2013; 
Hobbs and Dunnighan 1998).  
 
Having expressed concerns regarding the inadequacy of scholarly 
investigations of organised crime rooted in notions of transnationality, a number 
of scholars have preferred instead to highlight the particular importance of 
understanding organised crime’s dynamic local context (Hobbs and Dunnighan 
1998). This is because rather than being experienced in some abstract field of 
transnationality devoid of relations “it is at the local level that organised crime 
manifests itself as a tangible process of activity” (Hobbs 1998:408). Indeed 
organised crime, as Hobbs (1998:419) goes on to articulate, is “local at all 
points”. Accordingly, it is within this context that Robertson’s (1995:26) 
conceptualisation of the term “glocalization” can and has been put to work as an 
organising framework through which to explore both organised and loosely 
networked forms of crime (Hobbs and Dunnighan 1998; Edwards 2005; Winlow 
2001). 
 
The ‘Glocal’ Connection:  
In what has understandably become an often quoted passage Robertson 
(1995:34) maintains that: 
[I]t makes no good sense to define the global as if the global excludes 
the local. In somewhat technical terms, defining the global in such a 
way suggests that the global lies beyond all localities, as having 
systematic properties over and beyond the attributes of units within a 
global system.  
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This captures quite nicely the essence of the backcloth against which 
Robertson advances the notion of glocalization, a concept which, despite being 
either marginalised or simply glossed over by much of the globalisation 
literature (Bauman 1998), has certainly proven to be an important one. It has 
essentially reframed the often polarised global-local problematic so as to reflect 
with greater accuracy the way in which the global and the local interact and 
integrate in a process which ignites their bilateral implosion. From this process 
emerges the ‘glocal’, comprising an idiosyncratic mix of the two (Robertson 
1995; Ritzer 2007).  
 
Whilst there undoubtedly remains a certain cultural embeddedness or localised 
root inherent within globalising conditions (Aas 2013), it is nevertheless 
becoming increasingly rare if not altogether impossible to find within the world 
locales entirely untouched by the enveloping processes of globalisation (Ritzer 
2007). Indeed, culminating in what Ritzer (2007:159, original emphasis) terms 
“the death of the local”, the co-evolutionary implosion of the global and local 
facilitates the rapid evaporation of anything hitherto purely local to the extent 
that “much of what we often think of as the local is, in reality, the glocal” (Ritzer 
2007:31). This is not to say however that localised cultural and normative 
arterials dry up and disintegrate entirely, quite the contrary in fact as even within 
the glocal there certainly remain important vestiges of the local (Ritzer 2007; 
Kennedy 2010). Rather it is to suggest that local understandings combine with 
broader global influences to form new understandings or points of reference 
around which social actions may be framed (Winlow 2001). Fundamentally, 
local social relations indigenize globally appropriated socio-economic and 
politico-cultural elements which are subsequently seamlessly quilted into local 
experiential lifeworlds (Kennedy 2010). This in turn helps to perpetuate, if only 
in adulterated form, the globalising project, thereby involving both the global and 
the local in a relationally obscure parasitic symbiosis (Kennedy 2010; Edwards 
2005). 
 
When applied to the social scientific investigation of crime and criminality, the 
use of glocalization as an organising framework allows us to explicate how 
crimes inevitably manifest themselves at the local level, as external 
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criminogenic influences are inscribed upon the demands of local criminal 
markets to which deviant entrepreneurs respond (Goodey 2005). Indeed, as 
Winlow (2001:166) cogently notes, “crime and criminals have adapted to their 
changing cultural environment and have absorbed the influence of the global, 
while not entirely casting off the historical and local”. Interpretations of 
globalising influences mediated via the remnants of localised historical and 
cultural referents are integral to the successful navigation of new marketised 
spaces, opened up by the ever deepening coalescence of global and local 
alliances within both the realms of the licit and illicit (Winlow 2001; Hobbs 2013).  
 
However, in what undoubtedly represents a discernible break with the recent 
past (Hobbs and Dunnighan 1998; Winlow 2001), criminal entrepreneurs have 
been able to establish flexible alliances and ever-mutating interwoven networks 
with similar entities. Such associations are capable of providing varying degrees 
of brokerage from either within or outside geographical nodes of operation, as 
numerous forms of serious and organised crime groups become increasingly 
adept at occupying both local and global contexts (Hobbs 2013; Hobbs 1998). 
Consequently, a great many criminal career trajectories are no longer bound to 
geographical locations characterised by stereotypical images of the urban 
‘under world’ (Hobbs 2013). The jettisoning of nostalgic practices once 
associated with the ‘local firm’, alongside the expedient use of market 
broadening brokerage, have proven to be useful mediums through which the 
spheres of both the local and the global may be traversed (Hobbs 2013; Winlow 
2001). Accordingly, rigid hierarchies no longer constitute the dominant structural 
characteristic of serious and organised crime groups (Albanese 2011). Such 
factions are now widely recognised as being characterised by complex and 
flexible criminal networks, imbued with unaffiliated criminal freelancers capable 
of operating in numerous different localities with seemingly infinite collaborators 
(Ruggiero 1993; Hobbs and Dunnighan 1998).  
 
What this brief delineation of the multifaceted and complex interplay between 
loosely structured local and global networks of negotiated criminal 
collaborations has shown is that ultimately “our experience of crime is grounded 
in the local” (Hobbs and Dunnighan 1998:289). Indeed, despite being unable to 
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attain a palpable foothold within the empirical organised crime literature (Hall 
2012), it was Hobbs’ (1998) lucid excursion down the glocal that highlighted the 
importance of local contexts. This contribution stimulated others to note the 
inexorable rise of glocalized criminal markets which operate in a global shadow 
economy by fostering ‘glocal nodes’, predicated upon the collaborative melding 
of global networks and localised knowledge (Hall 2012b, 2012c). “Appreciating 
the geographic particularities of deviant flows” (Gilman et al 2011:10) and 
recognising the importance of positioning glocalized nodal points as essential 
units of analysis (Edwards 2005), the remainder of this chapter will focus upon 
the explication of Lake Town as one such ‘glocal node’. 
 
Much has been made of the importance of understanding the complex flows of 
flexible criminal networks that manifest themselves within local contexts, and 
rightly so. However, this should not detract from the fact that “crime is also part 
of the complex articulation of cultural and economic conditions that originate 
beyond the local” (Hobbs 2013:222). Indeed, as outlined at the beginning of this 
chapter, Lake Town suffered greatly from the socio-economic fallout of 
widespread deindustrialisation, a process which produced various casualties 
including the disintegration of traditional forms of community which once 
characterised the identity of the working-class (Hall and Winlow 2005a). 
Fundamentally, it can perhaps be argued that the resultant loss of communal 
ties and a sense of groundedness which accompanied the displacement of a 
collectively shared working-class habitus (Scholte 2005; Schirato and Webb 
2003), is akin to the frantic unravelling of the quilting points which once 
maintained the illusory fantasy of the social democratic big Other, the collective 
fib to which we all subscribed (Myers 2003).  
 
The position being advanced here is that following the demise of the partial and 
fragile social democratic big Other and the symbolic efficiency which previously 
buttressed its ideological structure, the subject has become encumbered with 
an oppressive and terrifying freedom (Winlow and Hall 2013). This terrible 
sense of independence is sustained, if not intensified, by the big Other’s innate 
state of lack, inconsistency and fragility of which the subject becomes 
increasingly aware as separation from the big Other solidifies (Winlow and Hall 
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2013; Žižek 2000b, 2006). With diminished authority the big Other fails to retain 
subjects of nature or tradition and in their place emerge creatures imbued with 
freedom of choice purchased with the severance of all conventional ties (Myers 
2003). Devoid of traditionally verified points of reference that provide “the 
ultimate horizon of meaning” (Žižek 2006:10) and cultural yardsticks against 
which symbolic identities can be measured, the subject approaches a state of 
hysteria (Žižek 2000a). Indeed, one is forced to permanently question the 
symbolic identity conferred by a big Other now incapable of determining 
appropriate social protocols (Winlow and Hall 2013).  
 
As a response to the increasingly senseless and ungrounded nature of 
deindustrialised social spaces which individuals are now forced to inhabit, 
attempts to restore some semblance of order are pursued by constructing 
various little others intended to take the place of the big Other (Winlow and Hall 
2013; Žižek 2008b). Predominantly these little others take the form of an 
expanding network of unconvincing bureaucratic authorities (Winlow and Hall 
2013). It can be argued however that glocalized criminal networks may in fact 
constitute yet another form of little other, through which individuals may find 
new reference points capable of providing meaning. Indeed, penetrating the 
void created by the absence of working-class ideological and socio-cultural 
quilting points, glocalized forms of crime serve to re-energize local and regional 
opportunities for economic activity in Lake Town’s otherwise barren 
deindustrialised wasteland (Hall 2012b). This point may perhaps be further 
clarified by augmenting slightly Hobbs’ (1998:409) assertion that “when the 
material base for such communities is removed [loss of the big Other], crime 
becomes located within loose collectivities of ad hoc groupings [little others]”. 
Fundamentally, whilst inevitably corrosive to many individuals’ quality of life and 
communities’ social relations, both organised and non-organised criminal 
networks function to reintroduce some sense of adulterated stability and offer 
various ‘employment’ opportunities in the realm of criminal entrepreneurship 
(Hall 2012b, 2012c; Hobbs 1998). Indeed crime is, Winlow (2001:170) argues, 
“one of the few traditional trades that still offers an apprenticeship in the post-
industrial North East”.  
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Accordingly, for those seemingly devoid of accessible legal avenues through 
which consumer-stimulated ambitions and commodified desires may be at least 
temporarily satisfied, involvement in networked criminal entrepreneurship often 
provides mediated means of momentarily slaking such desires and facilitating 
the attainment of stimulated ambitions (Hall and Winlow 2005a). Arguably, it is 
precisely because such criminal entrepreneurship caters for these more reliably 
stimulated baser human drives and desires within organically organised 
relations of trust and reciprocity that criminal markets are, economically 
speaking, more stable than their legitimate counterparts (Hall 2012b). Moreover, 
glocalized criminal networks provide those who constitute the social debris of 
deindustrialised communities such as Lake Town with suitable touchstones 
indicative of those associated with the traditional working-class habitus, from 
which they derive a sense of order however distorted and sporadic it may be 
(Hobbs and Dunnighan 1998; Hobbs 1998). This may be because such 
networks are inherently imbued with a resonance reminiscent of the localised 
criminal organisation historically deeply entrenched in urban working-class 
culture (Hobbs 2001). Proving incredibly seductive and comparing favourably 
with the otherwise bleak reality of life in deindustrialised Lake Town, glocalized 
forms of crime offer modified frames of reference for the interpretation of 
symbolic success (Winlow 2001). Moreover, they reframe the context within 
which the reinterpretation of traditional working-class methodologies serve as 
viable means through which such success can be pursued (Hobbs 2013). 
 
Working within a plethora of newly created fertile domains of illegality created 
by the harsh post-industrial milieu engulfing locales such as Lake Town (Hobbs 
1998), many criminal entrepreneurs operate as fluid, flexible, multi-dimensional 
and interlocking hubs. They are able to pursue opportunities likely to yield 
pecuniary success via the expedient use of a wide range of networked 
interactions, which ultimately facilitate involvement in an immense gamut of 
deviant entrepreneurship (Hobbs 2001, 1998; Hobbs and Dunnighan 1998). 
The characteristically flexible, mobile and often transient nature of these hubs 
allows them to operate on ever-changing terrain “exploiting geographic space 
without being restrained by territorial imperatives” (Hobbs 2001:554). Indeed, 
having established artificial yet instrumental relationships with other criminal 
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freelancers (Hobbs 2001, 1998), criminal entrepreneurs are able to utilise the 
‘earned’ stock of bridging social capital to transcend specific neighbourhoods 
and operate across different locales (Hobbs and Dunnighan 1998; Hobbs 2001; 
Winlow 2001).  
 
Such entrepreneurial diversification may function as a springboard likely to 
secure hubs with upwardly mobile career trajectories marked with varying 
degrees of success (Hobbs 1998). A precursor of such success is however 
mediated by the ability to cater for “indigenous renditions of global markets” 
(Hobbs 1998:416). Accordingly, the solicitation of local knowledge obtained via 
the establishment of glocal connections, particularly with young people whose 
cultural capital can be used to help attract customers and boost sales within 
specific glocal nodes, is of considerable importance (Hall 2012b). Consequently 
it can perhaps be argued that whilst glocalized criminal networks and 
interdependent hubs maintain a fairly loose and horizontal hierarchy, there 
nevertheless remains a discernible distinction between those on the demand 
side, those who occupy the lower end of the supply chain and those higher up 
the chain (Hobbs 2013). Simply put, there exists what can perhaps be viewed 
as a diagonal hierarchy of criminal entrepreneurs. Those hubs who possess 
denser webs of information linking networks, due to their higher degree of 
embeddedness within their operational realm of criminal entrepreneurship 
(Hobbs 1998), retain higher standing than those who simply labour 
opportunistically or sporadically for such hubs. 
 
Preliminary evidence for such an assertion is drawn from the researcher’s 
empirical data where it was discovered that a respondent, who was no stranger 
to low level criminality, was simply holding a significant quantity of cocaine for 
what was described as ‘quite an established’ dealer for payment of £100. Whilst 
the dealer’s status as a well-established hub with numerous interconnecting 
links undoubtedly imbues him with considerable standing as a criminal 
entrepreneur, the respondent’s involvement was purely opportunistic thus 
simply making him, in his words, “the little knob-head at the end of it”. What this 
brief delineation provides is a slightly more nuanced view of traditional 
vertical/horizontal hierarchy debates by positing what can perhaps be termed 
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the hierarchy of embeddedness. Essentially, this reveals a more diagonal 
hierarchical trajectory based upon an individual’s degree of embeddedness and 
concomitant density of networks within the realm of criminal entrepreneurship. 
However, it must be stressed that this is not to suggest that this transient 
diagonal hierarchy is emblematic of some fixed structure of criminal 
entrepreneurship. Rather it simply reveals the existence of varying degrees of 
embeddedness amongst those who form “a series of temporary social 
arrangements that enables a constantly changing group of actors to make 
money from predominantly criminal opportunities” (Hobbs 1998:413).  
 
Adding credential weight to the notion of analytical generalizability presented in 
chapter four, Lake Town’s glocalized hubs and the stock pile of sporadic and 
opportunistic ‘labourers’ who contribute to both their operational capacity and 
reservoir of local social and cultural capital, are evidently reminiscent of those 
identified by Hobbs and Dunnighan (1998). Indeed, a seemingly eclectic mix of 
sporadic and opportunistic labourers and more deeply embedded hubs have 
forged interlocking yet transient networks of diagonally hierarchized relationality, 
in order to traverse with greater success shifting terrains characterised by an 
increasingly dense blend of the local and the global (Hobbs 2001). 
Representing a synthesis of local cultural influences and global inputs (Winlow 
2001), Lake Town’s glocalized networks of criminal entrepreneurs are suitably 
positioned to respond to local demands for illicit goods and services.  
 
Accordingly Lake Town, as well as the wider conurbation of which it is a part, 
hosts established markets in the illegal sale of contraband and counterfeit 
cigarettes (Antonopoulos and Hall 2015), alongside a formidable narcotics 
industry dominated primarily by thriving heroin, cocaine and ecstasy markets 
(MacDonald et al 2007; Shildrick et al 2012; MacDonald and Marsh 2005; Lloyd 
2013). Additionally, in congruence with other glocal nodes (Treadwell 2011), the 
sale of stolen and counterfeit commodities has become a staple of many 
criminal entrepreneurs who have capitalised upon the expedient use of 
technological facilitators such as the internet in order to transform the traditional 
trade into a more lucrative venture. That is, one capable of catering for a 
burgeoning consumer demand for recognised yet affordable symbols of 
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success associated with active involvement in the legitimate formal economy 
(Treadwell 2011; Hall 2012). As will be further explicated in chapter five, Lake 
Town’s criminal beneficiaries often view such entrepreneurs as providing a 
necessary service to an otherwise disadvantaged community. This is 
commensurate with other areas whose consumer-oriented criminal 
entrepreneurship is geared towards catering for those who find themselves 
unable or unwilling to participate in the legal procurement of high valued 
commodities (Antonopoulos et al 2011).  
 
Consequently involvement in — to coin a phrase inspired by Gilman et al (2011) 
— deviant glocalization may provide those on the precipice of post-industrial 
communities such as Lake Town a potential escape from poverty or the 
drudgery of low-pay no-pay cycles of underemployment and unemployment. It 
may also enable community beneficiaries of such criminal entrepreneurship to 
experience the spasmodic acquisition of commodified success symbols 
(Kennedy 2010; Hall 2012). Indeed, these two facets emerged frequently during 
the empirical data analysis which is presented in chapter five. However, it is 
perhaps worth mentioning at this early stage that these two outcomes of 
involvement in deviant glocalization should be divorced from the romantic 
images of philanthropic criminals which impoverished early radical 
criminological writings (Jones 2006). Certainly, whilst the acquisition, if not the 
means of acquisition, of commodified success symbols may be viewed under 
certain circumstances by some as being socially licit (Hall 2012), the social 
harm involved remains considerable. Indeed, both the entrepreneur and the 
beneficiary are forced to purchase their modicum of symbolic recognition via 
illicit means. However, the social harm risked or endured by both factions during 
the phases of procurement, sale and acquisition of tangible symbols of 
recognition remain either unacknowledged or simplistically reduced to discrete 
and quantifiable incidents of actions, officially defined as criminal within the 
narrowly focused and event-oriented ‘crime decline’ discourse (Genn 1988).  
 
Nevertheless, it is within the precarious milieu of the glocal node and its wider 
context outlined above that those with whom the researcher spoke find 
themselves battling for survival amongst the insecurity that pervades what 
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remains of communities hollowed out by the aforementioned globalising 
processes. Indeed, it is here that the majority of those who participated in this 
research endure numerous and considerable forms of crime and social harm, 
unamenable to the rigid counting frames of reference preferred by the survey 
methodologies that inform the prematurely triumphal ‘crime decline’ discourse 
(Genn 1988). Accordingly, it is to these largely ignored flows of crime and harm 
that chapter three directs its attention. 
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Chapter Three:  
 
Invisible Crimes and Non-Criminalised Harms . 
 
As the last two chapters have shown, politically influential sections of 
criminology continue to be constrained by a narrow view of what constitutes the 
‘crime problem’ (Muncie 2000), and therefore remain largely out of step with the 
momentous changes in the dynamics of criminality occurring throughout the 
social landscape (Hil and Robertson 2003). Contributing in no small part to this 
unsynchronised position is the hegemonic dominance afforded to the utilisation 
of standardised survey-based methodologies by an embedded congregation of 
‘datasaurs’ (Young 2011). These ‘creatures’ remain contently committed to 
conducting a-theoretical quantitative research grounded in narrow 
conceptualisations of ‘crime’ and ‘victims’ (DeKeseredy forthcoming 2016; 
Pointing and Maguire 1988). Such commitment results not only in distortions of 
the extent, nature and distribution of crime and harm but actively contributes 
towards perpetuating the invisibility of certain types of crime; particularly those 
that do not fit neatly into the simplistic counting frames of reference favoured by 
those in pursuit of pragmatic expediency and blinkered visions of ‘what works’ 
(Jupp et al 1999; Squires 2013). 
 
Taking pride of place as one quintessential manifestation of the tendencies 
alluded to within the above sketching of the broad criminological landscape is 
the ICVS. This research instrument and those who have utilised its data to claim 
the existence of a ‘universal drop in crime’ have undoubtedly contributed 
towards maintaining the invisibility of many serious global crimes, thereby 
distorting the world’s ‘true crime story’ (Zvekic 1996). Indeed, they have 
selectively chosen and customised their view of crime, developing explanatory 
accounts based upon empirical excavations that scratch only the tip of the 
iceberg (van Dijk 2007a). This leaves untouched the quantitatively greater and 
qualitatively different flows of crime situated below the surface (Bottomley 
1979). Consequently despite claims that surveys such as the ICVS “provide an 
estimate of the true level of crime experienced by victims, including the so-
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called dark numbers” (van Dijk 2008:41-42), the “doubly-dark” figures of many 
international crimes (Rothe and Kauzlarich 2014:10) continue to overshadow 
the ICVS’s practical and methodological capabilities thereby eluding its 
investigatory scope (van Dijk 2007a; van Dijk and Shaw 2009).   
 
Indeed, many international crimes that produce a tremendous amount of harm 
continue to be ignored by the ICVS and its proponents, and are thus not 
considered when making claims of ‘universally declining crime rates’. However, 
the following brief excursion through this hidden landscape is not necessarily 
intended solely as a critique of what the ICVS has not done, for some of its 
main proponents readily admit its shortcomings in charting the hidden flows of a 
number of global crimes (van Dijk 2007a; van Dijk and Shaw 2009; van Dijk 
2011). Rather it serves to forcefully highlight the state of fetishistic disavowal 
that pervades the ICVS and draw attention to the scholarly irresponsibility of 
trumpeting overgeneralised, and quite simply untrue, assertions of a “universal 
drop in crime” (van Kesteren et al 2014:65). This will be achieved by positioning 
against the backdrop of such claims a number of particularly harmful crimes that 
maintain a global resonance. 
   
The Hidden Landscape of Global Crime:  
By “mapping the contours of invisibility” Jupp et al (1999:5) helpfully identify 
seven independent yet mutually reinforcing characteristic features, which 
together can be utilised to assess the relative invisibility of crime. These 
features include a lack of knowledge, statistics, theory, research, control, 
politics and panic (Jupp et al 1999). A number of these characteristic features 
are certainly exhibited by many of the globe’s prolific hidden crimes, including 
the burgeoning and extremely lucrative trade in human trafficking (Thachuk 
2007; Steele 2014; Galeotti 2005), which not only remains unamenable to 
reliable measurement but to adequate individual and organisational awareness 
(Aronowitz 2011; Clause and Lawler 2013). Similarly, there is little empirical 
data on the often ignored trade in counterfeit pharmaceuticals (Nordstrom 
2007), and perhaps even less professional and consumer knowledge 
surrounding the extent to which illicit traders have successfully inserted 
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counterfeits into the legitimate supply chain (Chaudhry and Stumpf 2013). 
Moreover, many illicit pharmaceutical traders have effectively utilised 
technological innovations as facilitators of invisibility (Francis et al 1999; Hall 
and Antonopoulos 2015), with approximately over half of all medicines sold via 
the internet in 2008 being classified as counterfeit (Dégardin et al 2014). 
However, relevant legislation to effectively combat the problems posed by these 
internet pharmacies is often non-existent (Dégardin et al 2014).  
 
These identified features of invisibility are further evident within economic crime, 
which despite its toll exceeding that of ‘conventional crime’ remains absent from 
crime audits and victimisation surveys (Croall 2009). Such crime is less likely 
than its more ‘conventional’ counterparts to feature in the media and many of 
those who fall victim to it remain largely unaware of their victimisation (Croall 
2009; Box 1989). Similarly, despite the significant threat posed to our planetary 
well-being, there is relatively little knowledge regarding the scale of 
transnational environmental crime nor the types of criminality involved (White 
2011).   
 
Consequently, it can be successfully argued that these crimes alongside those 
articulated in chapter two, though harmful, are conspicuous only by their 
absence within the ICVS inspired ‘international crime decline’ discourse. 
Indeed, they appear to have gained a state of exception based upon their 
designation as ‘non-conventional’ crimes. This status has seemingly allowed the 
embedded congregation of scholars associated with the crime decline discourse 
to fetishistically disavow their existence, whilst maintaining an unjustifiable focus 
upon the ‘conventional’ crimes thought to be more amenable to statistical 
measurement (van Dijk and Shaw 2009; van Dijk 2007a). However, the purpose 
of this chapter is not to further explore the analytical absence of such ‘non-
conventional’ crimes, for this relatively straightforward critique of the ICVS has 
already been presented within this thesis, and has to some extent been 
conceded by one of its major architects (van Dijk and Shaw 2009; van Dijk 
2007a). Rather the significance of this section of the chapter lies in the 
excavation of the hidden landscape of everyday crime and the illumination of 
the persistent and almost mundane nature of crime and victimisation, both 
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perpetrated and experienced by individuals as a social fact seamlessly woven 
into the fabric of everyday life (Hall et al 2008). 
 
The Hidden Landscape of Everyday Crime:   
Despite the inordinate focus placed by the ICVS and its proponents upon 
uncovering the ‘true’ extent and ‘actual’ experiences of victimisation by 
conventional crime among ‘ordinary’ people (van Dijk 2008), quite often the 
experiences and repressed views of the ‘silent majority’ remain either 
uncaptured or entirely unsolicited (Hall and Winlow 2015). Consequently such 
accounts, which contribute enormously to the dark figure of conventional crime, 
remain hidden from the ICVS’s ‘tunnel of vision’ (see figure 1). Indeed, it has 
already been established that the ICVS appears incapable of capturing 
sensitive and often prolonged and habitual experiences of sexual assault and 
other forms of abuse, by remaining wedded to its methodological naivety and 
itemised counting frame of reference (Young 2003; Genn 1988; Goodey 2000; 
Spalek 2006).  
 
Similarly, although attempts have been made by the ICVS to solicit data on the 
exposure to drug-related problems in developed countries (van Dijk et al 2007), 
it remains incapable of capturing both the nature and extent of this largely 
hidden crime let alone providing any indication of its evolution or trends over 
time (Barton 2011; Aebi and Linde 2010). Such failure is not surprising for there 
are numerous reasons which preclude the reporting of drug activity to either the 
police or a stranger administering a survey. First and foremost it must be 
acknowledged that not only has the dealing of illicit drugs become a normal part 
of everyday life for many individuals living in post-industrial locales such as 
Lake Town (Hobbs 2013), but that the consumption of a number of ‘recreational’ 
drugs has also become normalised (Aldridge et al 2011). Even among 
abstainers drug use is often tolerated and rarely reported to officialdom despite 
retaining its ‘deviant’ branding (Barton 2011). To complicate matters further, 
there is evidence pointing towards the existence of a hierarchy of acceptable 
drug use, a phenomena similar to what Shildrick (2002:44) terms “differentiated 
normalisation”. In essence, this refers to a mentality whereby many individuals 
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tend to view the use of certain drugs, such as cannabis for example, as being 
relatively unproblematic, or at least not sharing the same social stigma attached 
to the distribution or use of ‘harder’ drugs (Shildrick 2002; MacDonald and 
Marsh 2002; Barton 2011).  
 
However, besides being “unable to adequately reach the hidden population of 
drug users” (Barton 2011:29), perhaps one of the strongest inhibiters to the 
pursuit of data concerning ‘exposure to drug-related problems’ is the fear of 
reprisal (Anderson 2000), for “disastrous consequences await those who snitch” 
(Jacobs 2000:29). Indeed, whilst a firm adherence to an informal ‘code of the 
street’ serves to mitigate feelings of insecurity and vulnerability fostered by 
growing distrust towards institutions of legal authority (Evans et al 1996), it 
tends to cultivate deeper distrust of officialdom and the imposition of strong 
normative injunctions to avoid ‘grassing’ or ‘snitching’ (Anderson 2000; 
Rosenfeld et al 2003). Organised around such a code of conduct, those 
involved in the drug trade often employ extreme violence as a means of 
punishing both actual and perceived violations of the code (Anderson 2000). 
   
Consequently, a disproportionate share of violent crime is perpetrated against 
those who are themselves involved in various forms of crime, from low-level 
drug dealing to property offences and assaults (Jacobs 2000; Rosenfeld et al 
2003). Representing “one of criminology’s dirty little secrets” (Topalli et al 
2002:337), this often ignored phenomenon indicates that most serious crime 
involves non-ideal victims and takes place beyond the view of criminal justice 
practitioners and surveyors. Indeed Currie (2009) explains that not only are 
such victims unlikely to be contacted by victimisation surveys, but that they are 
even less likely to respond honestly about their experiences if they were 
contacted. The upshot is that those who are most at risk of being subject to 
violent victimisation, and in fact “make up a disproportionate share of crime 
victims” (Rosenfeld et al 2003:307), remain shadowy silhouettes lying beyond 
the sampling boundaries of surveys like the ICVS. 
 
For many of these individuals, particularly those involved in the drug trade, 
experiences of violence are both commonplace and normal aspects of everyday 
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life, often viewed as unexceptional occupational hazards (Jacobs 2000). 
Indeed, whilst in possession of valuable merchandise and often considerable 
sums of money with no recourse to protection from legal authorities, drug 
dealers make alluring targets with a high rate of victimisation (Jacobs 2000; 
Topalli et al 2002). With this high risk of victimisation and an inability to call 
upon formal justice mechanisms, drug dealers rely heavily on forms of 
retaliation as a mechanism of informal control (Jacques et al 2014). Such 
retaliation, described by Jacques and Wright (2011:733) as “unilateral self-help 
accomplished through theft, fraud, vandalism, or violence”, is a common 
reaction with the simultaneous purpose of punishing acts of robbery or ‘taxing’ 
and deterring others from attempting similar transgressions. Simply put 
retaliation, as a form of swift, certain and severe street justice, is utilised to right 
perceived wrongs and create or solidify a reputation for formidability as this 
remains one of the only available mechanisms capable of deterring future 
victimisation (Jacobs 2000; Jacques et al 2014). However, episodes of 
retaliation following experiences of robbery or ‘taxation’ often ignite acts of 
counter-retaliation which serve to draw into emergent conflicts a greater number 
of participants, thereby helping to sustain potentially lethal retaliatory cycles and 
contributing towards the contagion of aggression (Jacobs 2000).  
 
Despite the sheer pervasiveness of this normalised phenomenon — which is 
deeply embedded and widely recognised within a street culture that has 
emerged in the form of a little other presenting itself as a realistic alternative to 
the social democratic big Other — it barely appears in crime statistics (Jacobs 
2000). Indeed, drug robbery remains the quintessential hidden crime existing 
beyond the law and below the surface of official recognition (Jacobs 2000; 
Topalli et al 2002). It must be acknowledged however, that a number of other 
violent crimes exist on this plane equally entrenched in the ‘code of the street’, 
where episodes of ‘taxing’, retaliation, counter-retaliation and street justice 
remain pervasive and bound up with the normative injunction not to grass 
(Jacobs 2000; Evans et al 1996). 
 
One such example is the often violent victimisation experienced by the 
homeless who, despite being more likely than the general population to be 
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victims of crime (Fitzpatrick et al 1993) and in fact are victimised 
disproportionately often (Lee and Schreck 2005; Garland et al 2010), are 
excluded from the ICVS’s consideration due to their ‘non-residential’ status. 
Whilst already existing in a perilous and “ultimate state of victimisation” 
(Fitzpatrick et al 1993:366), the homeless are often subject to further 
victimisation by both the general public and other members of the homeless 
population. In some cases the latter are acting in retaliation to prior 
transgressions and therefore alternate between the roles of victim and offender 
(Lee and Schreck 2005). The extant literature indicates that instances of theft, 
intimidation, harassment, assault, robbery and sexual exploitation are common 
experiences among the homeless, and constitute for many of those who have 
experienced prolonged or multiple stints of homelessness a routine aspect of 
everyday life (Huey and Quirouette 2010; Garland et al 2010; Lee and Schreck 
2005).  
 
Consequently, it can be successfully argued that the claims of declining rates of 
crime stand in stark contrast to the high rates of victimisation experienced by 
the homeless (Lee and Schreck 2005). Evidently, whilst the daily lives of this 
forgotten population and the means by which they endeavour to survive them is 
often criminalised, their victimisation remains hidden in plain sight (Garland et al 
2010). Compounding this invisibility is the fact that such victimisation is severely 
underreported as many homeless people feel unable or unwilling to inform law 
enforcement agencies or even other state-based institutions (Huey and 
Quirouette 2010; Garland et al 2010). Interestingly, a frequently offered reason 
as to why many homeless people do not report their victimisation is the strict 
adherence to the same normative prohibition against grassing discussed above 
(Huey and Quirouette 2010). Certainly, breaching this “most sacred of all 
taboos” (Ancrum 2014:52) is to risk violent retaliation and potentially debilitating 
exclusion from one’s peer group and the reciprocal bonds that help to sustain 
life on the street (Huey and Quirouette 2010).  
 
Strict adherence to this normative prohibition against grassing has undoubtedly 
assumed a position of salience throughout large segments of the wider social 
body, including among the otherwise law-abiding (Morris 2010). This is 
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particularly the case for those locked in marginalised and crime rich areas of 
permanent recession such as Lake Town, where safety, status and the 
prospects of simply ‘getting by’ all depend on maintaining a deep commitment 
to the ‘no-grassing rule’ (Ancrum 2014). Indeed, in such areas where the 
‘special liberty’ of those who dispense street justice retains a conspicuous 
omnipresence (Hall 2012b; Evans et al 1996) “the ability to mind one’s own 
business is vital” (Jacobs 2000:29).  
 
For this reason many individuals “see but don’t see” (Anderson 2000:132) in 
that they actively endeavour to ensure that people do not notice them 
witnessing matters of ‘street business’ in order to preserve their personal safety. 
This necessary blindness in plain sight of often brutal victimisation has become 
a doxic response within communities where high rates of crime and 
victimisation constitute a normal social fact, simply representing yet another 
obstacle to be routinely negotiated (Young 1999; Garland 2001). Thus despite 
statistically diminishing crime rates a number of economically marginalised 
locales remain blighted by a plethora of harms and illegalities that continue to 
go largely unreported (Hall et al 2008). Certainly for many of those who fall 
victim to them, such experiences retain a remarkable familiarity exemplified by 
the military abbreviation SNAFU — Situation Normal, All Fucked Up 
(Groombridge 2013). 
 
It must be acknowledged however that alongside the normalisation of such 
criminal encounters lies the issue of structural normalisation, whereby rather 
than simply serving to fracture or destroy purportedly functional communities 
“certain types of crime increasingly function as part of the reproduction of social 
and economic life” (Lea 2002:140). Accordingly, many individuals may ‘see but 
don’t see’ because they actively support and benefit from such social crime 
(Anderson 2000; Lea 1999). To act differently is to risk potentially jeopardising 
the social function of these forms of crime, especially those associated with the 
informal or hidden economy (Yates 2006). Comprising acts of unreported and 
illegal economic transactions such as illicit drug distribution, prostitution and the 
trading of stolen or counterfeit goods, the hidden economy operates in the 
shadow of the legitimate economy and often constitutes a normal everyday 
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feature of many ordinary people’s lives (Beirne and Messerschmidt 1995; Henry 
1978). 
 
Whilst those on the supply side of the hidden economy undoubtedly utilise such 
normalised entrepreneurial ventures for the asocial pursuit of “fantasised 
positions of social distinction and ‘respect’” (Hall et al 2008:13), these illicit 
transactions are nevertheless sustained by those on the demand side who not 
only tolerate such illegalities but view them favourably as meeting their socio-
economic needs (Lea 1999, 2002). Certainly, for many of those existing within a 
milieu pervaded by substantial levels of poverty, inequality, unemployment and 
sporadic periods of underemployment in low-paid and insecure forms of work, 
involvement in the hidden economy has become a reasonable and attractive 
method of survival (Lea 2002; Henry 1978). In particular, shoplifting and the 
trade in stolen and counterfeit goods have assumed a position of particular 
salience in many poor communities, as not only are they considered to be 
necessary for survival but they are instrumental in facilitating access to 
otherwise unaffordable commodities (Lea 1999; Yates 2006). For those 
involved in this ‘survival’ model of social crime “taking the opportunity to 
supplement their often low standard of living seems common sense not crime” 
(Parker et al 1988:106).  
 
Accordingly, attitudes towards such activities are often framed within wider 
ideological mechanisms which operate to help modify socially determined 
distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate behaviour (Jupp et al 1999). This 
serves to blur previously clearly delineated boundaries and ultimately legitimise 
the endeavour to solve structurally induced problems via involvement in the 
hidden economy, despite potentially severe legal sanctions (Lea 2002; Sutton 
2005). The upshot of this is not simply a broad gamut of ‘tolerated illegalities’ 
(Foucault 1991), but an established hierarchy of acceptability complete with a 
lexicon imbued with deliberate linguistic confusion that renders invisible many of 
the crimes associated with the hidden economy (Muncie 2001; Henry 1978), 
especially those considered to be “providing a valuable service” (Wiltshire et al 
2001:203). Consequently, this invisibility is maintained by a community of 
complicit beneficiaries who remain absent of any need to “neutralise that which 
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is already normal and expected” (Lea 2002:139). Moreover, its membership of 
individuals, who have no interest in providing those representing legitimate 
authority with information flows capable of disrupting the social function of the 
hidden economy, tend to increase rather than diminish (Lea 2002). Since both 
effective policing and the construction of official or surveyed statistics remain 
dependent upon high levels of information provided by the public (Lea and 
Young 1993), it is highly possible that much of the social crime associated with 
the hidden economy persists as a large proportion of crime’s dark figure (Henry 
1978; Yates 2006).  
 
This persistence and its subsequent absence from the ‘crime decline’ discourse 
should not be viewed lightly as unimportant ‘petty’ crime, as the potential for 
severe harm remains omnipresent for those who participate in the hidden 
economy. Indeed, not only are participants forced to flirt dangerously with 
sanctionable illegality, but the forms of social crime within which they engage 
are likely to be absorbed and tied up with more organised and harmful criminal 
enterprises capable of infiltrating and moulding such tolerated illegalities to suit 
their purpose (Henry 1978; Lea 1999, 2002). Lea (2002:141) makes the point 
well when he notes that: 
The survival strategies of poor communities increase the hegemony of 
criminal groups as simultaneous sustainers and destroyers of the social 
fabric. The loanshark and his debt-collecting thugs are not far behind 
the shoplifter selling cheap stolen goods.  
 
However, those locked in areas of permanent recession often have little choice 
than to offset their socio-economic redundancy by becoming complicit 
beneficiaries of burgeoning criminal markets, whilst retaining a constant and 
exhausting vigilance as they negotiate the intertwined contours of harmful and 
beneficial criminal activity (Lea 1999, 2002). As with those involved in the drugs 
trade, participants of the hidden economy have little if any recourse to 
protection from legal authorities following victimising events, lest they risk 
exposing their own involvement in the social crime from which they extract the 
last vestiges of adulterated stability (Lea 2002; Yates 2006). Devoid of such 
legal recourse, and with their largely self-policed estates subject only to 
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episodic incursions by the police, volatile street justice and its normative 
prohibition against grassing remains the order of the day (Lea 2002; Jacobs 
2000; Evans et al 1996).  
 
Consequently, much of this landscape remains hidden as its associated forms 
of crime retain their invisibility by becoming increasingly normalised and 
embedded deeper into the social fabric, ontologically and epistemologically 
detached from the view of the state, its congregation of scholars and their 
statistical records (Hall 2012b). Indeed, it is now widely acknowledged that 
crime statistics, whether produced by state officials or victimisation surveyors, 
produce a distorted and misleading indication of the extent and nature of harm 
present in society (Hillyard and Tombs 2004). As the above sketching has 
shown, politically influential sections of criminology continue to operate with this 
statistically myopic view of crime, often understanding victimisation only in a 
very narrow and cursory way (Jupp et al 1999; Elias 1986). The extent of 
victimisation is evidently much more prevalent and widespread than official 
definitions or indicators would have us believe (Muncie 2001).  
 
However, it is pertinent to note that it is a little more complicated than official 
definitions of crime — cleverly carved up to retain statistically measurable 
segments whilst discarding the offcuts of ‘petty’ summary or complicated ‘non-
conventional’ crimes — serving to mask the true state of things, for we know 
very well the ‘shocking truth’ about this hidden landscape (Davies 1997). 
Instead, it is a combination of collective fetishistic disavowal and an unyielding 
adherence to the powerful traditional discourses of crime, by both academics 
and vast sections of the social body who appear unable not only to equate 
wider social harms to these discourses, but to transcend such narratives, that 
allows the broader scope of victimisation to remain hidden from view (Pantazis 
and Pemberton 2012; Bottomley 1979). Accordingly, recognition of this dual 
inability to either acknowledge or “escape the straightjacket of officially defined 
‘crime’” (Barton et al 2007:202) has prompted a number of scholars to marshal 
a move beyond the legalistic conceptualisation of ‘crime’, as “the fundamental 
empirical-analytic category for criminological inquiry” (Yar 2012:56), towards a 
social harm approach (Hillyard et al 2004). 
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Zemiology and the Exploration of Non-Criminalised Harms: 
A central focus of the new zemiological movement has been the provocation of 
crucial epistemological and ontological debates concerning, among other 
things, the critical interrogation of the problematic concept of ‘crime’ (Hillyard 
and Tombs 2004; Lasslett 2010). Although the Latin origin of the word ‘crime’, 
crimen, was heavily imbued with broad notions of harm its contemporary 
manifestation is now used to capture only a very narrow range of acts deemed 
to be in violation of state sanctioned legal codes (Muncie et al 2010; Henry and 
Milovanovic 1996). Such legal codes however only cover a partial list of harms 
(Milovanovic and Henry 2001) and portray other harmful acts which exist 
outside of this remit in such a way as to discourage the wider citizenry from 
considering them as ‘crimes’ (Tombs and Whyte 2010). Importantly, this reveals 
the apparent lack of some identifiable intrinsic feature present in all ‘crimes’ that 
justifies their designation as such (Hillyard and Tombs 2007).   
 
Consequently, it has been argued that not only does the legal category of 
‘crime’ lack any ontological reality (although see Lasslett 2010) but it excludes 
many serious harms which cause considerable damage to the wider social body 
(Hillyard and Tombs 2007). Such harms are often more widespread and 
damaging than many of the incidents that constitute the contemporary ‘crime 
problem’ (Muncie 2000). Nevertheless, the resilience of such a blinkered view of 
the ‘crime problem’ serves to obfuscate “the range of misfortunes, dangers, 
harms, risks and injuries that are a routine part of everyday life” (Muncie 
2000:222). Therefore, it can be argued that the measurement of ‘crime’, a task 
with which the ICVS and its proponents have concerned themselves for over 
two decades, does not capture the level of social harm present in society to 
which many individuals fall victim and which often constitutes their experiential 
lifeworld (Tifft and Sullivan 2001). 
 
By contrast the zemiological project, with the somewhat more ontologically 
grounded concept of harm as its empirical-analytical object of inquiry (Hall 
2012b), is better suited to providing a more accurate picture of the broad gamut 
of socially injurious events people endure (Hillyard and Tombs 2007). Such an 
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approach brings into focus a number of important harms that continue to remain 
untouched by the rhetoric surrounding ‘crime’ (Tombs and Hillyard 2004). 
Moreover, it serves to break the silence of criminology regarding pressing social 
issues such as the widespread and devastating nature of preventable harms, 
which are arguably more pervasive than ‘crime’ (Pemberton 2007; Box 1981). 
Many of these harms emerge as a consequence of the way in which post-
industrial society is organised (Pantazis and Pemberton 2012). That is to say 
that they are structurally embedded within the very architecture, as integral and 
necessary components, of neoliberal economic and political organisation 
(Barton et al 2007; Tombs and Hillyard 2004). However, as will be explained, it 
is also necessary to acknowledge the way in which this harmful societal 
organisation is inter-subjectively actualised and reproduced via a perpetual and 
active solicitation by the wider citizenry to the very culture and subjectivity it 
endeavours to cultivate (Hall 2015). Such an acknowledgement is salient 
precisely because it is all too often incorrectly articulated by right wing 
criminologists or entirely ignored by ‘leftist’ criminology (Hall 2012b).   
 
Perhaps one of the clearest examples of socio-structurally induced harm is 
poverty, for it currently causes “more death, disease, suffering and misery than 
any other social phenomenon” (Gordon 2004:251). However despite 
representing the world’s greatest source of social harm, real political will to 
ameliorate this pressing social issue remains impotent (Gordon 2004). As a 
result poverty has continued to grow remorselessly over recent decades, 
including within the economic powerhouses of the UK and the USA (Dorling 
2010). The fact that such growth has occurred within the two parent countries 
that gave birth to a revived free market capitalism is not surprising (Kiely 2009), 
for they represent the epicentre of a series of tenets that serve to uphold 
injustice (Dorling 2010). For instance, it has been argued that the subsequent 
poverty that results from violations of economic and social rights is “partly a 
result of a neoliberal philosophical position which equates justice and liberty 
with freedom from intentional coercion” (Gordon 2004:263). Simply put, the 
inordinate neoliberal focus upon protecting negative rights to non-interference 
precludes the meaningful application of positive rights to aid, which undoubtedly 
requires more extensive action from the state (Fagan 2011). Moreover, it 
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sustains our collective adherence to a set of basic regulatory moral norms 
based upon the notion of causation, allowing us to deny responsibility for harms 
resulting from a failure to act (Persson and Savulescu 2014).   
 
Despite requiring only a marginal redirection of the flow of income from the 
world’s richest 20% to the poorest 20% to dramatically change the extent and 
severity of the social harm caused by poverty (Gordon 2004), international 
income inequalities continue to widen (Dorling 2010; Wilkinson and Pickett 
2010). It is perhaps unsurprising to note that the greatest financial chasms 
between the rich and the poor exist in neoliberal countries, particularly the USA 
and the UK (Pantazis and Pemberton 2009). For instance, Chernomas and 
Hudson (2007) note that in the USA the income received by the bottom 90% of 
the population fell by 7% whilst that of the top 1% rose by 148% between 1973 
and 2000. Such disparities further reveal the extent to which the neoliberal 
economic restructuring discussed in the previous chapter has exploited, 
disadvantaged and damaged large sections of humanity without attracting 
legally codified condemnation (Taylor 2013).     
 
Dorling (2010) argues that such growing financial inequalities have resulted in a 
large and ever-growing proportion of individuals being excluded from the norms 
of society. However, it can be argued that rather than being barred from these 
societal norms, those defined as ‘socially excluded’ are also subject to its 
dominant cultural injunction to enjoy (Winlow and Hall 2013). Indeed, akin to 
their ‘included’ counterparts they over identify with the culture of consumerism 
and pursue with commensurate vigour its intoxicating symbolic power 
(Buccellato and Reid 2014). What they are in fact excluded from is the pseudo-
pacified means by which they can “engage in consumer forms of hedonistic 
indulgence” (Winlow and Hall 2013:114, original emphasis). Nevertheless, what 
remains agreeable is that those deemed socially excluded are increasingly 
experiencing a new kind of poverty in that they are poor, indebted and excluded 
from legitimate opportunities to attain symbolic success (Dorling 2010; Horsley 
2015). 
 
Justin Kotzé  PhD Thesis 
93 
 
With an estimated sixth of all households in countries like those constituting 
Britain being home to the new poor, the phenomenon is certainly extensive 
(Dorling 2010), and at its heart lies a collective state of indenture, “the terrifying 
spectre haunting the neoliberal era” (Taylor 2013:70). Living with this terrifying 
spectre has become a common experience for many Britons (Southwood 2011), 
with debt becoming a state of necessity in order to simply ‘get by’ for 
approximately a fifth of the population (Dorling 2010). However far from being 
confined to the production of financial inequalities, the latest manifestations of 
rising inequality and the attitudes which help to sustain them serve to maintain 
differentially distributed access to education, healthcare, employment and 
housing (Dorling 2010; Tombs and Hillyard 2004). Following the 2008 ‘credit 
crunch’ such inequalities deepened in the wake of the foreseeable and thus 
preventable consequences of the Coalition government’s austerity measures, 
which have served only to intensify the harms and indignities already suffered 
by large sections of the social body (Pantazis and Pemberton 2012; Winlow and 
Hall 2013). 
 
For instance, despite trying to mask its extent by counting individuals working 
one hour or more a week or those on a zero-hour contract as ‘employed’, high 
levels of unemployment has been a resulting harm of severe consequence (Hall 
and Winlow 2015). Indeed individuals denied participation in the labour market 
suffer a double bind of exclusion, for not only are they excluded from the 
opportunity to attain self-worth via involvement in productive economic activity 
but they are subsequently excluded from the realm of legitimate consumerism 
(Pemberton 2004; Pantazis and Pemberton 2009). Economically unintegrated 
and socially excluded, “this section of the population has become the ‘by-
product’ of capitalist society” (Pemberton 2004:80).  
 
Such socio-economic harm is largely a result of government policies intent on 
maintaining a commitment to capitalist realism, complete with its broad system 
of diverse harms which are reproduced in its conventional culture and 
subjectivity (Hall 2015). Accordingly, it could be argued that those who suffer 
from structurally induced unemployment have been victimised by the capitalist 
system (Ward 2004). Although such victimisation often escapes the analytical 
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and empirical purview of criminology, the social harm perspective takes full 
cognisance of the harmful effects caused by unemployment and the inevitable 
socio-economic exclusion that follows (Barton et al 2007). Similarly, by training 
this zemiological lens upon the widespread social phenomenon of 
homelessness it becomes clear that such indignity is a state induced harm that, 
despite existing outside the orbit of official criminalisation and thus mainstream 
criminological inquiry, should be considered a criminal failure to intervene 
(Milovanovic and Henry 2001; Henry and Milovanovic 1996; Salmi 2004).  
 
However, rather than optimistically assuming that such harms will immediately 
disappear once they are criminalised and obviated by minor and periodic policy 
tweaks (Bottomley 1979; Hall 2015), it must be acknowledged that they are the 
result of the fundamental systemic violence of global capitalism (Žižek 2009a). 
Indeed, they are inherent manifestations of our current social conditions which 
automatically create excluded and dispensable individuals (Žižek 2009a). It is 
perhaps within this overarching context that the harm perspective begins to 
show its true worth, for it can explore wider aetiologies of harm production from 
a perspective unrestricted by concerns for establishing proxy measures of intent 
(Pemberton 2007; Hillyard and Tombs 2007). From this perspective new and 
interesting possibilities emerge for the allocation of responsibility for the 
occurrence of adverse harms, which arise due to the failure to deal adequately 
with structurally embedded social issues (Hillyard and Tombs 2007). Such 
possibilities allow us the opportunity to hold accountable the entire liberal-
capitalist way of life, rather than simply those in possession of concentrated 
corpo-criminal power (Hall and Winlow 2015). 
 
Such accountability is of considerable importance as there is evidence to 
suggest that the most widespread harms are in fact structurally embedded 
within the global capitalist system itself and occur largely as a result of a socio-
political omission to act (Pantazis and Pemberton 2012). Certainly, the number 
of injuries sustained by individuals as a result of states omitting to ameliorate 
specific social conditions is overwhelming (Rothe and Kauzlarich 2014). 
However, it is salient to note that whilst responsibility for the production of the 
aforementioned examples of social violence by omission can be laid firmly at 
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the feet of the state (Salmi 2004), we are ourselves complicit in perpetuating 
both the structural conditions and ideological tenets that sustain these socially 
violent omissions (Dorling 2010; Hall and Winlow 2015). Indeed by maintaining 
a collective commitment to fetishistically disavow the harmful injustices 
orchestrated by the global capitalist project, large sections of the population 
simply reproduce and actively solicit the very sociosymbolic order that produces 
inordinate social harms (Winlow and Hall 2013). 
 
This complicity in the production of harm could perhaps be termed ‘the 
Anthropocene of harm’, a term that arguably provides a more accurate 
description of the phenomenon than those which refer only to the violence of 
systems or structures. Few zemiological perspectives have attempted to 
capture this anthropocentric dimension of harm as much as Pemberton’s (2004) 
developing theory of moral indifference. This theoretical framework seeks to 
capture the “inactivity of capitalist societies to the human suffering caused by 
their organisation” (Pemberton 2004:67), and the creation of a culture of moral 
indifference among both those who perpetrate harm and those who have 
effectively become inactive bystanders to such harm.  
 
However, it must be acknowledged that whilst Pemberton’s theory points us in 
the right direction it is only partially correct, for it fails to take adequate 
cognisance of the prerequisite epistemological dimension of a moral 
indifference towards harm. That is, it fails to recognise that to feel a sense of 
moral indifference one must have an accepted knowledge of the harmful events 
thought to stimulate such sensibility. Yet the attainment of such knowledge is all 
but precluded by the dominant sociosymbolic order’s inculcation of a state of 
collective fetishistic disavowal. Indeed, this convenient refutation of that which 
we know to be true but cannot bring ourselves to really believe effectively 
serves to suppress the stimulation of morality, and in time prevents its 
development altogether (Žižek 2011). Certainly, one cannot feel morally 
indifferent towards social harms that one disavows knowledge of, and it is in this 
sense that such disavowed knowledge precludes the animation of our moral 
sensibilities towards social harm.  
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However, even amongst those who remain partially resistant to the broad 
ideological technique of fetishistic disavowal, and thereby acknowledge the 
existence of adverse social harms, a sense of moral indifference is maintained. 
This is because their assimilation to the dominant negative ideology of capitalist 
realism and its associated identity politics function to ‘re-naturalise’ capitalism 
and the acceptance of things as they are (Fisher 2009; Žižek 2008b). Moreover, 
such moral indifference is often mediated by a perverse morality grounded in a 
strong Protestant vision of the undeserving, which serves to cultivate feelings 
not simply of indifference but of disdain towards those who suffer the harmful 
indignities of injustice (Eagleton 2009; Fredman 2008). Indeed, it is thought that 
those unfit to pursue their self-interests in the neoliberal free market actively 
court the harm that befalls them (Fredman 2008). Consequently, it is this 
strange bedfellowship of collective fetishistic disavowal and mediated moral 
indifference that fully constitutes the aforementioned anthropocentric dimension 
of harm.  
 
Toiling relentlessly to maintain the symbolic machinery that both creates and 
perpetuates this culture of collective fetishistic disavowal and mediated moral 
indifference, economic and political elites endeavour to validate the socio-
structural harms endured by large sections of society (Pemberton 2004). To a 
large extent this is achieved via an unyielding ascription to the dominant 
negative ideology of capitalist realism and its presentation as the least worst of 
all possible economic systems (Fisher 2009; Winlow and Hall 2013). 
Accordingly, the consent of subordinate groups is maintained by reasserting the 
idyllic image of liberal-capitalism whilst simultaneously creating physical and 
mental distance between those who perpetrate and witness social harm and 
those who suffer its indignities, thereby suppressing both moral and social 
responsibility (Pemberton 2004).   
 
As previously alluded to, this distancing and suppression is facilitated by the 
successful assimilation of the wider citizenry into a common-sense hierarchy of 
immorality, one which limits moral and legal abhorrence to immediately visible 
harms resulting from intentional acts (Box 1989). Consequently, collective 
culpability for the perpetuation of preventable harms is severely diminished as 
Justin Kotzé  PhD Thesis 
97 
 
we increasingly become socialised into feeling “more responsible for the harm 
we cause than for the benefits we fail to cause… [since we] have moral duties 
or obligations not to harm, but not to benefit” (Persson and Savulescu 2014:4). 
In other words, we retain a resolute adherence to the maintenance of negative 
rights to not be interfered with or intentionally harmed whilst affording less 
weight to the application of positive rights to be benefited (Persson and 
Savulescu 2014; Driver 2007). In essence neoliberal subjects feel morally 
indifferent towards socially mediated harms that exist outside of their empirical 
domain of experience. More specifically, as the physical and mental distance 
between the inactive bystander to harm and the actualised events endured by 
the victimised increases, the subject’s optical perspective of socially mediated 
harm is reduced, as are feelings of moral responsibility (Pemberton 2004; 
Bhaskar 2008a).    
 
Simply put, a collective state of fetishistic disavowal of both knowledge and 
moral responsibility for socially mediated harms is secured by a politically 
facilitated physical distancing and mental suppression of the effects of such 
induced harm. Strengthening this collective mentality further is the political and 
criminological focus upon the relative visibility of certain forms of ‘crime’ 
compared to that of social harm, alongside the perpetual representation of the 
former as constituting the major source of societal damage (Henry and Lanier 
1998; Pemberton 2007). This focus upon the more visible forms of subjective 
violence conveniently serves to distract the citizenry from the more widespread 
and structurally embedded forms of systemic violence and its anthropocentric 
dimensions (Žižek 2009a). However, it must be acknowledged that quite often 
such distraction is a comforting and welcomed official reaffirmation of the 
subject’s obsessive denial of broader social issues (Žižek 2011).  
 
Indeed, whilst remaining fixated upon a narrow range of immediate and 
relatively visible forms of officiated ‘crime’, one is able to remove any lingering 
vestige of moral responsibility for the myriad harms of reduction and repression 
which one has been latently complicit in perpetuating (Henry and Milovanovic 
1996). For many, simply making charitable donations that help to maintain the 
“humanitarian mask hiding the face of economic exploitation” (Žižek 2009a:19) 
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can further facilitate the removal of these lingering vestiges. Accordingly ‘the 
Anthropocene of harm’ takes on a new salience for whilst the neoliberal state 
and its economic agents hold the smoking gun, we remain complicit in its 
loading by soliciting the conditions for the rise of the very socially induced harm 
we try to either temporarily ameliorate or entirely disavow (Žižek 2009a).  
 
Although many forms of socio-structurally induced harms, and the largely 
charitable means by which they are temporarily dealt with, have become 
naturalised and normalised in political and media representations of everyday 
life (Hall and Winlow 2015; Žižek 2011), their socially murderous effects have 
lost none of their terrible potency (Chernomas and Hudson 2007). 
Consequently, despite mainstream criminology’s silence on the matter, it 
remains important to highlight both the physical and psychological experiential 
reality of social harm produced by the political and socio-economic organisation 
of society (Hall and Winlow 2015). 
 
Alongside the economic and physical manifestations of injustice — such as 
poverty, unemployment, homelessness, environmental pollution, the denial of 
basic intermediate needs and declines in the overall quality of life — that many 
people experience (Pantazis and Pemberton 2009; Taylor 2013), substantial 
increases in mental ill-health have accompanied the solidification of selfish 
capitalism (James 2008). Indeed, it has been widely acknowledged that anxiety 
and depression have become endemic features of a stress infested precarious 
existence that now constitutes normality for many in the neoliberal era (Taylor 
2013; Southwood 2011; Dorling 2010). However, as the ‘dose-response’ effect 
of growing inequality yields higher levels of poor mental health (Dorling 2010), it 
remains those at the bottom of the economic hierarchy that suffer the most 
(Wilkinson and Pickett 2010).  
 
Certainly, living in a state of incessant ‘predictable unpredictability’, 
endeavouring frantically to outmanoeuvre one’s economic obsolescence by 
entering a cycle of non-stop inertia and frenetic (in)activity (Southwood 2011), 
facilitates the descent into obsessional neurosis; a sub-set of hysteria whereby 
the subject tries to satisfy the big Other’s suspected injunction to work (Myers 
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2003). Of course the subject’s exhausting attempt has already been foiled by a 
predatory capitalism that no longer requires a mass industrialised workforce and 
is therefore thrust deeper into a state of ontological insecurity, bereft of a sense 
of context, meaning or identity and left only with a lingering depressive 
anxiousness regarding one’s place in society (MacKian 2012). Much of this 
lingering depressive anxiousness quickly becomes objectless, as its socio-
structural genesis is all but replaced by a diverse array of ideologically 
manufactured threats which serve to stimulate an anticipatory sense of further 
loss that constantly and irrevocably haunts the psyche (Hall and Winlow 2015).    
 
The resultant poor psychological health congeals in the neurological circuits and 
immune systems of those subject to such inequitable socio-economic 
conditions, ultimately affecting their physiological functioning (Wilkinson and 
Pickett 2010). Indeed, chronic stress and anxiety can cause a myriad of bodily 
ills including rapid aging, cardiovascular disease, infections and damage to the 
adrenal glands and reproductive organs (Wilkinson and Pickett 2010). The 
overall consequence of such induced ill-health is that people with limited social 
standing tend to die younger in societies where inequality is sharpest 
(Chernomas and Hudson 2007). However, it appears that society has become 
accustomed to socio-structurally induced psychological ill-health and the social 
murder that often results from it (Dorling 2010). This is perhaps in large part due 
to the fact that neoliberalism purposely encourages and distributes 
psychological distress among large sections of the social body; feasting upon 
the insecurity it cultivates (James 2008; Winlow and Hall 2006).  
 
Serving to attenuate the effects of such distress so as to maintain a sublimated 
and manageable excess, the manufacture of various pharmaceutical treatments 
has been used to “cope with the consequent despair on a mass scale” (Dorling 
2010:4). Indeed, despite the possibility of harmful side effects the normalisation 
of self-administered psychopharmacological treatments has become significant 
(Dorling 2010; Taylor 2013). Viewed alongside the high volume of illicit drugs 
and alcohol consumed in neoliberal societies, the overall picture provides a very 
clear indication of “the pain wrought by inequality on a very large scale” 
(Wilkinson and Pickett 2010:72). 
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Criminology or Zemiology? Yes, Please! 
Evidently, the zemiological perspective is capable of taking full cognisance of a 
wide range of socio-structurally induced harms and their pervasive economic, 
psychological and physical effects, which remain otherwise opaque to 
mainstream criminology (Hall and Winlow 2015; Hillyard and Tombs 2007). 
Consequently, not only have a number of critically informed scholars rallied for 
a reconceptualization of criminology’s legitimate domain of inquiry from ‘crime’ 
to ‘harm’ (Muncie 2000), but others have evoked a drive to move entirely 
‘beyond’ the discipline of criminology itself (Hillyard et al 2004). On the surface 
very little appears to be problematic about such endeavours, indeed much of 
what has been written so for in this chapter adheres to the expressed need to 
reposition harm at the forefront of the criminological enterprise. However, we 
must remain cautious regarding drives to dispense with criminology in favour of 
zemiology, for whilst the imposition of this dualistic false alternative appears 
‘promising’ there remain numerous pitfalls (Žižek 2000a).  
 
First and foremost it must be acknowledged that although many of the 
assertions made by the pioneering zemiologists are undoubtedly true, the claim 
that “‘crime’ consists of many petty events” (Hillyard and Tombs 2004:12) is a 
complete misnomer. Certainly, the argument — made via the use of positivist 
statistics no less — that the vast majority of events defined as ‘crime’ often 
create little physical or financial harm and would not “score particularly highly on 
a scale of personal hardship” (Hillyard and Tombs 2007:11), pays no regard to 
the experiential reality of crime alluded to above. Indeed, it has already been 
noted that “crude national or regional statistics tell us very little about what 
actually goes on in the nooks and crannies of everyday life” (Hall et al 2008:ix). 
Whilst the category of ‘crime’ is undeniably socially constructed, the outcome of 
individuals acting towards its culturally mediated production inevitably produces 
real consequences for those involved, who experience this reality as harm in 
the empirical domain of everyday life (Henry and Milovanovic 1996; Bhaskar 
2008a). 
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Make no mistake, the accumulation of what some of the early zemiologists 
considered to be ‘trivial’ or ‘petty’ offences undoubtedly causes considerable 
harm to those who endure them (Young 1975, 1988b). Accordingly, it must be 
acknowledged that whilst ‘crime’ is only the tip of the iceberg (Lea and Young 
1993), it remains a problematic tip nonetheless. It continues to disrupt the lives 
of many, but particularly those who occupy disastrous locales blighted by a raft 
of social issues among which ‘crime’ retains a salient position (Hall et al 2008). 
‘Petty’ offences co-exist alongside issues of socio-economic marginalisation 
and often intertwine with acts of violence and intimidation to form harmful and 
corrosive flows of under-reported and under-recorded crime, often perpetrated 
by and against the powerless, creating a milieu of fear and suspicion (Hall 
2012b). Grounded in bitter experience rather than mass-media constructions 
(Winlow and Hall 2006), individuals locked in such fear inducing milieus 
experience fear of crime as a concrete universal truth and not simply as 
objectless anxiety (Hall and Winlow 2015).  
 
To a large extent such fear constantly functions as a rational response guided 
by experiential ‘intuitions’ honed to protect oneself from impending attacks 
(Sparks 1992). However such protection comes at a price, for fear induced 
chronic over activation of the endocrine system, which marshals an individual’s 
fight-or-flight response, severely damages the physiological functioning of the 
body and therefore dangerously diminishes one’s health (Hill et al 2005; 
Wallace 2012). Despite the harmful consequences of such psychophysiological 
manifestations of fear, criminologists have largely neglected this facet from their 
investigations of the fear of crime (Sacco 2005). Yet it would appear that so too 
have some of the early zemiologists who evidently do not concern themselves 
with the consequences of the ‘trivial’ and ‘petty’ events which constitute ‘crime’ 
(Hillyard and Tombs 2007). 
 
Indeed, these scholars appear to commit the cardinal error of separating events 
which manifest themselves as ‘crime’ from the broader socio-structural harms 
generated by liberal-capitalism (Lea and Young 1993; Pemberton 2007). This 
separation excludes criminal harms from the analysis of social harm as if the 
two were isolated problems, weighted and judged to be amenable either to 
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exploration or ignorance (Pemberton 2007; Lea and Young 1993). However, it 
makes little sense to subject the un-criminalised socio-structurally induced 
harms discussed above to critical zemiological scrutiny without carrying the 
analysis through to its ultimate conclusion. That is to acknowledge that beyond 
the social harm generated by the state’s systemically violent acts of omission 
and indifference lies the criminal harm both perpetrated and endured by the 
very victims of such systemic violence. Evidently, if we are to adequately 
explore the production of social harm in all its multifaceted complexity it is 
necessary to move beyond the crude structuralist approach adhered to, at least 
for the most part, by many of the early zemiologists and adopt a more holistic 
approach (Hillyard et al 2004). Certainly, as early sections of this chapter have 
made clear, the powerless are victimised from all directions and subject to both 
social and criminal harm (Lea and Young 1993).  
 
Consequently the drive to move ‘beyond criminology’ solely towards zemiology 
appears problematic and more than a little misguided, for there is no reason 
why we cannot have both tea and coffee whilst having our cake and eating it 
too. The position being advanced here is a simple refusal of choice between the 
false alternatives of criminology or zemiology (Žižek 2000a). Interestingly, this 
refusal of choice does not appear anathema to those who blazed the 
zemiological trail (Hillyard et al 2004). Indeed, despite some scholars retaining 
feelings of disdain towards the investigation of what they consider to be the 
‘petty’ bulk of crime (Hillyard and Tombs 2004, 2007), the romanticised 
downplaying of serious harms caused by criminal acts and the simplistic 
separation of criminal and social harm is not endorsed by all the early 
zemiologists (Hillyard et al 2004; Barton et al 2007). Rather they maintain that 
the true endeavour of the zemiological movement has been to remove the 
constraining brackets surrounding criminological investigation in order to 
broaden its legitimate parameters of study, so as to incorporate a wide range of 
un-criminalised and hidden harms as serious focal concerns within its orbit of 
inquiry (Muncie 2000; Hopkins Burke 2014). Zemiology thus functions to re-
engage criminology’s dialectical energy enabling a more holistic exploration of 
both ‘crime’ and ‘harm’ (Hall and Winlow 2015). However, this re-engagement is 
undeniably still in its infancy and there remains considerable work to be done, 
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particularly surrounding the task of providing the concept of harm with a firm 
ontological anchorage grounded in reality (Hall and Winlow 2015). 
 
Finding ‘Harm’s’ Ontological Reality:  
It has been routinely commented that the concept of ‘harm’ is more ontologically 
grounded than the legal category of ‘crime’ (Hillyard et al 2005; Hall 2012b). 
However, this statement still requires some carful clarification for, as some 
zemiologists readily admit, ‘harm’ is still quite a nebulous term covering an 
inordinate range of heterogeneous phenomena of varied significance and 
consequence (Hall 2014a; Hillyard et al 2005). Consequently, whilst the harm 
perspective opens promising developmental avenues for the hitherto 
constrained discipline of criminology, it nevertheless remains beset with 
numerous conceptual issues and ambiguities thereby retaining a lack of 
specificity (Yar 2012). Attaining some semblance of specificity requires 
identifying and distinguishing between what constitutes consensual core and 
peripheral harms (Hall and Winlow 2015).  
 
Making such distinctions is by no means an easy task. One runs the very real 
risk of restrictively reducing the consensual core so that only a very narrow 
range of the most brutal harms are included (Hall 2014a), or expanding the core 
beyond its limits so as to render the concept of harm analytically and empirically 
ineffectual (Hall and Winlow 2015). Accordingly, it has been argued that the 
successful determination of what actions or events should be considered part of 
this harmful core requires a normative rationale firmly grounded in an 
understanding of the human condition (Pantazis and Pemberton 2009). 
Grounded in this understanding the needs-based harm perspective provides a 
reasonable starting point in the development of such a rationale (Pemberton 
2007). Simply put, this perspective endeavours to demarcate subjective wants 
and desires from the pre-requisite human needs essential for human well-being 
and posits that harm results from the denial or non-fulfilment of these needs 
(Pemberton 2007).  
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Helping to further refine this still quite amorphous position by honing in a little 
more precisely upon the ‘basic needs’ required to secure human integrity and 
well-being, Yar (2012) utilises the concept of recognition, itself considered to be 
a vital human need (Williams 2000), in order to try and remedy the ontological 
deficit currently pervading zemiology. Drawing upon Honneth’s (1996) 
recognition-theoretic which usefully identifies three forms of recognition — love, 
rights and esteem — essential for human self-realisation, Yar (2012) positions 
the denial of recognition as constituting the fundamental kernel of social harm. It 
is argued that since these three forms of recognition correspond to the basic 
requirements necessary for self and inter-subjective integrity, “social harms can 
be understood to comprise nothing other than the inter-subjective experience of 
being refused recognition with respect to any or all of these dimensions of need” 
(Yar 2012:59, original emphasis).  
 
Grounding the concept of harm in the refusal of recognition provides the 
heterogeneous phenomena identified by social harm theorists with some 
degree of conceptual clarity and unity, for the ontological reality of these harms 
can be said to lie in their proclivity towards the inducement of non-recognition 
and disrespect (Yar 2012). This initial ontological anchorage of the concept of 
harm undoubtedly draws us closer towards identifying the consensual core. 
However, it remains questionable whether the simple restoration of social 
recognition, which in the neoliberal imagination remains wedded to the 
preservation of negative rights, is sufficient to alleviate the social harm induced 
via the omission or purposeful negation of positive rights (Hall and Winlow 
2015). Indeed, it can be argued that any attempt to restore recognition alone 
borders on impropriety for the very social interdependency upon which social 
recognition was originally based has been severed (Hall 2015).  
 
Where once the mutual recognition of the Hegelian master-slave dialectic 
framed the social relations between capitalists and labourers, today’s neoliberal 
global economy has transcended this position of mutuality (Hall and Winlow 
2015). Endowed with the ‘special liberty’ granted by the solidification of the 
eighty/twenty labour relation referred to in the previous chapter, capitalists no 
longer require the mass of labourers, or their recognition, they once did (Hall 
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2012b; Žižek 2011). Accordingly, the simple restoration of inter-subjective 
recognition will not suffice as a harm reducing mechanism whilst structurally 
induced social inequalities and economic redundancies persist. Little 
recognition can be legitimately attained by those who no longer possess the 
means to actualise their potential, and whom continue to be viewed by those 
who wield self-affirmed ‘special liberty’ as little more than globalised human 
waste (Hall 2012b; Bauman 2004). Essentially, it is not enough to espouse the 
reaffirmation of social recognition whilst retaining untouched the wider political 
and socio-economic milieu that fostered its severance. Rather, what is needed 
is the simultaneous restoration of social recognition and concerted systemic 
social change (Hall 2012b; Hall and Winlow 2015).  
 
Indeed it is precisely because struggles for recognition occur within a milieu of 
exacerbated inequality and socio-economic and symbolic injustice, that 
affirmative attempts to restore recognition without systematically disturbing the 
dominant sociosymbolic order fail to pay dividend (Fraser 1995). Whilst social 
recognition retains a position of considerable salience to the human condition, it 
remains little more than an illusory or abstract right so long as it continues to be 
divorced from an equitable socio-economic base capable of providing every 
element of the social body the means to actualise this recognition (Marx 1843 
[2012]). To be ‘recognised’ in the current dominant sociosymbolic order is only 
to be given permission to acknowledge that one has the negative right to such 
recognition (Marx 1843 [2012]). This acknowledgement simply allows the right-
holder to pursue a position of social recognition without providing the structural 
means necessary to actualise inter-subjective recognition and meaningful 
positive rights in the first instance (Fagan 2011). Accordingly, the revival of 
inter-subjective recognition cannot in and of itself function to reduce the myriad 
social harms endured by the neoliberal subject for it evidently fails to consider 
the harms caused by such absence. That is, to acknowledge the reality of 
negative existences and the inscription of their causative influences within the 
domain of the real, which inevitably manifest themselves as constraining ills 
experienced by individuals as harm in the empirical domain (Nellhaus 2007; 
Bhaskar 2008b). Such as, for instance, the experience of enduring social harms 
caused by the withdrawal of meaningful economic participation, the 
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retrenchment of non-privatised welfare or the absence of other positive rights 
(Hall and Winlow 2015; Southwood 2011). 
 
Consequently the restoration of recognition must be accompanied by a 
reinvigorated application of positive rights, capable of securing for all the ability 
to exercise this vital human need (Fredman 2008). In other words, renewed 
emphasis must be directed towards providing the socio-structural conditions 
conducive to the exercise of one’s social recognition, via the solidification of 
actionable positive rights to “equality, education, healthcare and the means of 
earning a living and supporting [one’s] family” (Halstead 2008:13). However this 
requires more than tokenistic gestures of affirmative recognition and economic 
redistribution, which by their very nature presuppose the continuation of 
inequality (Fraser 1995). Indeed, it exacts a combined implementation of 
transformative economic distribution, via the fundamental restructuring of the 
existing relations of production, and transformative recognition which in turn 
restructures the current differentiation of social recognition (Fraser 1995). 
Although, it is salient to note that such implementations must take place within a 
stable and sustainable socio-economic system (Hall and Winlow 2015). Only via 
the establishment of such a system and the solidification of substantive equality 
grounded in full socio-economic participation (transformative economic 
distribution) and universally recognised citizenship (transformative recognition) 
can we secure a position of true human emancipation and flourishing (Fredman 
2008; O’Connor 2013).   
 
This is the dual position upon which a revitalised and ontologically grounded 
social harm perspective can be established, from which we may begin to more 
precisely demarcate the consensual core of harm as that which leaves 
whatever or whoever affected in a worse condition than before the enactment or 
absence of an action, system, process or event. Therefore, rather than limiting 
the core to the denial of recognition alone its circumference must extend to 
include the socio-structural negation of the means by which recognition can not 
only be attained but actualised. Certainly, the retention of a resilient focus upon 
the preservation of the negative right to recognition alone not only risks 
perpetuating social harm under the guise of what could perhaps be termed 
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pseudo-recognition, but diminishes the original zemiological pursuit to 
incorporate within our vision of what constitutes harm the omission of positive 
rights and duties (Pemberton 2004). Accordingly, the position being advanced 
here is that a new conceptual framework, built upon the empirical-analytic 
concepts of recognition and distributive economic participation, provides the 
harm perspective with a firm ontological anchorage grounded in the reality of 
late capitalism (Hall 2015). From here we can begin to establish, revise and 
investigate more holistically core social harms (Hall and Winlow 2015).  
 
Moreover, from this position the contemporary juxtaposition of ‘harm’ and 
‘crime’ as being antagonistic conceptual alternatives can be dissolved (Yar 
2012). Indeed, it has already been established that it serves no useful purpose 
to impose a choice between these false alternatives, proceeding to investigate 
these artificially imposed brackets as if they exist in isolation divorced from one 
another and their effects (Hillyard et al 2004). Certainly, many of the individuals 
with whom the researcher spoke experienced both criminal and non-
criminalised harms from multiple directions and layers of the social body. 
Consequently, the interconnectedness of systemic social harms and the 
inevitable ‘criminal spillage’ that follows assumes a simple yet corrosive 
resonance for a number of Lake Town’s residents (Hall 2014a). Indeed, many 
individuals articulated narratives that portray all too clearly the experience of 
suffering socio-structurally induced harm, whilst simultaneously enduring and/or 
perpetrating criminal acts against those in similar socio-economic conditions.  
 
Fundamentally, such accounts are indicative of the fact that social harm, in the 
form of the denial of recognition and distributive economic participation, is not 
only generated at the macro level but simultaneously exercised and 
experienced at the micro level. For instance, in areas such as Lake Town many 
residents are often denied the negative rights to recognition and non-
interference, as well as the positive right to legitimate economic participation, by 
socially intimidating and economically monopolising branches of glocal criminal 
networks (Hall 2015, 2012b). In essence, many of Lake Town’s residents 
experience the systemic denial of both negative and positive rights whilst 
simultaneously having such denial further reinforced by those who illegally 
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sustain and destroy the area’s social fabric (Lea 2002). Therefore, as the 
findings in chapter five suggest, the social harm perspective must once again 
take cognisance of the fact that beyond socio-systemic induced harms lie 
perpetual flows of corrosive yet largely normalised criminal harms, both 
perpetrated and endured by the very victims of such socio-systemic harms. 
Before such findings can be presented however, it is necessary to address the 
multifaceted methodological parameters which have informed the research 
process and it is to their delineation that the next chapter now turns. 
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Chapter Four: 
 
Research Methodology. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to delineate the ontological and epistemological 
considerations that have informed the researcher’s decision-making process 
regarding the selection of the particular research design, appropriate methods, 
instruments, procedural manoeuvres and other pertinent methodological 
considerations. These considerations have been collated and put to work to 
form a robust methodological framework capable of eliciting not only individuals’ 
articulable experiences of crime, but also their tacit or disavowed knowledge of 
non-criminalised social harms. This has primarily been facilitated by combining 
the harm perspective of the new zemiological movement with the philosophical 
traditions of critical realism and transcendental materialism. Together these 
provide the discursive space within which individuals may express their lived 
experiences of harm without being constrained by legalistic conceptualisations 
of criminality. Through the use of this unique methodological framework 
participants were encouraged to think beyond the dominant capitalist realist 
ideology, official terminology and rhetoric in order to express their otherwise 
disavowed drives, desires and real world experiences of both recognised and 
unrecognised forms of social harm.  
 
Ontological and Epistemological Considerations: 
As previously mentioned, underpinning this research is a complex 
methodological framework which combines, alongside the aforementioned 
zemiological perspective, the philosophical traditions of critical realism and 
transcendental materialism. Accordingly, it is necessary to provide here a brief 
discussion of these two intricately complex systems of thought for two important 
reasons. Firstly as a means of explicating the fundamental ontological and 
epistemological groundings and the accompanying influence that such 
considerations have had upon the methodological structure of this research. 
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Secondly, this discussion will serve as a brief introduction for those who may 
not necessarily be familiar with these traditions.   
 
Critical realism, initially associated with the foundational work of Bhaskar 
(2008a, 1998) and subsequently Archer et al (1998), Sayer (2000, 2010) and 
Danermark et al (2002) among others, is a sophisticated philosophical and 
methodological movement. It can perhaps be best described as “one of a range 
of postpositivist approaches positioned between positivism/objectivism and 
constructionism/relativism” (Clark 2008:167). This movement emerged as a 
result of the sustained critique of the seemingly antagonistic and diametrically 
opposed dominance of both positivist empiricism and 
constructionist/interpretivist relativism (Bhaskar 1998; Elger 2010; Iosifides 
2011a; Wynn and Williams 2012). Indeed, critical realism advanced itself as a 
viable alternative capable of transcending such paradigmatic tensions and 
unhelpful dichotomies by proposing “a way of combining a modified naturalism 
with a recognition of the necessity of interpretive understanding of meaning in 
social life” (Sayer 2000:3). Consequently, social scientists operating within a 
critical realist framework accept a transcendental realist ontology whilst 
simultaneously retaining a form of epistemological constructionism and 
relativism, in addition to an axiologically inspired emancipatory focus (Maxwell 
2012; Easton 2010a).  
 
Fundamentally, and at its most basic, critical realism assumes the existence of 
a real world ‘out there’ (Easton 2010a; Wynn and Williams 2012), a reality 
independent of human knowledge or identification of it, and “at the same time a 
dimension which includes our socially determined knowledge about reality” 
(Danermark et al 2002:6; Iosifides 2011a; Sayer 2010). However, it is salient to 
note that such socially determined knowledge is always conceptually mediated, 
theory laden and thus fundamentally partial, incomplete and fallible. Therefore 
there is a hiatus in the relationship between knowledge and its object (Maxwell 
2012; Sayer 2010), or more precisely, between the intransitive and transitive 
dimensions of social scientific knowledge and inquiry (Bhaskar 1998; Sayer 
2000; Iosifides 2011a). Synonymous with ontology (Engholm 2007), the 
intransitive dimension consists of the multifaceted entities which comprise the 
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world, its structures, systems of social relations and other physical processes 
and social phenomena (Wynn and Williams 2012; Iosifides 2011a). These 
operate independently of our ability to identify or understand them, but 
nevertheless form the objects of science (Wynn and Williams 2012; Sayer 
2000). Congruently, and for its part synonymous with epistemology (Engholm 
2007), the transitive dimension includes our constructed theoretical 
propositions, discourses and conceptual schemes which form the basis of our 
tentative knowledge regarding the intransitive dimension (Iosifides 2011a). This 
uncertain knowledge base has gradually been generated through inherently 
fallible reasoning and scientific research and is inevitably, as a matter of course, 
continuously subject to revision and reinterpretation (Wynn and Williams 2012).  
 
This distinction between the intransitive and the transitive dimensions infers that 
the world, as it exists ‘out there’, cannot simply be reduced to, or conflated with, 
our perceptions and direct experiences of it (Sayer 2000; Wynn and Williams 
2012). Indeed to do so would be to commit what has come to be termed the 
‘epistemic fallacy’, whereby statements about being are investigated in terms of 
statements about knowledge (Bhaskar 2008a). In other words, by conflating 
ontology with epistemology, transposing being into knowledge of being 
(Cruickshank 2007), we reduce “what is to what we can know about it” 
(Danermark et al 2002:21). It must therefore be acknowledged that the complex 
nature of reality is not exhausted merely in what individuals perceive or directly 
experience for reality is differentiated and stratified (Bhaskar 1998). It is 
characterised by ‘ontological depth’ and is comprised of multifaceted layers, 
structures and relations which possess productive powers and causal 
mechanisms that are not directly observable or comprehensible (Iosifides 
2011b). They can however be experienced indirectly, although only in a 
fractional and spasmodic way, by individuals through the effects of events 
causally produced by these powers and mechanisms (Danermark et al 2002).  
 
It is this identification of a stratified ontology, as opposed to what might be 
regarded as a flat ontology characteristic of both positivism and constructionism 
(Easton 2010a), that forms a key aspect of critical realism (Wynn and Williams 
2012). It is also one which Bhaskar (2008a) helpfully facilitates the exploration 
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of by providing an ‘ontological map’, charting and delineating three distinct yet 
overlapping ontological domains of reality (Danermark et al 2002). Indeed, as 
depicted in Table 1 below, Bhaskar (2008a) differentiates between the domains 
of the real, the actual and the empirical. 
 
Table 1: The Three Ontological Domains of Reality.   
(Adapted from Bhaskar 2008a:13). 
 Domain of  
Real 
Domain of  
Actual 
Domain of 
Empirical 
Mechanisms  
  
Events   
 
Experiences    
 
The domain of the real refers to the underlying generative mechanisms, 
structures and relations which, when appropriate contextual circumstances and 
contingent conditions coalesce to stimulate what are predominantly latent or 
unexercised tendencies, possess the causal power to produce events and 
phenomena in the actual realm (Clark 2008; Iosifides 2011a). Consequently, the 
domain of the actual refers to what eventuates if and when the causal powers 
which reside within the real are enacted (Sayer 2000; Wynn and Williams 
2012). However, as alluded to previously, both the domains of the real and the 
actual remain recalcitrant to direct observation and can be perceived only 
fallibly (Clark 2008). Therefore, they produce patterns of events which inevitably 
occur regardless of the capability of the human condition to observe their 
existence (Wynn and Williams 2012; Christie et al 2000). As a result, despite 
our social scientific interest orbiting the predominantly unobservable domains of 
the real and the actual, the researcher has instead to “deal with what can be 
observed in the realm of the empirical” (Ackroyd 2009:533).  
 
Indeed, it is within the domain of the empirical that social actors may 
spasmodically observe and experience, either directly or indirectly, phenomena, 
events and processes emanating from the domain of the actual. Informed by 
such empirical actualities individuals subsequently attempt to construct 
conceptual and interpretive schemes that may facilitate the partial and fallible 
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apprehension of reality (Iosifides 2011a; Danermark et al 2002). However, it 
should be acknowledged that what is observed or experienced may not be 
interpreted uniformly by different social actors, in as much as there is an implicit 
process of interpretation that intervenes between the realms of the actual and 
the empirical (Easton 2010a). Consequently, engagement with what Sayer 
(2000:17) refers to as the “interpretive or Hermeneutic dimension” is of 
acknowledged importance to critical realism (Smith and Elger 2012). Indeed, 
critical realists view social phenomena as being intrinsically meaningful and 
thus it becomes necessary, if one is to understand the dominant cause of 
societal action, to attain some understanding of the reasons and meanings that 
individuals assign to their actions (Sayer 2000; Manicas 2009; Danermark et al 
2002). Fundamentally, the position being advanced is that social actors’ 
meanings, beliefs and reasons have consequences (Maxwell 2012). They can 
be causes of social events (Sayer 2010) in that they provide the influential 
generative mechanisms or underlying motivations conducive to the production 
of behavioural impulses, which correspond towards a tendency for the social 
actor to act in certain ways (Maxwell 2012; Krauss 2005; Wynn and Williams 
2012). Accordingly, “the beliefs, understandings, and meanings of humans do 
matter — not because they determine what objective reality is but rather 
because they are likely to influence behaviour” (Clark 2008:169).  
 
It should also be acknowledged that critical realism supports the view that the 
wider physical contexts within which individuals are situated causally influence 
their beliefs and perspectives. Therefore it treats both individuals’ meanings, 
beliefs and perspectives, as well as their wider socio-structural situations, as 
real and causally interactive social phenomena (Maxwell 2012). Evidently, 
significant understanding of individuals’ meanings, beliefs and reasons and how 
such ‘mental’ phenomena exert causal powers is crucial for our ability as social 
scientists to explore and explain the complexities of the social world 
(Danermark et al 2002). This is a task to which critical realism is particularly well 
suited. It can be utilised to guide research into lay beliefs, accounts and 
experiences (Clark 2008) of how the actualities of stimulated structural 
mechanisms and processes exert potentially harmful effects upon individuals’ 
lived realities.  
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However, this should be tempered with two important caveats. Firstly, it should 
be acknowledged that individuals may possess, and subsequently act upon, a 
misunderstood and altogether imperfect view of themselves and their wider 
socio-economic and cultural circumstances, inevitably resulting in the 
solicitation of data pertaining to inaccurate accounts of reality (Manicas 2009; 
Wynn and Williams 2012; Sayer 2010; Clark 2008). They may also possess 
tacit rather than articulable knowledge (Fleetwood 2005) in that, in the case of 
this research, individuals may publicly disavow knowledge of social harms 
which fail to be encompassed within the official rubric of ‘crime’. Consequently, 
and commensurate with the view that not all knowledge is equally fallible 
(Danermark et al 2002), it is for this reason that critical realists place 
considerable emphasis upon ascertaining the adequacy of individuals’ 
understanding of their own ideas, beliefs and actions. Additionally, they 
consider the importance of recognising the possibility that those very ideas, 
beliefs and actions may contribute towards the reproduction of socio-economic 
and cultural relations which threaten the interests of the individuals themselves 
(Iosifides 2011a).  
 
Nevertheless, caution is advisable here. While trying to grasp some discernible 
understanding of individuals’ ‘mental’ phenomena and the causal powers they 
exert, one should not needlessly slip into extracting the agent from the wider 
social structure as an autonomous being. This leads to the unnecessary 
ontological separation of agency and structure which constitutes the subject of 
the second caveat. Whilst critical realism generally views both wider socio-
structural contexts and individuals’ beliefs, meanings and understandings as 
causally interactive social phenomena (Maxwell 2012), it has not always been 
successful in retaining this holistic view. Simply put, there is a noted tendency 
for some forms of critical realism to overemphasise the ontological separation of 
the agent from the social structure, in such a way as to endow the agent with 
undue autonomy and command over the self’s drives and desires (Brown 2014; 
Kivinen and Piiroinen 2006; Hall 2012b). 
 
It is in this respect that the Žižekian synthesis of German idealism and Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, which has come to be known as transcendental materialism 
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(Johnston 2008), can arguably help augment the explanatory power of critical 
realism (Hall and Winlow 2015). Certainly, it undoubtedly yields greater insight 
into the structure-agency dynamic by explaining more holistically how the agent 
is temporarily captured by the dominant negative ideology of capitalist realism 
that underpins the contemporary social structure (Winlow and Hall 2013; Fisher 
2009). As alluded to previously, transcendental materialism usefully facilitates 
the exploration of how individuals are recruited at the emotional and material 
level, assimilated into the ideological base of the very sociosymbolic order that 
produces harmful effects to human communities (Winlow and Hall 2013). Before 
briefly articulating how such assimilation occurs it is worth noting that despite its 
destructiveness, inequality and perpetual instability (Hall 2012a), the current 
dominant sociosymbolic order is constituted upon the principles and negative 
ideology of neoliberal market capitalism and consumer culture (Winlow and Hall 
2013). Fisher (2009:2) aptly refers to the ideological entrenchment of this 
functionally destructive symbiosis as “capitalist realism”.  
 
So how and why does such potentially destructive assimilation occur? 
Fundamentally, it is argued that in order to avoid the trauma that accompanies 
the potential re-assimilation into the un-symbolised Lacanian Real, individuals 
actively solicit their inclusion within the dominant Symbolic Order (Johnston 
2008). This in turn provides the requisite socio-cultural symbolic framework, or 
ideology, necessary to allay the onset of psychic disturbances erupting as a 
result of an encounter with the obscene Real, as the individual continues to 
precariously traverse the borders between the orders of the Real and the 
Symbolic (Winlow and Hall 2013; Myers 2003). At its most basic the argument 
is that individuals “must belong to a comprehensible sociosymbolic order whose 
meanings and codes are shared with others who are needed to ensure material 
and psychic survival in everyday environments” (Winlow and Hall 2013:162). 
Indeed, as Becker (1975) long since noted, humans are frail and fragile 
creatures who are so fearful of death, one of the principal evils facing the 
human organism, that they scurry frantically in search of a means through which 
they can secure victory over their earthly limitations.  
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This all-consuming pursuit to retain life at any cost, which in itself often 
produces new evils in the form of heightened anxiety and constant instability, 
culminates in the active solicitation for inclusion within a culture or society, or 
more broadly a sociosymbolic order (Becker 1975; Hall 2012a). Such inclusion 
serves as an antidote to the terror of mortality by providing a more powerful and 
durable alter-organism capable of enduring beyond the bodily life endowed by 
nature (Becker 1975). To be sure, the subject is evidently more than the 
Symbolic Order’s ideology in that residual vestiges of the Real remain in the 
heart of the subject, precluding the completion of any signifying operation (Žižek 
2008a). This essentially bars its comprehensive socialisation, resulting in the 
subject finding itself in the gaps between symbolic designations which capitalist 
realism endlessly endeavours to close up (Žižek 2008a; Bjerg 2011). However, 
inclusion within the sociosymbolic order provides the necessary immortality 
symbols required to secure some form of indefinite duration and self-
perpetuation, ultimately functioning as a standardised system of death denial 
(Becker 1975, 2011). Therefore, “we are, as it were, part of the [Symbolic] 
system but more than it at the same time” (Myers 2003:113).   
 
In order to retain some semblance of control over an otherwise overwhelming 
world, humans immerse themselves completely within the dominant 
sociosymbolic order and nourish wholeheartedly its ideology. Only such 
unyielding allegiance will secure the immortality which the socio-cultural 
symbolic framework alone may confer (Becker 1975). Of course the promise of 
victory over innate earthly limitations cannot be kept for “death anxiety always 
lingers under the surface and is never surely and smoothly absorbed in the 
cultural hero system” (Becker 1975:122). Yet such fear and anxiety remains 
repressed for the most part, surfacing only occasionally as it forcefully 
punctures through brief momentary lapses in our collective fetishistic disavowal 
of our fragility and vulnerability (Becker 1975; Žižek 2011; Winlow and Hall 
2013).  
 
Importantly, the dominant sociosymbolic order does not simply offer benign 
freedom, for it represents both the sanctuary of survival and the cage of 
entrapment. Indeed, the compelling injunction to grasp for dear life the 
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immortality symbols offered to us by the sociosymbolic order, which 
convincingly sells the alluring façade of some indefinite duration, is seized upon 
by our political leaders. They purchase our obedience to and denial of their self-
appraised negative ideology of capitalist realism with the threat of severance 
from the very immortality symbols which now sustain our material and psychic 
survival. There exists, they argue, no plausible alternative capable of securing 
such survival (Becker 1975; Winlow and Hall 2013). Consequently this ideology, 
as Winlow and Hall (2013:173) note:  
… congeals in our neurological circuits to ensure that we encounter 
and emotionally commit ourselves to the dominant ideology as pure 
common sense, as a timeless fact of life that must be accepted.  
 
However, it is such emotional commitment combined with the obsessive denial 
of its harmful effects that inevitably results in social actors inadvertently 
securing their own domination and degradation. In almost masochistic fashion 
individuals wilfully and actively collude in, and support the maintenance of, the 
very sociosymbolic order, complete with its destructive ideology, entities and 
generative mechanisms, that produces socially harmful events, absences and 
phenomena within the realm of the actual (Bhaskar 2008a, 2008b). This effects 
not only the lived realities of those who experience such harms either directly or 
indirectly in the empirical realm, but also the interests of the wider social body. 
Therefore, and as shall be explored in more detail in later chapters, the link to 
criminogenesis is clear. Individuals actively solicit and buy into a negative 
ideology that constitutes and reproduces cynicism, depoliticisation and potential 
criminal responses to heightened anxiety, constant instability and insecurity 
(Hall 2012b). In many respects the effects of such solicitation are particularly 
acute amongst the impoverished immortality seekers who lash out with more 
vigour in light of their failure to attain the power of symbolic immortality (Becker 
1975).   
 
The position can thus be advanced that transcendental materialism is an 
independent philosophical tradition that intricately intersects and interacts with 
the three overlapping ontological domains of reality identified by Bhaskar 
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(2008a). In fact rather than simply constituting a ‘bolt on’ to the critical realist 
framework explored so far, it can itself perhaps be viewed as constituting the 
fourth ontological domain, as depicted in Table 2 below.  
 
Table 2: The Four Ontological Domains of Reality.  
 The 
Transcendental 
Materialist 
Domain 
Domain 
of  
Real 
Domain 
of  
Actual 
Domain of 
Empirical 
Sociosymbolic 
Order, Drive 
and Desire 
 
   
Mechanisms 
  
  
Events 
   
 
Experiences 
    
 
In keeping with the critical realist and transcendental materialist inspired 
emphasis placed thus far upon the dominant sociosymbolic order and the 
harmful effects produced in the real, enacted in the actual and experienced in 
the empirical, this thesis draws upon the concept of social harm, dominion of 
the new zemiological movement (Hall 2012b). This decision is also in 
congruence with the acknowledged possibility that such individuals may 
possess tacit rather than articulable knowledge (Fleetwood 2005), and therefore 
potentially publicly disavow knowledge of social harms which fail to be 
encompassed within the ambit of official criminalisation.  
 
Indeed, the social harm perspective is capable of providing individuals with the 
discursive space to express their lived experiences of harm without the 
constrictive adherence to the concept of ‘crime’ (Pemberton 2007). By utilising 
this augmented zemiological approach, the researcher aimed to facilitate 
research participants’ ability to think beyond the dominant ideology and official 
terminology, in order to reveal experiences of social harm that remain unnoticed 
by the statistical quantification of various official institutions. Having delineated 
the ontological and epistemological framework underpinning this research and 
articulating the reasons for its utilisation, the thrust of this chapter can now be 
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directed towards explicating the methodological contours of the research design 
and methods employed. 
 
Research Design and Methods:  
Whilst the overall methodological structure underpinning this research is 
predicated upon the aforementioned framework, the research design and 
methods employed were primarily informed by a close reading of the critical 
realist methods literature. The primary reason for this is that not only is critical 
realism evidently highly compatible with the other two components of this 
framework, but it has a relatively more established and better documented 
methodological focus. This is usefully explicated by numerous scholars 
including, among others, Sayer (2000, 2010), Maxwell (2012), Iosifides (2011a) 
and Danermark et al (2002) who outline helpful ways in which research of this 
nature may proceed.  
 
Essentially, this research is designed around two major components. First and 
foremost is the exploratory and empirically informed investigation of unreported 
and unrecorded as well as invisible or overtly ignored forms of crime and social 
harm within an area referred to in this thesis as ‘Lake Town’. Secondly, and less 
logistically intricate, is the thorough review of the existing literature on 
international forms of invisible crimes and un-criminalised harms, which will 
serve to both further illuminate the primary data findings and highlight the 
connective interaction between the local and global research contexts. Whilst 
this second component is by no means straightforward, its literature based 
analytical procedure does not necessitate with commensurate cogency the 
precise delineation of its intricacies as that associated with the primary empirical 
component of this research. It is for this reason that the majority of what follows 
in this chapter is oriented towards the explication of the methodological 
parameters of this primary empirical component.     
 
Positioned as it is between positivism/objectivism and 
constructionism/relativism, critical realism is compatible with both quantitative 
and qualitative research methods (Clark 2008; Krauss 2005; Sayer 2000), or 
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perhaps more precisely with what a number of critical realists refer to as 
extensive and intensive research designs (Sayer 2010; Danermark et al 2002; 
Iosifides 2011a). Similar to but not entirely synonymous with quantitative 
methods (Iosifides 2011a), extensive research is primarily concerned with the 
identification of regularities through the sustained observation of variables’ 
quantitative dimensions. Particular emphasis is placed upon identifying their 
common properties, general patterns and relations in an attempt to reveal how 
extensive certain phenomena and patterns of events are in a given population 
(Sayer 2000, 2010). Procedurally, such research is geared towards the 
collection of quantitative data through, for example, utilising large-scale formal 
questionnaires or interview surveys aimed at a predetermined and 
‘representative’ sample of individuals from taxonomically defined groups 
(Danermark et al 2002; Sayer 2010). The focus essentially is upon generating 
descriptive and inferential statistics and subsequently engaging in complex 
statistical analysis.  
 
However, it is salient to note that the quantitative identification of statistical 
relations between observed variables utilising such extensive oriented research 
does not necessarily facilitate the explication of causal relationships, therefore 
rendering its explanatory value minimal (Sayer 2000). Consequently, extensive 
research is considered to be significantly weaker than its intensive counterpart 
in terms of its ability to excavate causal explanations. Its explanatory power is 
severely undermined by its embedded successionist theory of causation, 
evidenced by its dependence and incessant fidelity towards the identification of 
regularities in punctiform data (Sayer 2010, 2000). Nevertheless, to accept the 
wholesale rejection of extensive research’s methodological efficacy is to risk 
severe oversimplification for, as Iosifides (2011a) aptly reminds us, its largely 
quantitative methods are extremely useful for identifying what Lawson (1998) 
refers to as demi-regularities. According to Lawson (1998:149, original 
emphasis) a demi-regularity is “a partial event regularity which prima facie 
indicates the occasional, but less than universal, actualization of a mechanism 
or tendency, over a definite region of time-space”. In other words, demi-
regularities refer to the identification of rough and ready partial generalities or 
event regularities that manifest as a result of specific generative causal 
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mechanisms operating at the empirical level that require further investigation 
and explanation (Danermark et al 2002; Iosifides 2011a). Consequently, 
Lawson (1998) argues that the most obvious and useful role for such demi-
regularities is that they are capable of providing an important source of 
directionality to the investigatory remit of social scientific research. That is to 
say that they provide tentative evidence that certain identifiable mechanisms, 
which are relatively enduring yet hold imperfectly, have been in play (Lawson 
1998; Faulkner 2007). 
  
Importantly, it should be clarified that demi-regularities are not empirical facts or 
causal explanations that constitute the end point of social scientific research. 
Rather they are exploratory devices which facilitate researchers’ identification of 
social phenomena ripe for further exploration and potential explanation. This is 
particularly the case when such demi-regularities point towards the existence of 
an anomalous inconsistency or disjuncture between a set of prior beliefs and 
purportedly observed phenomena (Lawson 1998). Fundamentally, they 
encourage social scientific researchers to delve deeper in what then becomes a 
predominantly qualitative attempt to elucidate the precise causal factors that 
produced the identified partial event regularity (Iosifides 2011a). The purported 
‘international crime decline’ arguably represents just such an anomalous 
disjuncture that is undoubtedly worth exploring further.  
 
Having laid the conceptual foundations it is time to build upon the discussion 
presented above by articulating the researcher’s conceptualisation of what is 
referred to in this thesis as ‘soft positivism’. This term is borrowed from the legal 
positivist Hart (2012:250), whose original conception of it denoted a 
commitment towards the inclusion of moral principles or substantive values 
within the criteria for legal validity (Hart 2012; Kramer 2003; Wacks 2006). 
However, it is used here to avoid the wholesale rejection of positivist-inspired 
social scientific research by distinguishing between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ positivism.  
 
‘Hard positivism’ is synonymous with positivism proper and is thus equally 
susceptible to all associated criticisms which have been rehearsed in detail 
elsewhere (Sayer 2010; Maxwell 2012). ‘Soft positivism’, as it is conceived 
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here, draws heavily upon Lawson’s (1998) notion of demi-regularities. Whilst it 
perhaps provides no other advancement to this concept than simply orienting its 
discourse within a vocabulary which clearly demarcates it from the more 
conventional or ‘hard’ forms of extensive/positivist social research, the 
articulation of its parameters is nevertheless pertinent. Fundamentally, it is 
critical of the wholesale abandonment of quantitative techniques within the 
social sciences but admits that such techniques should be used with more 
discrimination (Danermark et al 2002). Moreover, ‘soft positivism’ acknowledges 
that quantitative based approaches cannot successfully address questions of 
causation as they lack sufficient explanatory power (Sayer 2000). They can 
however be invaluable in their initial ability to identify interesting empirical 
manifestations of activated mechanisms, otherwise known as demi-regularities. 
The identification of which may draw social scientists’ attention towards the 
need to illicit qualitative data capable of providing causal explanations 
(Danermark et al 2002; Sayer 2010).  
 
It could be argued that whilst not expressly articulating it, it is Iosifides 
(2011a:94) who provides perhaps the most succinct yet cogent delineation of 
this ‘soft positivist’ approach by noting that: 
[W]hen quantitative methods are used and quantitative data and 
findings are interpreted in a non-positivist manner, they can serve as 
valuable means in highlighting crucial aspects of social reality. For 
example, when empirical regularities or — to put it more accurately —
demi-regularities (Danermark et al 2002) are not taken to be causal 
explanations, they may guide and orient researchers towards the 
postulation of generative mechanisms able to explain these demi-
regularities causally.   
Therefore, the utilisation of ‘soft positivism’ as an initial analytical method to 
identify quantitative demi-regularities should be swiftly followed by a 
contextually sensitive qualitative investigation of the causal mechanisms 
responsible for producing such partial event regularities (Iosifides 2011a). It is in 
this regard that the in-depth intensive approach becomes most useful 
(Danermark et al 2002).  
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Evidently, these extensive and intensive oriented approaches are 
complementary rather than antagonistic. There nevertheless remains a 
methodological hierarchy in as much as where the scholarly emphasis remains 
upon the detection of causal mechanisms the qualitative-intensive approach 
remains the most important element (Danermark et al 2002; Iosifides 2011a). It 
is perhaps worth mentioning that this conceptualisation of ‘soft positivism’ is a 
position more in tune with what Danermark et al (2002:152) refer to as “critical 
methodological pluralism” than the ontological and epistemological pragmatism 
associated with more conventional mixed methods research (Denscombe 
2010). Accordingly, it is in this capacity that it is appropriate to acknowledge that 
the current research was informed by a ‘soft positivist’ approach. That is to say 
the researcher was initially alerted to the purported occurrence of an 
‘international crime decline’ via the presentation of statistical analyses, 
emanating from the crime decline literature, which must now be explored more 
appropriately by utilising qualitative-intensive research. 
 
As previously alluded to, the intensive research approach predominantly utilises 
qualitative methods such as interactive interviews, ethnography and participant 
observation in order to illicit data which is subsequently subject to structural and 
causal qualitative analysis (Sayer 2010). Its primary concern is the elucidation 
of causal processes and generative mechanisms. This is achieved by 
maintaining a focus predominantly, although not exclusively, trained upon the 
study of individual agents, their relationships, interpretive meanings, 
understandings and practices within their wider causal contexts (Sayer 2010, 
2000). At its most basic intensive research, which may also be exploratory in 
nature (Sayer 2010), is oriented towards illuminating the way in which 
processes work. It aims to generate causal explanations regarding the role of 
such process in producing certain objects or events within a particular or limited 
number of cases (Sayer 2010).  
 
Whilst the intensive approach’s methodological efficacy has undoubtedly 
secured its place at the heart of critical realism’s “social scientific endeavour 
towards causally explaining reality” (Iosifides 2011a:132), it must be 
acknowledged that the vast majority of the issues with which it deals are 
Justin Kotzé  PhD Thesis 
124 
 
extremely complex. This makes their exploration difficult and time-consuming, 
inevitably resulting in researchers having to limit their investigation to a 
relatively small number of cases which are studied more intensively (Danermark 
et al 2002). Consequently, and since “[t]he empirical basis of the intensive 
design is ‘cases’” (Danermark et al 2002:170), it can be successfully argued 
that case study research is firmly located within the methodological milieu of the 
intensive research design (Easton 2010a; Ackroyd 2009).  
 
The methodological literature is replete with chapters and references to the term 
‘case study’, however the ways in which this term is delineated are often wide 
ranging, disparate and at times even contradictory (Christie et al 2000; Easton 
2010a; May 2011). Therefore, in order to avoid the dangers of unexpected 
resonances, surplus meanings and other forms of ‘excess baggage’ that may 
accompany the use of “a well-worn term like case study” (Robson 2011:135), 
this research adheres to the often quoted description provided by Yin (2009). 
This popular case study exponent defines a case study as “an empirical inquiry 
that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life 
context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident” (Yin 2009:18). Utilised primarily as a strategy for the 
qualitatively in-depth and contextually complex investigation of social 
phenomena, particularly when the preservation of the phenomenon’s 
wholeness, unity and integrity is of high importance (Punch 2005), case studies 
are often capable of uncovering causal relationships between such phenomena 
and the wider milieu within which they occur (Gray 2009).  
 
For the purpose for which it is to be utilised here, the case study research 
design provides the scope for the detailed, holistic and intensive examination of 
one or a small number of instances pertaining to wider processes and 
phenomena via the employment of qualitative-intensive research methods 
(Bryman 2012; Iosifides 2011a). It is arguably these features, in conjunction 
with ‘case’ oriented research maintaining a different ‘logic’ of causality and 
generalizability than that associated with ‘variable-oriented’ ‘hard positivist’ 
research, that “makes qualitative case study research highly compatible with the 
principles of critical realism” (Iosifides 2011a:202). Indeed, a number of critical 
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realists, including Ackroyd (2009), Easton (2010a, 2010b) and Iosifides (2011a), 
have identified case studies as being the best strategy for exploring the 
interaction of events, structures, processes and actions as well as the 
excavation of causal generative mechanisms (Wynn and Williams 2012). 
Evidently the standard features of case study research, such as its ability to 
excavate social actors’ negotiated meanings, understandings and discourses as 
well as investigate the occurrence of specific social processes within their wider 
socio-economic and politico-cultural context, are of great value to critical realists 
(Elger 2010).  
 
However, it is perhaps the further ability of case studies to explore and explain 
the contextually complex interaction of causal powers and generative 
mechanisms, and the social events and experiences that subsequently occur as 
a result of their enactment, that makes case study research particularly 
attractive for critical realists (Elger 2010; Ackroyd 2009). Equally attractive is its 
explicatory power to illuminate the wider implications of specific cases via a 
reliance upon explicit theorising, a feature more commonly referred to as 
analytic or theoretical generalization (Robson 2011). Indeed, critical realist case 
study research is well-suited to the task of identifying and teasing out the 
complex interplays of causal generative mechanisms in either one or a limited 
number of cases, which inevitably reveal implications that extend far beyond the 
immediate case or cases (Easton 2010b; Iosifides 2011a).  
 
Consequently, and in stark contrast to the ‘hard positivist’ inspired assumption 
that one cannot form valid generalizations on the basis of a single case 
(Flyvbjerg 2011), the position can be advanced that “if a defensible causal 
explanation has been produced in one case then the constituents of that 
explanation provide a basis for developing theory beyond that case” (Easton 
2010a:127). In other words, case studies are generalizable to theoretical 
propositions rather than to some predetermined ‘representative’ sample of the 
wider population, facilitating the expansion and generalisation of explanatory 
theories as opposed to the statistical enumeration of frequencies (Yin 2009). 
This analytical form of generalizing the theoretical framework or propositions 
established in one study to explain broader events, concepts and situations 
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residing in the wider social body, yet which remain external to the identified 
case (Yin 2012), is an important tool in the critical realist repertoire. It provides 
researchers who operate from within this philosophical tradition the justification 
for using a single case study in order to causally explain social phenomena and 
successfully generalise from the insights gained (Easton 2010b; Maxwell 2012). 
Accordingly, “it is possible that understanding one instance in depth can offer 
universal understanding that study of millions of cases cannot” (Easton 
2010b:13), and it is perhaps in this sense that Easton (2010b:1) is right to argue 
that “one case study is enough”. This provides considerable credence in 
support of the researcher’s decision to focus his empirical lens upon the 
excavation of unreported and unrecorded crimes and invisible forms of social 
harm in Lake Town alone, whilst simultaneously arguing for the analytical 
generalizability of the conceptual framework developed and insights gained.  
 
This emphasis upon utilising the detailed and contextually focused study of a 
single case in order to expose causal processes or mechanisms as well as 
initiate and build upon explanatory theory are the two main distinguishing 
features of critical realism’s intensive case study research (Wynn and Williams 
2012). It is this intensive case study research that has been lauded as “the 
dominant approach to critical realist research because this methodology 
enables researchers to develop detailed context-sensitive causal explanations 
of specific phenomena” (Wynn and Williams 2012:804). 
 
Consequently, informed by the forgoing discussion and the commensurate 
delineation by Ackroyd (2009) of extensive and intensive case study research 
as comprising the two dominant modalities of critical realist case study research 
design, this thesis ascribes to the latter. In addition to the methodological 
grounding provided by the adoption of this intensive research design, the 
researcher has elected to utilise what Stake (1995:3) refers to as an 
“instrumental case study”. This is in no way anathema to the zemiological 
oriented critical realist and transcendental materialist positions upon which this 
research is based. The argument being advanced here is that the motivation 
behind the intensive study of unreported and unrecorded crime and harm in 
Lake Town is not simply based upon some intrinsic interest in the case itself. 
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Rather such intensive investigation is instrumental towards understanding more 
than the sum of this case’s parts (Stake 1995), to exploring the complex 
contours of the purported ‘international crime decline’ by finding the general 
within the specific (Easton 2010b).  
 
As alluded to above, the utilisation of case study research designated as 
‘instrumental’ is not all that far removed from the realist paradigm. Drawing 
upon Popper’s delineation of three worlds (Magee 1985) Healy and Perry 
(2000) helpfully connect the dots by explaining that Popper’s third world is 
related to realism. Indeed the third world, which is comprised of highly complex 
objective structures produced by social actors, “is largely autonomous, though 
created by us” (Magee 1985: 61). There is no great philosophical leap required 
here to see how this Popperian view intersects with the critical realist assertion 
that the world exists independently and irrespective of the ability of the human 
condition to either know of or identify it (Sayer 2010; Bhaskar 2008a). From 
here it is suggested that instrumental case study research can be used to 
investigate and understand such world three phenomena and in turn study a 
reality beyond immediate perception (Healy and Perry 2000). Accordingly, it is 
this extrinsic reality that instrumental case study research is interested in 
illuminating, by critically utilising interviewees’ potentially fallible perceptions as 
a window through which the researcher may begin to study a reality beyond 
those perceptions rather than the perceptions themselves (Healy and Perry 
2000). It is in this capacity that it has been adopted for the purposes of this 
research.  
 
Moreover it is this instrumental orientation that has facilitated the purposive 
selection of the case itself, by encouraging the researcher to select a case that 
explicitly illustrated the main features and processes which this research is 
endeavouring to illuminate and subsequently extrapolate beyond the analytical 
borders of the immediate case (Silverman 2013). Such selection criteria is 
evidently commensurate with the common convention that an appropriate case 
should be selected based upon its likely ability to illuminate the research 
questions posed in such a way as to maximise what can be learned (Yin 2009; 
Stake 1995). One must therefore identify a setting and individuals that both 
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exhibit the characteristics common to the phenomena under investigation and 
are conducive to gaining the requisite understanding sought (Maxwell 2012). 
More specifically however, and commensurate with such wisdom and the 
aforementioned instrumental orientation, this research adopts, as a rationale 
congruent with single case research, a typical case selection strategy (Yin 
2009; Henn et al 2009), or what Bryman (2012:70, original emphasis) refers to 
as “an exemplifying case”.  
 
The guiding principle in selecting an exemplifying case is not because the case 
itself is of interest in some extreme or unusual way, but rather because it 
epitomises and/or exemplifies circumstances and conditions thought to inhere 
within a broader category of similar cases, and provides a suitable context 
within which the researcher’s questions are more likely to find answers (Bryman 
2012). The researcher’s designation of Lake Town as just such a typical or 
exemplifying case is supported by Lloyd (2013:1), who notes that Lake Town is 
by no means unique and that its study may facilitate an analysis of wider social 
trends in as much as it “is representative of many other post-industrial towns 
and cities with nothing to offer”. Indeed, as stressed in chapter two, Lake 
Town’s characteristically bleak context is far from unique amongst the globe’s 
deindustrialised towns and cities scattered across the post-industrial landscape. 
Having delineated the philosophical and methodological parameters 
underpinning this research, the remainder of this chapter will focus upon 
mapping the researcher’s procedural manoeuvres. 
 
Research Process:  
With consideration to the qualitative principles guiding the selection of research 
settings and participants outlined in the critical realist literature (Maxwell 2012), 
this research has utilised a purposive sampling strategy in order to facilitate the 
identification and selection of both the research location and the participants 
recruited from it. Fundamentally, “purposive sampling places the investigator’s 
research questions at the heart of the sampling considerations” (Bryman 
2012:416). That is to say that sampling contexts and units are chosen because 
they possess particular socio-demographic characteristics or specific 
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behavioural tendencies, experiences or occupational positions (Ritchie et al 
2003). In other words they are thought to be inherently imbued with the relevant 
knowledge and understanding of the research phenomena, resulting in the 
solicitation of data pertinent to achieving the objectives of the research (Kumar 
2011). Indeed, both the research site and participants were selected based 
upon their proximity to, and experience of, the harmful effects of the dominant 
sociosymbolic order’s actualised structures and processes.  
 
Congruent with this purposive orientation, and with a particular focus upon the 
recruitment of hard-to-find participants (Holt and Walker 2009), the researcher 
enlisted the additional and complimentary aid of a snowball sampling strategy. 
This strategy involves purposely selecting the initial participants and then, once 
data has been collected, asking them to recommend other suitable participants 
thereby establishing access to a new recruitment network (Hessler 1992; Seale 
2012). Purposely selecting and snowballing from certain participant networks 
such as various criminal justice officials, staff from voluntary agencies and local 
residents, was relatively straight forward. Conversely, finding and accessing 
active/ex-offenders or those who maintain contact with criminal associates 
proved to be somewhat more logistically challenging. For instance there were 
occasional incidents whereby potential participants would, upon receiving a text 
message from the researcher reminding them of an arranged interview, claim to 
have never heard of the researcher let alone recall having agreed to be 
interviewed. Fortunately however, the researcher was lucky enough to have 
befriended a particularly well positioned ‘gatekeeper’, who was able to facilitate 
access to these naturally secretive individuals, and whose contribution in this 
way undoubtedly played a crucial role in the success of the research’s empirical 
element. Since the primary objective of the empirical element was to uncover 
not only hidden but evolving forms of crime and harm, the researcher prioritised 
the recruitment of these secretive individuals as well as local residents of Lake 
Town.  
 
This recruitment process continued until a point of sufficient saturation was 
reached (Seidman 2013), which occurred around the 27th-30th interview when 
the researcher began to hear the same information from subsequent 
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participants resulting in no new knowledge being obtained. Consequently, and 
in line with general qualitative sampling guidelines positing 30 as “a bit of a 
magic number in sampling” (Holt and Walker 2009:30-31), the empirical phase 
culminated with the researcher having interviewed a sample of 30 participants. 
The majority of participants were comprised of active/ex-offenders, individuals 
who maintain contact with criminal associates and local residents, while the 
remainder were made up of various local criminal justice officials and staff from 
voluntary sector agencies.  
 
As one of the dominant data collection tools associated with qualitative critical 
realist research in general (Sayer 2010; Iosifides 2011a; Smith and Elger 2012) 
and case study research in particular (Yin 2009; Gray 2009), the researcher 
elected to utilise semi-structured interviews as the primary means by which to 
collect empirical data. Such interviews are renowned for their ability to allow the 
researcher to get closer to both internal and external interview realities, by 
facilitating the solicitation of individuals’ partial and fallible interpretive 
understandings and perspectives as well as both their acknowledged and 
disavowed lived experiences (Iosifides 2011a, 2011b). Essentially, participants 
are afforded the opportunity to express themselves through their own voices 
and conceptually mediated language, whilst simultaneously illuminating the 
culturally embedded normative frames through which they symbolise their 
experiences (Byrne 2004; Miller and Glassner 2011).  
 
Accordingly, and in line with the zemiological oriented critical realist and 
transcendental materialist framework underpinning this research, semi-
structured interviews have been put to work here in order to elicit individuals’ 
experiences, tacit perceptions and disavowed knowledge of crime and harm. 
This was accomplished by providing them with a discursive space that remains 
uninhibited by the narrow legal concept of ‘crime’, thereby enabling them to 
reveal experiences of social harm in a way that moves beyond the dominant 
ideology and official terminology. Indeed, because individuals actively solicit 
and adopt neoliberal culture and ideology they do not necessarily connect or 
attribute their experiences of crime and social harm to its genesis in the domain 
of the real outlined by Bhaskar (2008a). In this respect semi-structured 
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interviews can help connect the two by excavating tacit knowledge and moving 
beyond respondents’ fetishistic disavowal.  
 
Prior to conducting interviews the researcher constructed several interview 
guides designed to remind the researcher of the key question topics that 
needed to be asked during the interview (Hennink et al 2011). The structure of 
the guides followed a coherent order yet remained relatively loose in order to 
facilitate the pursuit of tangents that developed naturally as the interviews 
progressed. This allowed the researcher to capitalise upon the articulation of 
particularly interesting yet unsolicited comments whilst simultaneously giving 
the interview more of a conversational feel, thereby contributing to the 
maintenance of an established rapport. Acknowledging the cyclical nature of 
qualitative data collection, the researcher refined certain questions and 
developed new probes where necessary enabling a deeper exploration of the 
key issues with each subsequent interview (Hennink et al 2011). Instrumental to 
this reflexive process was the researcher’s use of what Flick (2009:298) refers 
to as “documentation sheets” upon which notes were written directly after each 
interview. Among the things documented were the use of interview guides, 
notes on areas of content and the context of the data collection, including any 
special occurrences which may have arisen during the interview. 
 
For the most part, interviews were conducted in pre-designated interview rooms 
located in the University’s Social Sciences, Business and Law building. These 
facilities not only provided the participants with a safe and welcoming 
environment in which to articulate what were in some cases particularly 
harrowing accounts of social harm, but were conducive to the researcher’s 
practical requirements. Indeed, following the advice to “record whenever 
possible” (Fielding and Thomas 2008:257), the researcher utilised a digital 
audio recorder during all interviews rather than the slow and often inaccurate 
process of having to pause after every few utterances in order to frantically write 
down the participant’s responses (Gray 2009; Fielding and Thomas 2008). In 
addition to preventing this potentially “stilted and peculiar interaction” (Fielding 
and Thomas 2008:257), audio recording provides a more accurate account of 
the interview, which is essential if the analysis phase is not to be made 
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redundant, by facilitating a thorough and if necessary repeated examination of 
the data obtained (Yin 2009; Gray 2009; Bryman 2012). Heeding Mason’s 
(2002) cautionary note warning researchers not to become visually and audibly 
complacent simply because one has an audio recorder switched on, the 
researcher continued to pay diligent attention to the body language and tone of 
the participants and noted such information in the above mentioned 
documentation sheets. Accordingly, through such attentive observation it 
became evident that whilst the majority of respondents where comfortable 
talking in the presence of an activated audio recorder, they did not simply forget 
it was there as many often admitted to being self-consciously reluctant to swear 
on tape. However, in light of the quality and detail of the data obtained it is felt 
that the presence of the audio recorder did not greatly diminish the candidness 
with which individuals spoke.  
 
Immediately following the completion of an interview the audio file was 
transcribed in order to maximise the researcher’s analytical familiarity with the 
data (Arksey and Knight 1999). Noting the numerous paragraphs of advice 
contained within the methodological literature as well as considering the limited 
time and resources available, the researcher utilised a transcription style that 
incorporated a happy medium between full and partial transcription. This 
amounted to transcribing the majority of all audio files verbatim whilst 
simultaneously omitting certain sections of the recordings deemed to be 
irrelevant (Poland 2008). Indeed, as Bryman (2012:486) cogently notes, “there 
seems little point in transcribing material that you know is unlikely to be fruitful”. 
Fundamentally, and in light of the scrupulous ‘play and read’ accuracy checks 
conducted by the researcher (Arksey and Knight 1999), this balanced 
transcription style did not preclude the opportunity to identify preliminary 
analytical themes or establish connections between the data and existing 
literature. Moreover it was consistent with the requirements of thematic 
analysis, a procedure undertaken once all the interviews had been transcribed 
(Grbich 2007), in that this analytical method typically does not require the same 
level of transcript detail as that associated with conversation or discourse 
analysis (Robson 2011). 
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Indeed, the decision to employ the use of thematic analysis within the 
parameters of this research is well justified. Not only is it regarded as “one of 
the most common approaches to qualitative data analysis” (Bryman 2012:578), 
but its theoretical neutrality makes it highly compatible with realism’s admittedly 
still infantile methodological structure (Robson 2011; Sayer 2010). Thematic 
analysis entails identifying themes and subthemes via observing commonalities, 
relationships and differences within and across data sets, by thoroughly reading 
and rereading the interview transcripts (Bryman 2012; Gibson and Brown 2009) 
and is essentially “a process for encoding qualitative information” (Boyatzis 
1998:4). This process of encoding requires the development of explicit codes 
which are in essence conceptually codified themes often identified at both the 
manifest and latent levels of the information contained within the transcripts 
(Boyatzis 1998).  
 
These codes, like the themes they represent, were both identified apriori via 
reviewed literature and generated empirically directly from the raw data itself 
and simply referred to “categories of data that represent[ed] a thematic concern” 
(Gibson and Brown 2009:133). Ultimately they were judged according to their 
ability to capture adequately and consistently the richness of the phenomenon 
to which they referred (Boyatzis 1998). Procedurally, this entailed the 
researcher steering clear of the latest computer-assisted qualitative data 
analysis software, replete with its technological discrepancies (Bryman 2012; 
Gray 2009), in favour of utilising a Microsoft Word facilitated copy and paste 
technique. This involved the creation of new Word documents for each 
manually codified theme identified, all of which were subsequently collated and 
printed out into a thematically organised sourcebook. This technique is similar 
to what Grbich (2007:32) refers to as “a block and file approach” and has the 
advantage of retaining intact large and contextually detailed segments of 
transcript material facilitating a richer final interpretation of the data. 
 
Throughout the research process the researcher remained aware of the need to 
ensure both the validity and reliability of the study in general and the collection 
and analysis of the data in particular. Acknowledging the point that “the quality 
of scientific research done within a paradigm has to be judged by its own 
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paradigm’s terms” (Healy and Perry 2000:120-121), this research drew 
predominantly, although not exclusively, upon the work of those positioned 
within the paradigms of realism and critical realism to make these vital 
assessments. Indeed, with regards to validity the researcher first and foremost 
ensured that all of the questions posed related directly to the research 
objectives and therefore explicated or illuminated what they were intended to 
(Gray 2009; Mason 2002).  
 
Additionally, and in keeping with a critical realist approach to validity that relies 
upon multiple perceptions (Healy and Perry 2000), a form of data source 
triangulation was employed, a process considered to be a powerful means by 
which to counter threats to validity (Robson 2011). Essentially, this involved not 
only drawing upon what were often converging lines of evidence from numerous 
and varied interview participants (Yin 2012), but from a range of additional 
sources including both published and unpublished literature as well as publicly 
available government and local council documents (Rothbauer 2008). It is also 
perhaps worth mentioning that both within and across interviews the researcher 
utilised member-checking and cross-checking techniques respectively. This 
facilitated the covert interrogation of the intricate details of participants’ 
accounts and by extension served to indicate whether or not the data obtained 
could be regarded as valid (Antonopoulos 2008).  
 
Moreover, whilst of contested relevance for qualitative research (Bryman 2012), 
the position can be advanced that this research is externally valid in that it can, 
via a process of analytical generalizability, produce what Mason (2002:1, 
original emphasis) refers to as “cross-contextual generalities”. Indeed, as 
previously mentioned, and in accordance with Healy and Perry’s (2000) fifth 
criterion for judging the quality of realist research, the process of analytical 
generalizability adopted within this thesis facilitated the development of the 
study’s theoretical frameworks as well as their subsequent expansion beyond 
the borders of their immediate empirical focus (Yin 2009, 2012).  
 
To a large extent this entire chapter has been geared towards ensuring the 
reliability — or what Healy and Perry (2000:125) in their fourth criterion refer to 
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as “methodological trustworthiness” — of this study by lucidly and intricately 
explicating its philosophical underpinnings, methodological foundations and 
procedural manoeuvres. Indeed, similar to but not synonymous with the 
conventional reading of reliability (Bryman 2012), the emphasis here has been 
on ensuring that an adequate degree of transparency has been maintained 
throughout the research process. This is a technique often employed by those 
more concerned with safeguarding the replicability of the procedures used 
rather than the results obtained (Hiles 2008). Fundamentally, the researcher 
took care to ensure that philosophical assumptions, rationales supporting the 
selection of the research design, methods and data analysis as well as the 
operationalization of findings — aided by the presentation of quoted sections of 
transcript material — were delineated with sufficient transparency in order to 
ensure the overall reliability, credibility and trustworthiness of the study (Hiles 
2008; Healy and Perry 2000). 
 
It is acknowledged that the nature of qualitative research produces ethical 
challenges that are far more pronounced than those associated with other forms 
of social scientific research, due primarily to its investigation of what are often 
sensitive topics, such as harmful activities in this instance (Hennink et al 2011; 
Gray 2009). For this reason the researcher took all necessary precautions in 
order to secure the safety of all those involved, including the researcher, and 
ensure the overall ethical integrity of the research. Consequently, the ethical 
considerations of informed consent, confidentiality and anonymity, data 
protection and the minimisation of harm were taken seriously throughout the 
research.  
 
Prior to the initiation of any interview, and in accordance with Teesside 
University’s guidelines for conducting ethical research (Teesside University 
Research Governance 2012), the researcher sought to gain participants’ 
informed consent. First and foremost this involved informing the participants as 
clearly and as fully as possible about the nature and purpose of the research as 
well as the intent to disseminate the results via publication. Details were then 
offered regarding the methods used, their rights as a research participant, 
including their right to withdraw from the research, and what their involvement 
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would realistically entail, including the possibility of enduring emotional distress, 
discomfort and/or inconvenience. In addition to explicating this verbally, the 
participants were asked to read an information sheet which covered these 
details in more depth, and accordingly asked to sign a consent form to 
acknowledge that they were willing to take part in the research.  
 
Due to the sensitive nature of the research topic under investigation, 
considerable effort was directed towards ensuring the maintenance of 
participants’ confidentiality and anonymity. In addition to ascribing pseudonyms 
to both the research location and the participants, the researcher removed from 
the data records and the written thesis any additional features that could be 
used to identify participating individuals. Furthermore, any personal contact 
information obtained from participants has been stored securely and separate 
from the data records, which have also been stored securely at all times in 
accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. At the heart of these ethical 
considerations lies the fundamental concern to minimise the physical, 
psychological and emotional harm done to participants whilst trying to do some 
good through research (Gomm 2008).  
 
Although “any interview about any topic can trigger distress occasionally” 
(Gomm 2008:383), it is acknowledged that the particularly sensitive nature of 
the research questions had a greater potential to cause participants emotional 
distress or discomfort, as they revisited potentially painful or unsettling 
memories about their experiences of crime and harm (Hennink et al 2011). In 
an attempt to minimise the effects of this potential risk the researcher equipped 
himself with knowledge of various local services to which participants could be 
signposted. However, not only did such preparatory work thankfully prove to be 
unnecessary, but many participants actively acknowledged that they rather 
enjoyed the interaction of the interview and the opportunity to air their own 
views on the research topic (Hennink et al 2011). Indeed, one participant in 
particular joyfully remarked after the interview, “I enjoyed that”. In this way the 
balance between the researcher and the researched may not be as unbalanced 
as perhaps it first appears. Whilst the scales are by no means equal participants 
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may indeed find the research experience cathartic and perhaps even personally 
empowering (Arksey and Knight 1999).  
 
One would be remiss however for not acknowledging that there are always two 
sides to every story. Whilst the potential for participant benefit and the 
emancipatory effects of participating in social scientific research have been well 
documented (Hennink et al 2011; Arksey and Knight 1999; Sayer 2000), less 
has been written regarding the potentially demoralising and disheartening sense 
of dejection that participants may experience following the conclusion of an 
interview. It should be noted that one is not simply alluding to the psychological 
distress that may accompany a participant’s articulation of traumatic events 
(Hennink et al 2011), but rather the sense of futility that individuals may feel 
having participated in criminological research. Indeed, the possible occurrence 
of what could be termed post-interview dejection remained largely unaccounted 
for by the researcher until it was illuminated vocally by one participant. 
 
The individual to whom the researcher refers ardently queried both the 
usefulness of his narrative and general participation as well as that of the 
research project as a whole. Despite the researcher enthusiastically reasserting 
the importance of the participant’s involvement in research that is hoped to yield 
some social contribution he remained sceptically unconvinced. The participant’s 
evident post-interview dejection, highlighted further by the gesticulation of 
disappointment as the interview came to a close despite not having said all that 
much, served to forcefully puncture the researcher’s insulated view of having 
‘done ethics’ as the actualities of ‘benefit’ where thrown into sharp relief. Whilst 
this undoubtedly highlights the importance of frequently reiterating the valuable 
contribution made by research participants, the inherently unethical ‘use’ of 
participants for what inevitably seems to be uneven benefit is something that 
remains unresolved in this research, and perhaps even within empirical 
criminological research in general.  
 
Nevertheless, there is evidently an emancipatory function within critical realist 
qualitative research (Sayer 2000). Certainly, it has the potential to benefit not 
only those directly involved but the wider social body, by highlighting 
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suppressed voices and illuminating societal issues (Hennink et al 2011). 
Despite the presence of what can only be described as an unclear balance of 
benefit, it is hoped that this research will go some way towards contributing to 
the actualisation of this emancipatory function. Having intricately delineated the 
methodological contours of this research, the next substantive chapter will be 
directed towards revealing the empirical insights gained from the data collection 
phase.      
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Chapter Five: 
 
Research Findings. 
 
“Crime decline? What? Where?” This remark from Sarah, a member of Lake 
Town’s Crime Reduction Initiative team, captures the predominant reaction of 
many participants towards the idea of a ‘crime decline’. Accordingly, what this 
research appears to have uncovered are expressed glimpses of experiential 
lived realities of crime and harm that do not fit the idyllic image painted by some 
scholars of a more reasoned, empathetic and less violent world that is currently 
experiencing ‘universally’ declining rates of crime (Pinker 2011, 2012; De Wolf 
2012; van Kesteren et al 2014). Indeed, many participants recounted 
deleterious yet all too common experiences of crime, un-criminalised harm and 
victimisation that occur as familiar constituents of everyday life as they 
endeavour to survive amongst the criminal predation, systemic and subjective 
violence, insecurity and precarity that now characterise their locale and others 
like it (Winlow 2001). Certainly as mentioned in the previous chapter, it can be 
argued that Lake Town is but part of a constellation of nuanced yet 
fundamentally similar locales whose residents comparably share such 
deleterious experiences (Lloyd 2013; Hobbs 2013, 1998; Davies 1997).  
 
The present chapter offers a window through which to view the stark reality of 
life as it exists beneath the veneer of the ‘crime decline’ discourse’s intricately 
woven statistical quilt. This will be achieved by presenting first-hand accounts of 
experiential lifeworlds steeped in crime, un-criminalised harms and almost 
perpetual cycles of victimisation experienced by those who find themselves in 
uncomfortable proximity to the worst effects of the dominant sociosymbolic 
order’s actualised structures and processes. However, although the broad 
positionality of those offering these accounts may be revealed, it is pertinent to 
clarify that detailed biographical specificity must by necessity remain absent so 
as not to breach the researcher’s ethical requirements. Moreover, whilst it must 
be acknowledged that such accounts are anecdotal and hyperbolic, it has long 
been established that they nevertheless contain kernels of truth which deserve 
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to be taken seriously (Young 1975). This empirical excavation endeavours to 
position at the forefront of our view that which the ‘crime decline’ discourse has 
so successfully forced to the periphery. That is, despite statistical reductions in 
crime everyday life for many in areas such as Lake Town continues to be 
blighted by socio-economic impoverishment, uncertainty, fear and a raft of 
unreported and unrecorded harms and illegalities (Hall et al 2008). 
 
‘You Should Have Called it Skid Row’:  
As alluded to in chapter two, Lake Town suffered from the socio-economic 
fallout of widespread deindustrialisation and has subsequently struggled to 
come to terms with and recover from its deleterious effects (Lloyd 2013; 
Shildrick et al 2012). Accordingly the area has very little to offer its residents 
and retains a broad range of overlapping issues among which high levels of 
crime and unemployment continue to feature heavily (Lloyd 2013; Bounds 
2013). Consequently, many participants expressed unfavourable views towards 
living in Lake Town. For instance when asked ‘what is it like to live there?’ 
Laura, a local unemployed resident with a history of substance misuse, quickly 
replied “terrible, absolutely terrible”. She explained that: 
It’s just all the kids and that and all the crime and everything it’s just 
absolutely terrible, there’s always pinched cars or motorbikes going 
past, you can’t even let your kids out on the front because of the cars 
and all the crime.  
When asked what types of crime she was referring to Laura remarked “drug 
dealing, car crime, burglaries, robberies, you name it, it gets done in Lake 
Town”.  
 
Similarly, as a local resident and ex-offender who possesses an ‘accomplished’ 
criminal record, Paul revealed that where he used to live “was hectic with drugs, 
alcohol, prostitution, there was robberies all the time; then I moved up to [***] 
and that was full of alcoholics and drug addicts as well”. He added “I had to get 
away from Lake Town because I was constantly getting robbed, and I was 
getting hassled all the time”. Reece, an active offender who until recently has 
been homeless since the age of fifteen, paints a particularly vivid picture of life 
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in Lake Town. After having been told that the research location was given a 
pseudonym in order to ensure participants’ anonymity, he remarked “you should 
have called it skid row; its ruthless round here you know, it’s hard to live”. 
However, perhaps the most cogent articulation of the daily turmoil experienced 
by residents comes from Craig, an ex-offender and inhabitant of Lake Town 
since childhood, who explained that: 
 
Lake Town is a rough place to live for different reasons. Whether you 
want to say the night life, the crime, the crack cocaine, the working girls 
and all that, your gambling, your drugs, and your alcohol you know 
what I mean, it’s all day long. I used to get in on a night and it’s going 
on till 4 o’clock in the morning, you can’t get your head down on a night 
because you can hear it going on outside, hear someone just getting 
beaten up or you can hear the working girls kicking off with the dealer 
or punter or whatever. It’s absolutely madness down there, you can 
walk around there on a night and see some stuff that’s like ‘wow this is 
really insane living’ you know what I mean. 
 
Alongside such overt displays of disorder however lies the far more subtle yet 
no less pervasive act of systemic violence often benignly referred to as 
unemployment (Ward 2004; Dorling 2010; Wilkinson and Pickett 2010). This 
systemically induced ailment and its many dangerous side effects continues to 
be “one of the biggest issues facing Lake Town at the moment”, according to 
Safer Lake Town Partnership representative Luke. Jeremy, a local volunteer 
and ex-offender in his late twenties, captures particularly well the daily toil of 
searching for jobs of which there is less than there are residents (ONS 2016a):  
People are looking for jobs, my brother is especially. I mean he’s out 
every day looking for jobs and there’s nothing out there, and if he says 
that to a member of staff in the Job Centre they just say ‘keep looking 
we’ve got jobs on the board’, but when he says he’s not qualified they 
just shrug their shoulders you know what I mean. There’s only so many 
jobs in Lake Town and that’s what the concern is about that’s where 
the anger comes from, look back on what I’ve applied for there’s 
nothing else in Lake Town for me.   
 
The general strains associated with “jobseeking-as-career” are accompanied by 
potentially debilitating feelings of stress and anxiety that form a daily 
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background presence as life becomes ever more precarious (Southwood 
2011:58). For some the only escape is to descend into the soft narcosis of 
anhedonic nihilism (Fisher 2009). No one conveyed this late capitalist malaise 
better than a local resident named Doug who exclaimed: 
The fact that I’m unemployed makes me anxious to be honest. It’s 
crazy you’ve got to make like £10 last you three days you know and it 
makes me very anxious that if I wanted to buy a bottle of pop I’ve got to 
think about it five times before I make that decision, and then that 
decision would be ‘well no you can’t afford it’. I can feel myself getting a 
bit down and depressed and having no motivation or energy to the 
point where you think ‘well what’s the point’ you know. I don’t have a 
job to get up to at the minute so I just spend most of my time indoors 
you know. I look for a job a few times a week, I’ll go on the internet job 
hunting for a few hours but apart from that there doesn’t seem to be a 
lot in my life to do you know, there doesn’t seem to be a job out there 
for me. So when I get down and I’d say a bit depressed about it then I 
just spend most of my day doing nothing, you know, daydreaming. It’s 
crazy really. I think a lot of people in Lake Town are the same as well, I 
know there’ll be a lot of people out there the same as me that don’t 
wanna get up or just lounge about on the sofa watching T.V all day 
because they don’t know what else to do. 
 
The excessive consumption of alcohol and the self-administration of 
psychopharmacological treatments, counterfeit or otherwise, have become 
normalised responses to such feelings of despair (Dorling 2010; Taylor 2013). 
Indeed, a number of participants relayed either having consumed such 
substances or conveyed knowledge of others who had. Jeremy for instance 
revealed that: 
I was taking zimmers and diazy’s which basically zombie you out. I was 
just buying them off the street and I was taking five-ten a day just to 
help me relax and sleep, I was actually waking up and taking them and 
they were easy to get. 
 
Similarly Zane, an active offender with a number of previous convictions for 
theft and other illegalities, told the researcher that “a lot of people are taking 
sleeping tablets and Diazepam during the day as a coping mechanism”. 
Although having consumed such substances in the act of self-medication Zane 
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was by no means unaware of the dangers associated with buying what he 
suspects were counterfeit pharmaceuticals:  
Last week a lad was selling some and a few of the lads bought some 
but they were 10mg white, you don’t get 10mg white Diazepam, but 
people were taking them and crashing out, sleeping for a day and half 
and I thought ‘that’s not right’, Diazepam’s are supposed to just chill 
you out, you know take the edge off when you’re anxious or nervous 
you know what I mean. But this year three people who I know have 
died from taking them.  
 
Nevertheless, despite the apparent dangers “people are willing to buy them 
because they’re just looking for anything to block out the misery” according to 
Gavin; a man with quite a serious criminal record who appears well acquainted 
with the intricacies of the counterfeit pharmaceuticals market. And as a local 
community volunteer and resident named Eddy suggests, “if people can’t get 
their drugs they’ll get alcohol instead”. Evidently, not only do many residents of 
Lake Town experience a range of codified illegalities but they suffer from 
systemically induced, and thus un-criminalised, social harms that appear to be 
seamlessly woven into the fabric of everyday life. Yet despite their damaging 
consequences these systemically induced harms do not register in the 
statistical framework of the ‘crime decline’ discourse. Indeed, whilst 
governments and scholars alike prematurely praise themselves for a job well 
done, few considerations are reserved for what life ‘on the ground’ is really like 
for residents such as Nick, who captures particularly well the unquantified reality 
of life on the margins:  
The crime to me is the state of some of the streets in Lake Town you 
know, like it’s a bit abstract what I’m talking about but you can walk 
down there and you can just feel the darkness. It’s just got crime all 
over the place, and that’s the biggest crime that it should be like that.  
 
Unfortunately however, recent government austerity measures and welfare 
benefit reforms have made life even harder and more miserable for many of 
those who reside in Lake Town by producing more instability and insecurity at 
every turn (Lloyd 2013). For many participants the end result of these short-
sighted manoeuvres is obvious. Catherine for instance, who works as an 
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offender manager, feels that “we’re seeing a big rise in offences because of 
these cuts and I think we’re yet to see more”. In a similar vein a local community 
volunteer named Owen mentioned that: 
They’ve cut access to life enhancing services like libraries and 
community centres and things like that. There are so many dimensions 
to these cuts as well, I know a lot of people who have been sanctioned 
very easily from their Job Seekers Allowance, which is just forcing them 
into immediate poverty and that can obviously lead to more crime 
because people ultimately have to survive.     
 
Indeed according to Robert, who now works for a local substance misuse 
support service having desisted from crime, “benefit reforms are pushing people 
into crime” because, as Gavin explains:  
 
When you leave someone with no money so they can’t eat or look after 
themselves they’re gonna find other ways to make money and they’re 
gonna do it in any way they can and its gonna be quick and generally 
it’s gonna be brutal you know. 
 
Additionally, Laura noted that half of the people she knows “just don’t even 
bother signing on anymore, they’re just ‘criming’ it instead” (See also Griggs 
and Evans 2010). The stark reality of the current situation is brought sharply 
into focus by Reece who exclaimed: 
If you sanction someone’s benefits for three years how are they going 
to support themselves other than by committing crime? They can’t get 
a job, they’re already trying to get a job, they’re on benefits because 
they’re trying to get a job it’s a job seeker’s allowance and if you give 
someone a three year sanction what are they going to do to actually 
support themselves? I mean the only thing you can do is commit crime. 
 
These cogent exasperations are supported by evidence which suggests that 
benefit sanctions do in fact have unfavourable impacts upon crime rates (Griggs 
and Evans 2010). Evidently, as the available facilities for managing life rapidly 
diminish (Taylor 2013) it becomes increasingly difficult for those on the margins 
to survive by legitimate means alone. In such circumstances the enticement to 
become involved in various forms of crime is seductive as they often compare 
favourably to the otherwise bleak reality of life in deindustrialised Lake Town 
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(Winlow 2001). Indeed as discussed in chapter two, whilst inevitably corrosive 
certain forms of crime may serve to reintroduce some adulterated sense of 
stability, by offering those excluded from the highly competitive legitimate 
economy a revived opportunity for economic participation and commodity 
consumption (Hall 2012b). Craig and an opportunistic offender named Jake, 
who is certainly no stranger to crime, respectively drive the point home 
particularly well: 
You look over there right at this guy’s expensive car and it’s like he 
grew up where I grew up but this man’s selling drugs, now I’m a single 
father and I’ve been told that I can get a couple of hundred quid a week 
just by stashing a few keys of his stuff in my loft. I don’t even have to 
see it but I get a couple of hundred quid and you know what my 
daughter is wearing the same shoes as her up the road you know what 
I mean. It’s like you can either be nothing and nobody or you can join in 
with what goes on in the estate. 
 
The lad who’s just dropped me off, he sells coke and he’s like ‘so what 
you doing for money?’ I said to him ‘nowt’, he said ‘well can I leave this 
[drugs] in your flat?’ So as from today I’m the little knob-head at the end 
of it you know what I mean but its £100 in my pocket come Friday.  
 
When probed further Jake revealed that “I’ll have six kilos of Benzocaine and 
about two kilos of cocaine. I don’t touch it though; all I’ll do is run it down the 
stairs at the most”. These accounts perhaps provide some credence to Robert’s 
claim that “it’s easier to do crime than it is to get a job in Lake Town”, or 
certainly to utilise illicit means to attain otherwise unaffordable commodities. As 
Doug explains:  
It’s getting near impossible for anybody to have little luxuries in life you 
know, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that people stop wanting them 
so ultimately they will source what they want in some way shape or 
form. 
 
Such as for example, according to Zane, by “asking shoplifters to get them toys, 
clothes, perfume, aftershave, chocolates. Especially during Christmas you get a 
lot of people asking for these types of things”.  
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What the above perhaps begins to illustrate is the somewhat doxic nature and 
‘social’ functionality of certain forms of crime which have to some extent 
become ‘tolerated illegalities’ (Foucault 1991). However, as the next section will 
show, these pervasive illegalities are often accompanied by and intertwined with 
more violent and brutal forms of crime, creating a thinly delineated border 
between the ‘social’ and ‘asocial’ criminality that surrounds the daily lives of 
many of Lake Town’s residents, which they must carefully navigate.  
 
‘The Frontline is All-Around’:  
For many of Lake Town’s residents there appears to be no shelter from the 
pervasive yet relatively inured experiences of crime and harm that surround 
their daily lives. For instance Aaron, a young man in his early twenties, 
recounted that “you see crime every day, you see it everywhere round Lake 
Town, you get drug dealing going on constantly throughout the day and violent 
acts occur all the time”. Similarly, Gavin stated that:  
Given the environment that I live in, I hear stories every day of people 
getting knives pulled on them, or people running into people’s rooms 
and beating them up, like that’s a day-to-day thing now.  
 
Providing perhaps one of the most vivid accounts of what appears to be the 
omnipresent nature of crime in Lake Town, Laura describes how:  
You get robberies happening all the time, like phone snatching and 
things like that, you’d be on your phone and the next minute somebody 
will be riding off with it on a bike. You get people knocking at your door 
trying to sell you drugs all the time, or people putting your windows 
through or putting glue inside your locks so you have to get your locks 
changed, you can’t go out or do anything because once you leave 
they’ll be straight in your house. That happens quite a lot, my windows 
have been put through twice and my locks got done in October.  
 
Representing perhaps the most doxic form of crime experienced or perpetrated 
by participants is the solicitation to become involved in or actively participate in 
the selling and purchasing of stolen and/or counterfeit goods. Indeed it is not 
uncommon, as another local resident named Mark explains, “to be asked if I 
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want to buy things like bikes, laptops, tablets, cameras or clothes”. Similarly 
Conner, a resident of Lake Town since birth, told the researcher that: 
It was getting to the point at work where it was like a couple of times a 
day that different people would come in saying ‘I’ve got some cheap 
Polo shirts’, or this other guy last week tried to sell me deodorant and 
watches. 
 
 According to Catherine buying and selling stolen and/or counterfeit goods is:  
… really, really big in Lake Town, anything goes. Food, clothes, 
someone can go into Asda and fill up a trolley with goods worth £300 
and go to the pub across the road and sell the stuff. But they also have 
customers, they go in with shopping lists that people have posted 
through the door and they sell the items for less than half the retail 
price.    
 
Reference to this ‘shopping list’ style of acquiring goods was made and 
corroborated by many participants. Jake, for instance, noted that: 
People don’t do it like before where they’d go burgle a shed and turn up 
and go ‘here do you want to buy this drill for a fiver’. Now they just turn 
up with whatever you want so it’s sort of a bit more organised. 
 
He went on to reveal that:  
This lad will go to a big warehouse in [***] and pick up £1,000 worth of 
stuff that’s been ordered. He gets all the tablets like the fake Viagra 
and Ephagine, I just got a big tub of weight protein for £12.50. But yeah 
they sell anything you want, anything you want you can order and they 
will just go get it for you.  
 
However, as Zane attests, there is still a market for going out and stealing or 
otherwise acquiring common necessities and luxuries that people can ill afford; 
“you always get people trying to sell you jars of coffee and things like that, what 
they tend to go for is stuff that they can sell easily”. When asked if he had ever 
purchased such goods he said:  
Oh yeah, the other day I bought a Lynx set and some clothes. I needed 
a coat and if someone had one and I had the money I’d have bought it, 
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or if I didn’t have enough I’d give them a percentage and I’ll owe them 
the rest and they know I’m good for it. Because word gets around fast if 
you’re a good payer or not you know what I mean so there’s like a bit of 
a pecking order.  
 
Gavin also nonchalantly revealed that: 
You get approached most days by people trying to sell you stuff, I’ve 
just recently bought clothes and a Mach 3 razor. If I’ve got the money 
and I need whatever’s being sold I’m quite happy to buy it.  
 
Such accounts perhaps provide credence to the suggestion made by Lewis, a 
recently retired police officer, that buying and selling stolen and/or counterfeit 
goods “is a way of life for many in Lake Town”. Indeed, Eddy exclaimed that “it’s 
part of everyday life now; they’re saying we’re coming out of the recession but I 
can’t see it and a lot of people on the breadline can’t either”. Certainly, for many 
of those interviewed the ability to either buy or sell stolen and/or counterfeit 
goods constitutes a valuable lifeline, as Zane elucidates:  
I needed some money, I needed to buy food and put a bit of electric on 
so on Thursday I went into Iceland on [***] Road and pinched £25 
worth of chocolate and sold it for £10, and then later on I went and got 
six jars of Nescafé Gold Blend and sold them for £15 because I had no 
money, I didn’t know what to do.  
 
Evidently, its seemingly doxic nature as a suitable means of ‘getting by’ has 
conferred upon it a status of “de facto decriminalisation” (Lammy 2015:6) 
whereby “it’s not regarded as criminal activity, it’s just what you do” and “half the 
shops now just let you go they don’t even bother phoning the police round our 
area” according to Ethan, an actively serving police officer, and Laura 
respectively. Underneath the somewhat ‘social’ veneer of such seemingly 
‘tolerated illegalities’ lies the ever present potential for severe harm. Indeed, 
those who participate in the hidden economy flirt dangerously with sanctionable 
illegality and risk associating with or engaging in more harmful and organised 
forms of criminality (Henry 1978; Lea 1999, 2002). For instance Sean, an ex-
drug dealer turned recovering addict, noted how the selling and purchasing of 
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stolen and/or counterfeit goods is often intimately connected with the drug 
trade:  
You go to buy knock off or stolen gear and end up buying drugs as well 
because some dealers sell hot goods to make up for the money lost 
when they can’t sell enough coke or whatever.  
 
Indeed, recent evidence suggests that some criminal networks are increasingly 
turning their attention towards the acquisition of such ‘hot goods’ in order to 
either replace or augment high-risk activities such as drug dealing (Lammy 
2015).  
 
Nevertheless, as intimated above, the traditionally high levels of drug activity in 
Lake Town continue to feature as common constituents of everyday life for 
many residents (Lloyd 2013). Nick, for example, expressed that “where I live 
I’ve got drugs all around me, like in the flats above me and that”; and according 
to Zane “people just come up to you offering to sell you weed, sleeping tablets, 
crack cocaine, heroin, MKAT, seriously anything and everything”. As a frequent 
recreational user of drugs Jake knew all too well the rhythms and routines of the 
dealers on his estate. He noted that:  
There must be a good six or seven cocaine dealers on the estate and 
then all the kids, they all sell the ‘green’ and from about 3 o’clock they’ll 
just be dropping ‘green’ off left right and centre, just constantly here 
there and everywhere, but they sell heroin as well you know what I 
mean. And its blatant, it’s right in your face. Like people walk about 
smoking joints and all that and like no one says nowt about it. 
 
However, as Zane alluded to previously, the sale, purchase and consumption of 
drugs in Lake Town is not simply restricted to the well documented and more 
conventional forms of illicit substances, but include a plethora of 
pharmaceuticals counterfeit or otherwise. Indeed, Doug told the researcher that 
“Lake Town is rife with drugs, I see people every day selling heroin, cocaine 
and now they’re even selling prescription drugs on the streets”. According to 
Reece this is primarily due to the fact that drugs such as heroin are “being cut 
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that much now that people are ‘topping up’ on pharmaceuticals to get the same 
effect”. Adding additional weight to this finding Gavin revealed that: 
You get a lot of prescription drugs being sold especially Pre-Gabs, so 
strong pain killers or Codeine-based tablets and that. Like people get 
them on prescription off the doctors and sell them to each other, and 
Subutex and things like that, that’s quite common.  
 
In keeping with recent research regarding the online sale of counterfeit 
pharmaceuticals (Dégardin et al 2014; Hall and Antonopoulos 2015), Reece 
articulated what many had intimated, that:  
Some people are actually buying these tablets off the internet and one 
tablet might not be as strong as the next you know what I mean. So 
they’re buying like Diazepam but it’s not like how we’d get it, it’s more 
dangerous and people have died from taking them. 
 
Indeed Jade, a local expert on the online trade in counterfeit medicine, told the 
researcher that according to recent estimates “as much as 50% of the 
medicines bought online by UK consumers are fake and up to one million 
people die globally each year after consuming counterfeits”. Accordingly, both 
the scale and scope of harm is significant yet completely ignored by the ‘crime 
decline’ discourse.  
 
Moreover alongside the harmful side-effects of ingesting such substances, 
threats or physical acts of violence are often directed towards those who 
possess the desired product. For instance, Reece has personally experienced 
being “robbed for my prescription drugs”. Considering the relatively well-
documented link between drugs and violent crime (Wincup 2005; Bean 2008), it 
is perhaps unsurprising to reveal that a number of participants have 
experienced, or know of others who have experienced, drug related violence or 
personal threats and intimidation. Jake and Laura respectively conveyed that: 
There’s a lot of intimidation, I know a couple of lads who threatened a 
women because her son owed them. They went round to where she 
works and said ‘look that’s £600 tomorrow or your son’s getting it and 
you’re getting it’. So in the end she just gave them the money, it’s just 
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easier than phoning the police because they know where she lives and 
they’ll go round the house. 
 
Drug dealers get taxed all the time. Drug users who are ‘game’ you 
know what I mean, who carry knives, will order drugs and when the 
dealer turns up they’ll just pull their blades out and take the drugs off 
him and then start selling them, and it just goes round like that all the 
time. 
 
However, it appears that the act of ‘taxing’ is not simply reserved for the drug 
trade but is also used to expropriate a range of goods that others have illegally 
acquired. As Jake explains: 
If someone knew that you pinched a scooter and stashed it in the bush 
they’d go and get it and take it off you because you can’t fucking say 
nowt, you’re not gonna be able to go to the police so they just take it.  
 
Evidently, and contrary to the ‘delusions of peace’ (Gray 2011) embedded 
within the ‘crime decline’ discourse, crime and harm continue to form a 
pervasive presence for many of Lake Town’s residents. So pervasive in fact that 
if participants had neither perpetrated nor been a victim of crime themselves 
many knew of others who had. Indeed, after posing the question ‘do you know 
anyone currently involved in crime?’ participants would almost habitually laugh 
as though the answer was an obvious one before articulating what became the 
customary initial response, “yeah, of course I do”. Upon further probing, 
participants such as Paul revealed that “I know people who deal drugs, shoplift, 
commit robberies, burglaries, you name it they’re into it”. Similarly, Eddy replied 
“I know quite a few people involved in burglary, shoplifting, assault, drug 
dealing, and dealing in stolen and counterfeit goods”.  
 
Congruently, experience or knowledge of those who experience often 
unreported victimisation was prevalent among participants. Reece, for example, 
recounted that “in January I was attacked, I got my head smashed off a sink 
and I was nearly killed”. He further explained that “they knocked the shit out of 
me and then turned me onto my stomach and started booting on my neck trying 
to break it”. Additionally, Jake expressed that: 
Justin Kotzé  PhD Thesis 
152 
 
There was a Polish lad who moved on the estate and he didn’t last two 
minutes, one lad hit him, another hit him with a bottle and the rest 
jumped all over his head, and that was just because he was Polish, but 
that’s quite normal.  
 
Rather than representing exceptional incidents of scarcity such experiences 
form an ever-present and frightening reality for many individuals who inhabit 
areas such as Lake Town (Young 1999). Doug and Paul respectively portray 
this reality vividly:  
You see people walking about with guns and machetes and stuff and it 
really scares me, it’s quite worrying seeing it openly you know. You’re 
scared to even walk the streets and I don’t like to feel like that. 
 
There’s a lass I know who won’t even walk out of her front door unless 
there’s a taxi coming to get her. She won’t go anywhere on her own 
because of what’s happened to her you know so she’s basically 
imprisoned in her own home. 
 
Importantly, such fear is neither irrational nor unfounded but is, as research 
tends to suggest, based upon real risks and present dangers (Hollway and 
Jefferson 2013; Jackson and Gray 2010). Indeed, grounded in experience 
“there is nothing unreal about the embeddedness of social knowledge about 
crime” (Sparks 1992:131).  
 
Accordingly, it is possible that rather than being ‘out of sync with reality’ (Warr 
cited in University of Texas 2008) many participants’ perceptions of crime 
trends are perhaps accurately informed by lived experiences of crime and harm, 
and can therefore often tell us more about the reality of crime and its trends 
than the official research instruments used to ‘measure’ crime (Presdee 2004b; 
Muncie 2001). Craig drives the point home well when stating that “thing is I’m 
out there on the streets seeing the crime, there’s no way on this planet that it’s 
dropping, certainly not in Lake Town”. Additionally, Sean proclaimed “I think 
crime is going up from the things I see in my area”. Further claims of increased 
crime in Lake Town come from Doug and Gavin respectively who assert that 
“crime has risen; I’m just witnessing through my own eyes an increase. I see 
something going on where crime’s concerned everyday”. “I’ve lived in Lake 
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Town for the past ten years and I’d definitely say that there’s been an increase, 
especially in violent crime”. These experiential wisdoms stand in stark contrast 
to the official view of SLTP representative Luke who ardently claimed that: 
Crime, and now I’m talking about police recorded crime, has come 
down massively in the last ten years to such a degree that I would feel 
confident in saying that there’s less crime now, even taking into 
account the unrecorded crime and all that, than what there has been in 
the past. There’s significantly, in fact hugely less crime now I’m 
absolutely convinced of that. 
 
Such optimism is however unfounded, particularly in light of the fact that in early 
January 2014 the decision was made by the UK Statistics Authority to remove 
the ‘National Statistic’ designation from police recorded crime data (Lammy 
2015). Interestingly Ethan, who continues to serve as a police officer, does not 
share Luke’s optimistic appraisal but rather corroborates many of the resident’s’ 
views expressed above. He noted that:  
In my opinion crime has gone up but there’s less reporting of crime now 
for various reasons. I quite often speak to people that don’t report that 
their bike’s been stolen, don’t report that their car’s been broken into, 
even house burglaries and street robberies go unreported because 
what is the point? So if I’m being honest I think people report less crime 
but I don’t think there’s less crime happening. 
 
Consequently, there is evidence to suggest that a range of both ‘low-level’ and 
serious crimes form a persistent and seemingly relentless undercurrent to the 
already turbulent lives of many in Lake Town. Yet, as remains the case in many 
other economically marginalised locales, such illegalities often flow beneath the 
statistical radar as common constituents of everyday life remaining largely 
unreported, unrecorded and unpublicised (Hall et al 2008).  
 
‘Well That’s Just Normal Now’ : 
Indeed, despite its corrosive effects much of the crime experienced by 
participants has become a relatively normalised and doxic part of everyday life, 
and as such is often not reported to the police or any other proxy resembling 
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officialdom. This particular, yet all too common, barrier towards the reporting of 
crime is vividly illustrated by Gavin who explained that: 
You become numb to crime, you get desensitised to it all you know 
what once might have been a strange experience becomes 
commonplace. That’s just through like the longer you live here the 
more and more extreme circumstances seem to become normality 
because it’s just the way it is, it becomes part of your life. What maybe 
five or ten years ago you would have reported you just think ‘well that’s 
just normal now’. If you’re on the outside looking in you see a totally 
different story but when you’re deep in it you know it’s just your world 
isn’t it. 
 
Echoing this familiar viewpoint Aaron admitted that:  
You become accustomed to it, you put your blinkers on essentially. If 
you see something going on, unless it’s something that you really don’t 
agree with, you don’t really take notice of it, and like you don’t notice 
things that go on under your nose anyway.  
 
This tacit intimation towards the presence of differentiated normalisation 
(Shildrick 2002) is made explicit when Aaron declared that: 
 
If I saw somebody dealing smack or crack or anything like that I’d be 
like ‘nah its wrong’, I would report that but anything else I’m a bit like 
each to their own type thing and I think other people are kind of like 
that, especially round here. 
 
This research tends to suggest that the concept of differentiated normalisation 
extends beyond the realm of drug use as it appears evident throughout many 
participants’ feelings towards crime in general. For instance, when commenting 
upon why no one intervened in a particularly brutal incident witnessed by the 
researcher during the fieldwork — whereby a man was physically assaulted by 
another attending the soup kitchen — James, a frequent user of this service, 
explained that “it’s because he wasn’t injured that badly, he didn’t have any 
injuries so there was no real need to ring the police, and besides that’s normal 
round here”. Evidently, it appears that even extreme physical violence needs to 
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exceed a certain ‘threshold of normality’ before it is deemed appropriate to 
intervene or inform the authorities. This is supported by Reece who noted that: 
If you see something enough you do become a little bit numb to it and 
you don’t want to get involved unless it goes over the top because 
you’ll likely get battered yourself.  
 
For some however, a differentiated normalised view towards crime is mediated 
by the degree to which they actively benefit from its committal. For instance, 
Jake notes how he doesn’t “agree with anyone burgling, mooching around 
someone’s house while they’re in bed going through their draws and stuff, but I 
agree with buying a £50 watch for a tenner”. Indeed, as alluded to in chapter 
three, community beneficiaries of criminal entrepreneurship often view it as a 
necessary and valuable service (Antonopoulos et al 2011; Wiltshire et al 2001), 
and thus have no interest in furnishing the authorities with information likely to 
result in the disruption of its ‘social’ function (Lea 2002). Craig illustrates the 
point well: 
It’s a service being provided, I’m not gonna report the dodgy coffee 
because I need dodgy coffee you know what I mean, it ain’t going on in 
the areas where people don’t need this stuff.  
 
He further explains that: 
I can’t afford the other jar of coffee, its dodgy coffee or no coffee, Bic 
razors that cut your face when you shave or a Mach 3 with loads of 
blades, it’s the same aftershave as he’s got up the road or no 
aftershave at all, it’s a tracksuit for your daughter this Christmas or no 
tracksuit at all, you know what I mean.  
 
The police are by no means unaware of this common barrier towards reporting 
as Lewis makes clear: 
Because you have so much deprivation in Lake Town people rely on 
being able to buy stolen and counterfeit goods and if they can get them 
cheaper then why are they going to tell us?  
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There is however a more ominous reason why many residents do not report 
even the most serious and deleterious forms of crime, and that is the strict 
adherence to the ‘code of the street’ and its powerful normative injunction to 
avoid ‘grassing’ at all costs (Anderson 2000; Rosenfeld et al 2003). Jake and 
Gavin respectively articulate how the ‘code of the street’ precludes the reporting 
of crime: 
I know a law’s a law but there’s also the other law that you don’t go to 
the police, you just get on with it and that’s how it is. No one’s got trust 
in them, no one believes in them round here.  
 
You just don’t go to the police on each other, I mean I’ve known people 
who have ended up with fractured jaws and broken noses and they just 
go to the hospital and get patched up. Because they don’t trust the 
police and it’s kind of like a culture thing that you don’t go around 
blowing each other up to the police you know what I mean, because 
that’s just gonna bring more and more repercussions. 
 
The stark reality of both the need to resolutely adhere to the normative 
prohibition against ‘grassing’ and the disastrous consequences that befall those 
who breach this sacred taboo (Ancrum 2014) was articulated by many 
participants. Laura, for instance, told the researcher that “if the police are seen 
at your house you’ll be called a grass and you’ll have all your windows put 
through, so you just keep your mouth shut”. Similarly, Catherine explained that: 
 
If you see something you don’t say anything, even if your life is at risk 
because you’ll be called a grass and if people think you’re a grass 
they’ll make your life impossible. To be called a grass is the worst thing 
ever; you really don’t want to be called a grass in Lake Town.  
 
Indeed, according to Gavin “If you put that label on someone it’s just death to 
them”, and as Jake attests this threat is literal rather than figurative: 
I saw this one lad talking to the police and I phoned my mate and said 
‘your mate’s sat outside my house talking to a copper’ so they went 
round and set his house on fire.  
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Consequently, and perhaps unsurprisingly, Doug notes that “if somebody sees 
something it’s best not to say anything, if it comes back on you there’s more 
trouble. So there’s that wall of silence, a wall of fear”. Accordingly, many 
residents inevitably secure their self-preservation by ensuring that that they ‘see 
but don’t see’ (Anderson 2000) as they retain an almost habituated fetishistic 
disavowal of the persistent perpetration of crime and harm. Gavin captures well 
this necessary blindness when noting that: 
Nobody wants to get involved you know nobody wants the hassle, so 
as long as it’s not affecting them they’re happy to be ignorant to it. And 
you need to be, you need to have a certain degree of ignorance you 
know for your own safety. 
 
Similarly, Craig explained that “it’s just easier to not see things, you can avoid 
that uncomfortable feeling and avoid having to do anything about it by not 
seeing it in the first place”.  
 
Further precluding the reporting of crime is the strong belief among a number of 
participants that authorities have simply given up on the area and seemingly 
tolerate or turn a blind eye to much of the crime and harm they routinely 
experience. For example Natasha, who is relatively new to the area, expressed 
that:  
No one ever cleans up or fixes the damage, like there’s been broken 
windows down my street that have been that way for months and it just 
feels like if something else happens no one’s gonna do anything, the 
council doesn’t seem to care. 
 
Likewise, Craig exclaimed that his area “isn’t cared about, it’s not looked after. 
It’s one of the worst areas and you’ll see the least police driving round”. 
According to Jake:  
The police don’t bother with crime in my area, you rarely see them. You 
just see one big van going round every now and again, they just go in 
one big loop round the main roads and back out and that’s about it.  
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Zane also noted how “they see little bits of the seedy side when they’re driving 
round but they just turn their face away from it, they don’t want to know”. 
Comparable feelings of police inaction were expressed by Laura and Eddy 
respectively who noted that “the police just turn a blind eye half the time”, “they 
know it happens but they’re not bothered, they’d rather be stood at a sandwich 
bar eating a bacon sandwich or something”. Inevitably, such experiential 
wisdoms foster a general sense of disbelief in the efficacy of the police which 
serves to militate against the reporting of crime (van Dijk and Groenhuijsen 
2011). Remarkably, although an actively serving police officer, Ethan expressed 
cogently what appears to be a consensual apathy towards reporting crime or, 
as he puts it, “needlessly participating in an exercise in futility”:  
I used to phone the police when I was off-duty if I saw something going 
on but I don’t bother anymore because I know nobody will come. 
There’s no point phoning in I just don’t see the point, it’s not worth the 
phone call to be fair and I think a lot of people feel that way.  
 
Indeed, as Jeremy attests “when you need the police they don’t come but when 
you don’t need them they’re just there. That’s a motto, especially round here”. 
Consequently, in lieu of what are often episodic and fleeting incursions by the 
police, many estates in areas such as Lake Town tend to be largely self-policed 
in accordance with the ‘code of the street’ and ‘street justice’ is meted out with 
brutal impunity (Lea 2002; Evans et al 1996). As Jake explains:  
The estate’s policed itself basically, it’s got its own law you know what I 
mean. If you did have a big problem you could go to someone and 
they’d go sort it out for you rather than getting in with the police. You 
don’t get no second chances, cause any trouble and you’ll be gone 
within a matter of minutes. 
 
The fundamental upshot is that due to strong communal support for what are 
perceived to be ‘social’ crimes and a necessarily strict adherence to the ‘no-
grassing’ rule and the overarching ‘code of the street’, there remains a great 
reluctance among participants to report crime to the police (Lea 1999; Evans et 
al 1996). Accordingly, since approximately “80% of crime known to the police 
comes to their attention as a result of information from the public” (Tierney 
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2010:29), the argument can be advanced that Lake Town perhaps constitutes 
part of a vast constellation of vortices where only a small proportion of the total 
volume of illegalities registers on the statistical radar (Hall and Winlow 2015; 
Pearson 1983). Indeed, Zane makes the point well by noting that “because you 
only see a certain level of crime doesn’t mean to say that there’s not more 
lurking underneath, which there is and I know there is”. Carl, a struggling 
desister who evidently still identifies and associates heavily with his old criminal 
fraternity, makes a similar argument when articulating that “unrecorded crime is, 
oh God, its tip of the iceberg stuff you know the rest of it is underneath totally 
under the radar”. Evidently, a persistent and significant disjuncture continues to 
exist between recorded crime and the sum total of crime committed (Quinney 
and Wildeman 1977; Watts et al 2008).  
 
‘You’ve Got Like  Police Recorded Crime and Then You Have Crime’:  
Whilst this disparity is often acknowledged by officialdom it appears that its true 
effects are frequently denied to such a degree that there is no “desire to 
apprehend what might be the totality of real crime” (Taylor et al 1975:40). 
Rather, what seems to persist amongst many in positions of authority is an 
unyielding fidelity towards the efficacy of police recording systems and practices 
and the belief that whilst not all crime is reported or recorded at least “what gets 
reported is recorded accurately” as Luke contends; as if, despite evidence to 
the contrary, this constitutes some reliable illustrative guide to trends in crime 
(Reiner 1996). Indeed, despite cautioning the researcher that “you’ve got to 
consider what crime is because you’ve got like police recorded crime and then 
you have crime”, Luke went on to exclaim that crime has declined significantly 
in Lake Town. Similarly, having forwarded the familiar caveats, Lewis noted that 
“reported crime has gone down, statistically” before declaring that “I personally 
think it’s a real decline, statistics support me in that”.    
 
Nevertheless Lewis admitted that “you can only measure what you’ve got in 
front of you and the information that you’re given”. He went on to explain how 
the police:  
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… tend to respond to things, if people don’t bring it to our attention, 
unless it’s picked up in some other way shape or form through 
intelligence, then we tend not to deal with it. It sounds awful but one of 
the things we do is something called ‘fire brigade’ policing, we respond 
to things, we deal with the there and what’s happening now.  
 
Evidently, effective policing continues to be dependent upon receiving a high 
volume of information from the community (Lea and Young 1993). However as 
Rowe (2013) explains, this ‘fire brigade’ style of policing has been complicit in 
isolating frontline officers from the rhythms of community life, resulting in 
diminished public confidence and limited information flows. Moreover, it appears 
that even when crime is reported it is often not dealt with appropriately or 
recorded correctly, due primarily to a politically motivated target-driven culture 
that is still very much a part of contemporary policing (Guilfoyle 2013; Patrick 
2013). Indeed, Ethan recalled personal experiences of continuously being 
forced to adhere to an institutionalised culture which ensured that he was 
complicit in a myriad of unscrupulous policing practices designed to drive crime 
figures down, admitting that “it’s a team expectation that you will do as you’re 
told”. This often involved having to persistently and deliberately downgrade 
reported crime, aggressively persuade victims not to make complaints and 
ultimately physically manipulate police recorded crime figures as the following 
interview exchange between Ethan and the researcher demonstrates:  
We used to work out of what was called ‘the Crime Management Unit’ 
seven or eight years ago, the CMU everybody in the police called it the 
crime manipulation unit, openly. 
 
So they would manipulate the figures? 
Yeah, to whatever the government wanted. If the government want 
knife crime down then we would drive knife crime down by fixing the 
stats. 
 
Does that still happen now? 
Yeah! If we want to reduce burglary then we’ll just be very tough on 
people that report burglary. Really the only burglary that the 
government are bothered about is burglary dwelling, so we would do 
our hardest to try and record burglary non-dwelling. You can be very 
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creative about the way that you record crime, like if someone’s broken 
into a house that they’ve been into before as a guest or broke in and 
come in as a trespasser it could be classed as a theft, because theft 
from a dwelling is not a burglary. So there’s lots of ways to get crime 
down. And we still do it now, we occasionally snigger at the log where 
we see ‘male has phone snatched from hand, theft from person’, it’s 
not a street robbery because violence wasn’t offered, or at least that’s 
how it was recorded. 
 
He added that “we are conforming to what we are expected to conform to, we 
use the figures constructively in order to work within our parameters. Who 
wouldn’t when you’re under scrutiny?” Such trenchant testimony undoubtedly 
resonates with that of other frontline officers who have been forced to “play the 
numbers game” (Eterno and Silverman 2012:xxvii). Patrick (2013) for instance, 
notes that the target culture has become so corrosively engrained that the 
prevention and detection of crimes have become subordinate to the ongoing 
manipulation of the number and type of offences recorded. This same culture 
has fostered a working environment within which non-target-meeting work has 
become irrelevant, already limited resources are diverted towards satisfying 
constantly shifting performance indicators and morale has almost dissipated 
entirely as officers are continuously pushed beyond their limits (Metropolitan 
Police Federation 2014; Patrick 2013). Ethan captures particularly well the stark 
reality of this current landscape:  
We’ve been told that we have to work smarter and harder because 
there’s just not enough resources. We quite often can’t get to crime 
events because we don’t have the resources, we just don’t have the 
cars anymore and we won’t pay the fuel costs, so the most simplest of 
things become very, very difficult. People often ask ‘is morale low in the 
police?’ No, morale isn’t low at all because there is no morale anymore. 
It was low a year ago and now everyone’s just given up, the whole 
police service is now in disarray behind the scenes and that’s an 
honest thing to say. Every police officer in my department is saying the 
same thing ‘how can I get out and when can I get out?’ 
 
Evidently, it appears that participants’ previously expressed disbelief in the 
efficacy of the police and their concomitant trepidation and reluctance to report 
crime is well founded. Indeed, evidence suggests that residents’ needs are 
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often ignored or rated second-order considerations as priorities are directed 
towards playing well the crime numbers game (Eterno and Silverman 2012). 
Essentially the solidification of a corrosive, and more recently austerity-driven, 
targets culture has fostered an institutionalised tendency to simultaneously 
ignore persistent everyday experiences of harassment and thuggery whilst 
focusing upon ‘target friendly’ arrests and detections (Eterno and Silverman 
2012; Guilfoyle 2013). Furthermore, potentially problematic, technologically 
complex and resource intensive investigations are frequently and deliberately 
avoided in favour of pursuing ‘target rich’ volume crimes (Guilfoyle 2013; 
Neyroud and Disley 2007). However, this tunnel vision is extremely problematic, 
particularly in light of the fact that many of the conventional volume crimes the 
police tend to focus upon have begun to enter stages of obsolescence (Farrell 
et al 2010). Yet those of the calibre they actively seek to avoid have 
increasingly assumed positions of dominance throughout the criminal 
landscape, as crime continues to mutate as it moves through innovation-to-
obsolescence cycles (McQuade 2006).  
 
‘Crime’s Changing, it’s Evolving’:  
Perhaps one of the most pertinent findings to emerge from this research is 
corroborating evidence to further support the assertion made in chapter one, 
that rather than simply ‘declining’ certain forms of crime are rapidly mutating 
beyond our current indicators’ field of vision whilst others are becoming largely 
obsolescent (McQuade 2006). This co-evolutionary process has changed both 
the nature and broad landscape of crime in a myriad different ways as 
numerous participants attested (Maxfield et al 2007). For instance, according to 
Jake: 
Crime’s not declining it’s just a different wave of crime you know what I 
mean, it’s moving on. Crime’s changing, it’s evolving, like a couple of 
years ago there was no MKAT and even that’s changing all the time.  
 
Explaining how technological advances such as the internet and concomitant 
developments such as Facebook have transformed the practicalities of 
criminality and facilitated its committal, Craig and Reece respectively noted that: 
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You used to have to be a bit connected you know what I mean now you 
don’t, you just switch your Facebook on and you can get drugs or 
whatever you want, it’s easy. You don’t have to hit the darkest streets 
anymore to get messed up and buy dodgy stuff, the internet provides 
that now.  
 
I think crime has changed especially with the internet, people have 
found new ways to make money illegally. Now you don’t have to go to 
the bloke round the corner because you can order it yourself off the 
internet, especially pharmaceuticals.  
 
Reece further noted that: 
It’s not the same crimes being committed, it used to be car thefts you 
know what I mean joy riders and stuff like that, but now cars are that 
well protected that you can’t pinch a car anymore.  
 
Congruently, Luke explained that “there used to be a huge number of vehicles 
stolen but because of the industry standards now it’s harder to steal cars so 
theft of vehicles has massively reduced”. Whilst these latter accounts 
undoubtedly lend some support to the security hypothesis alluded to in chapter 
one (Farrell et al 2011), their evidentiary credence cuts both ways for they also 
provide cogent examples of a crime, upon which we still focus our statistical 
lens, that is becoming obsolescent (Farrell et al 2010). However, whereas the 
security hypothesis perhaps too readily assumes a successful, immediate and 
complete cessation of such activity, an obsolescence based perspective 
provides a more nuanced view. It accepts not only that such security inspired 
‘success’ may not be total, but that it may have unwittingly played a part in 
prompting the creation of opportunity loopholes that stimulate adaptive and new 
forms of crime (Walsh 1994; McQuade 2006). Illustratively, in reference to his 
earlier comment regarding reduced car crime Luke remarked: 
But then you get some incidents now where because you can’t break 
into a car and steal the car, you break into the house and steal the keys 
and then steal the car so there’s some other crime types that have 
increased, so you do get some displacement type crime. 
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Certainly the acceleration of innovatory criminal momentum stimulated by the 
simultaneous technological negation and creation of criminal opportunities has 
inevitably resulted in many offenders becoming, as Carl suggests, “an awful lot 
more technical and analytical in the way they approach crime”. Indeed, for some 
this amounts to circumnavigating installed security measures utilising 
rudimentary items, innovative tools and a little know how. According to Paul this 
can be as simple as using a large magnet to magnetically force security tags off 
clothes, or dismantling dye tag alarms without ruining valuable merchandise 
using nothing more than a lighter: 
You just grab hold of the alarm and use a lighter to burn off the stump 
and there’s a little pin inside with a round metal piece with a spring, 
that’ll pop off and the alarm falls apart that’s how simple it is.  
 
For others however, the technologically facilitated complete or partial 
transcendence of their terrestrial boundaries (Brenner 2007) has proven to be 
“a natural progression” as Lewis puts it. He further clarified how he thinks that: 
It’s because of the reliance on IT systems that people have naturally 
migrated across to it and also because you don’t have that face-to-face 
contact all the time so you can be anonymous just about.  
 
Such ‘natural progressive migration’ from the real-world into cyberspace and the 
perceived anonymity that has accompanied it (Brenner 2007; Sutton 2007), is 
particularly well illustrated by the growing participation in the adaptive crimes of 
trading in fake medicines and other stolen and/or counterfeit goods online (Hall 
and Antonopoulos 2015; Treadwell 2011). Indeed, Jade told the researcher 
how: 
 
The demand has always been there but the internet has facilitated the 
illegitimate supply of pharmaceutical products. So what you have is a 
crime that already existed but the internet has facilitated and increased 
and expanded the trade.  
 
She went on to note that: 
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People have moved into it because of the high profit and low risk 
involved, I mean I’ve seen social networking sites where you can view 
product and price lists for anything and everything imaginable and you 
pay directly into someone’s bank account. But in terms of risk you’re 
more likely to encounter fraudulent sellers than police interception.  
 
Jade certainly drives this point home well: 
The UK’s got one of the better reputations across Europe for the 
enforcement of counterfeit medicines, but that doesn’t mean to say that 
it’s a big team of a hundred people, there’s two people working on 
illegal online pharmacy shutdowns. And I’m not being funny, but if you 
close a website down it just opens up somewhere else and it’s a huge 
trade so it’s very hard to detect.   
 
Evidently the internet, and social networking sites in particular, has transformed 
the traditional criminal marketplace by providing a new, relatively easy to 
navigate and largely unpoliced, terrain upon which innovative means of 
exercising entrepreneurial instincts can be harnessed for low risk profitable gain 
(Treadwell 2011). Amongst the most prevalent uses of this new terrain 
uncovered during the fieldwork was the online trade in stolen and/or counterfeit 
goods via Facebook. Jake, for instance, vividly described its attractive allure: 
You can go on Facebook and there’s loads of stuff for sale like 
tracksuits, bikes, drugs, and it’s easy to get at because it’s just one 
private inbox message, so it’s easy to order it’s cheaper and it’s 
dropped off to your door you know what I mean. 
 
However, as with the online sale in fake medicines, the authorities have 
seemingly struggled to get to grips with this adaptive form of crime despite its 
comparatively ‘low-grade’ complexity, as Lewis and Ethan respectively 
acknowledged: 
From a policing perspective we’ve been slow on the uptake, but I think 
that’s because we didn’t understand it and you’ve got kids sort of ten or 
thirteen years old that probably have a much better understanding of IT 
systems than most police officers do and I think that’s been the issue.  
 
It’s very, very difficult to enforce because although their names are on 
there to actually get that person identified correctly is very difficult. I 
would have to ask them on my own personal time on my own identified 
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Facebook page ‘what’s your address’ and it’s gonna be very difficult to 
trace them down, and the thing is no one can monitor that it’s just too 
busy and its everywhere. No way shape or form would you be allowed 
to monitor that, you just won’t be able to. 
 
Consequently, it certainly seems as though many amongst the criminal 
fraternity, who undoubtedly remain more flexible and technologically adroit than 
their policing and security counterparts (Thachuk 2007), have taken a 
comfortable lead in the highly competitive, dynamic and co-evolving civilian 
arms race (McQuade 2006). Indeed, with regards to the internet being utilised 
as a criminal facilitator Lewis admitted that: 
Because it’s moving at such a fast pace it’s always a catching up game 
from a policing point of view, as something new will happen we’ve gotta 
then get up to that point by which time they’ve moved onto something 
else and in a different way. 
 
Similarly according to Carl, who retains “one foot in their [offenders] camp” as 
he puts it: 
The police need to catch up and keep up with their pace because they 
are so advanced they really are, trust me it’s absolutely fucking board 
room level some of this stuff it really is.  
 
Yet despite the importance of maintaining a current understanding and 
knowledge of emerging criminal markets and evolving forms of crime (McQuade 
2006), it appears that to a large extent the police, like many of their victimisation 
surveying counterparts (Kirchhoff 2010), preserve a static view of crime and the 
techniques of its committal (Williams 2012; Brenner 2007). Despite 
acknowledging the rapidity and fluidity of technologically adaptive crime, Lewis 
maintained that “at the end of the day the crimes being committed are the 
crimes that were being committed thirty years ago. Things may have changed 
slightly but not significantly”. Perhaps one reason for this stagnant view — aside 
from the political and organisational utility of statistically separating 
‘conventional’ from ‘non-conventional’ forms of crime and focusing upon 
measuring the dispersed obsolescence of the former (Lomell 2010) — is the 
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expressed difficulty of policing technologically adaptive and new forms of crime. 
Indeed, according to Lewis: 
There are certain areas, you’re looking at your cybercrime as one of 
them, where people are suddenly realising that we aren’t as effective in 
that because we don’t have the people trained, we don’t have the 
equipment to deal with it because it’s an expensive investigation.  
 
More to the point, Ethan explained that: 
It’s difficult for an officer to find the resources and time to deal with it 
because if I went back to the office now as a normal response officer I 
have no way of checking eBay or Facebook for people selling things or 
doing transactions. I know officers that do more effective investigations 
on their own personal mobile phone because at work you can’t do it, 
you don’t have the tools and you don’t have the authority you know. It 
becomes a logistical nightmare to the point where officers don’t really 
want to get involved because it will take up so much of their time and 
resources and it just becomes another exercise in futility.  
 
Accordingly, the partial or complete assimilation by many amongst the criminal 
fraternity to the new, easy to navigate and difficult to police cyber-terrain has 
stimulated the mutation of crime and concomitant criminal innovation-to-
obsolescence cycles (McQuade 2006). As criminals adopt and adapt perpetual 
technological innovations to facilitate the committal of adaptive or new forms of 
crime, older variations and techniques become increasingly obsolescent. 
 
However, whilst the traditional criminal marketplace is being rapidly transformed 
by this co-evolutionary process (Treadwell 2011), it appears that both the police 
and victimisation surveyors alike continue to focus their statistical lens primarily 
upon those forms of crime beginning to enter stages of obsolescence. This is 
perhaps in part due to the tendency to maintain an analytically myopic tunnel 
vison whereby only that which can be easily measured and quantified is 
explored as figure 1 in chapter one demonstrates (Lomell 2010). As figure 2 
illustrates, this concentration upon the narrow range of relatively well-measured 
forms of crime at the expense of poorly-measured adaptive and new forms of 
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crime gives the statistical impression that crime is declining. However, as Ethan 
explains: 
We’re not experiencing a crime decline we’re just seeing a shift 
towards more diverse forms of crime. The people at the lower end of 
the spectrum are still committing street crime, and the people who are 
committing the higher end of crime are getting away with it better 
because they can’t be detected because it’s so difficult. There’s only 
the people in the middle that are being caught you know; only the 
people in the middle are fair game. 
 
Essentially, the fundamental upshot is that crime may not have simply declined 
overall but has perhaps rather mutated in ways that current indicators, replete 
with their well-known inability to chart all the contours of crime and harm 
(Francis et al 2014), have not adequately captured (Farrell et al 2010). 
 
‘People Believe What They Want to Believe’:  
Whilst many participants perhaps unsurprisingly articulated feelings of disdain 
towards the idea of a ‘crime decline’, others seemingly accepted such an 
assertion only when presented with ‘credible evidence’. Conversely however, 
some appeared to accept wholeheartedly the ‘crime decline’ discourse despite 
the presence of much countervailing evidence. The position being forwarded is 
that such disparity is perhaps indicative of participants’ range of assimilation 
within modernity’s ‘dream myth’. Accordingly, the purpose of this section is to 
foreground and tentatively ‘typologise’ such disparate assimilation, ultimately 
beginning to lay the empirical foundation upon which the researcher’s theory of 
the dream myth will subsequently be built in chapter seven.  
 
For many, their close proximity to the deleterious effects of the dominant 
sociosymbolic order’s actualised structures and processes foreclose their 
assimilation into modernity’s dream myth. Consequently, this group of 
‘unassimilated’ participants vociferously denounced the notion of a ‘crime 
decline’, and the government statistics on which it is thought to have been 
based, as such a seemingly absurd assertion did not align with their lived reality 
of crime and harm in Lake Town. Indeed, as Robert and Sarah respectively 
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note “there’s definitely no crime decline, the government are magicians when it 
comes to crime figures”, “It’s very naïve to accept the perception of a crime 
decline”. Responding more indignantly to the question ‘what would you say if I 
told you that some criminologists think that crime has declined over the last two 
decades?’ Gavin and Zane respectively exclaimed: 
I’d say I’d find it hard to believe, definitely. Especially seeing what I see 
on a day-to-day basis there’s no way that crime in Lake Town is 
declining. I’d say listen, come walk in my shoes for 28 days and you tell 
me that crime’s declining, fair enough you might be able to get them 
figures because people are more reluctant to report it you know, but 
crime’s not declining. 
 
You don’t see it, I mean they’re just going off their figures they’re not 
out there on the frontline seeing it, they’re not seeing what’s going on 
behind their figures. But if they came to Lake Town and went 
undercover they’d see a lot of things and I tell you what their figures 
would go up a bit you know what I mean. And I think the police hide 
beyond a lot of it, they just put a brave face on, and then whoever does 
the numbers says ‘oh everything’s under control’ because then there’s 
like no panic in the public and it’s all like ‘oh our forces are doing well, 
the figures have dropped so they must be doing something, we feel 
safer’ when actually we’re not because it’s getting worse and it should 
be highlighted you know what I mean. 
 
Zane appears to be alluding to the role the statistical quilt plays for many in 
maintaining access to the fundamental fantasy-construction of the dream myth, 
which ultimately serves as an artificial vista from which to view the world 
providing an appealing frame that guarantees uninhibited access to their ‘sense 
of reality’ (Myers 2003; Žižek 1999).  
 
This was certainly evident amongst the second group of ‘partially assimilated’ or 
‘episodically resistant’ participants. Despite the cogency with which they 
denounced the efficacy of official statistics and articulated knowledge or 
experience of crime and harm, these individuals seemingly accepted the ‘crime 
decline’ discourse once presented with ‘evidence’ of its ostensible longevity. For 
instance, in response to the same question posed to Gavin and Zane above 
Aaron, although having previously expressed his disbelief of the purported 
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‘crime decline’, declared “I’d agree, like people are more civilised I’d like to say 
now, although they’re not but I would say its dropping like on a public scale”. 
Congruently, following similar utterances of scepticism such as “that’s just print, 
that’s just percentage but where’s the proof to say that that’s happening” and “I 
don’t believe the figures, I think everything’s gone up”, Jeremy and Doug 
respectively replied: 
I’d say that’s probably true. Especially when you mention two decades 
because when I was younger there was crime everywhere and now 
that I’m older you don’t see it as much as what you used to. 
 
Yeah, I could quite believe that there’s a decline in crime at the minute 
with the amount of people locked up, but if the prisons weren’t full then 
I couldn’t believe that.  
 
Accordingly, this group of participants demonstrated a rather schizoid view of 
the ‘crime decline’ as experiential and normative wisdoms were seemingly 
overridden by the presentation of ‘statistical evidence’. This is perhaps in part 
due to their proximity to the actualised experiences of crime and harm, 
independent of their ‘event knowledge’, being somewhat more intermittent than 
that experienced by the ‘unassimilated’ group above (Bhaskar 2008a).  
 
Conversely, on the other end of the spectrum lies a third group of ‘fully 
assimilated’ participants who’s limited proximity to crime and harm allows them 
to overcome statistical scepticism and accept the ‘crime decline’ discourse and 
concomitant liberal progressive expressions of a more peaceful society (Pinker 
2012). For instance, Natasha noted that “statistics are whatever you want, it’s a 
number isn’t it so you just make it fit in with what you want to believe really”; yet 
when questioned about the ‘crime decline’ statistics she maintained “I think 
they’re accurate because people are in a better state now than they were two 
decades ago, so there’s just not as much desire to commit crime”.  
 
Evidently, as discussed in chapter three, the ability to fetishistically disavow the 
presence of crime and harm is mediated by the degree to which one is able to 
physically and mentally distance oneself from their deleterious effects (Žižek 
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2011; Pemberton 2004). Importantly, this mediated fetishistic disavowal is 
further strengthened via the presentation of ‘statistical evidence’ affirming the 
idyllic fantasy vision of the ‘crime decline’ (Žižek 2008a), yet is seemingly 
unhindered by countervailing evidence as Natasha explains, “If you wanna see 
its declining then you’ll take the figures and if you don’t believe it you’ll say ‘aw 
it’s just stats’”. Indeed as David, an ex-offender who now works at a local 
substance misuse support service, elucidates:  
People believe what they want to believe, not just in relation to crime 
but in relation to everything. If it doesn’t fit in with their inherent beliefs 
then they ignore it, choosing instead to have preference to tabloid 
nonsense to support their own personal beliefs. If it fits people will 
choose to believe it and vice versa.  
 
Alluding to the function a retention of such beliefs and our ‘sense of reality’ 
serves in maintaining the internalised ideological rituals of capitalist life (Myers 
2003), Mark notes how news of a crime decline would: 
… make me feel safer, it would make me feel more secure in where I 
was living, it would make me feel happier in my area, so yeah I would 
like to hear that; because it would continue to let me go to work and 
keep earning my wage in a happy sort of mood.  
 
According to Nick such reassurance undoubtedly allows individuals “to continue 
as they are in their comfort zone”, because it is far easier as Craig suggests “to 
just not see things, it’s comfortable isn’t it, it’s that sort of blissful ignorance stuff 
where your asleep, your completely asleep you know what I mean”. Echoing 
such views Reece and Gavin respectively stated that “there’s a general like 
ostrich effect you know like if we pretend that its true then it is. Bury our heads 
in the sand and then it’s not happening”. “You can just blind yourself and you 
can be like ‘oh well crime’s falling and there’s a government statistic to prove it 
so it must be true’, you know”. This well-orchestrated and reassuring statistical 
quilt and its concomitant gift of being able to “go about the everyday and not 
know” (Morrison 2014:193) “definitely just paints a picture for people that want 
to believe that it’s declining” as local resident Rachel puts it. Stated differently, it 
is a carefully constructed dream designed to enable a prolonged sleep so as to 
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avoid awakening into reality and face deconstructing the comfortable myth of 
the ‘crime decline’, which serves to obfuscate the hiatus that exists between the 
imagined ideal and reality (Žižek 2008a; Box 1981).  
 
It is here that a strong fidelity towards the efficacy of the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
machines’ ability to maintain order becomes useful for the preservation of this 
‘dream myth’, as they are apparently seen to ensure that no ‘loss of reality’ is 
experienced (Žižek 1999). Illustrating this point well, Rachel revealed that: 
I wouldn’t be happy knowing that you could just be walking down the 
street and like there could be ten criminals just walking down the same 
street as you. I definitely wouldn’t feel safe if I didn’t know that there 
was a system to punish people.  
 
Indeed, when presented with a radical scenario involving the loss of the control 
system’s ‘hard’ machine it was not uncommon for participants to articulate 
dystopian views almost inadvertently akin to their present situations. For 
instance, Mark and Laura respectively expressed that “it would be chaos 
absolute chaos, people would become crazy”, “it would be hectic; it would just 
be non-stop crime I think, you’d have people walking into shops and taking 
whatever they wanted”. Similarly, James and Jeremy respectively stated that: 
There would be anarchy and chaos. You’d get a lot of people thinking 
‘who cares, there’s nobody looking after me so why should I look after 
or care about anybody else’. But hopefully that situation should never 
arise, it’s unthinkable isn’t it. 
 
It would be horrible, it’s not even worth thinking about you know what I 
mean. The country would be ruined if that was the case, I’d brick it, I’d 
be terrified, it’s just not worth thinking about.  
 
When probed as to what he would do in such an extreme scenario Doug told 
the researcher that: 
 
I’d probably run away and hide, you know get what I need and then go 
hibernate. I think I’d be quite scared, you know I see half of these types 
of people on the streets now and if there was no law enforcement at all 
it would just be crazy. You could never imagine could you what it would 
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be like, but it would be crazy because people would just go and take 
what they wanted and nobody would stop them you know.  
 
It could be argued that despite its visible discrepancies the simple abstract 
presence of the ‘hard’ machine appears sufficient to offset the otherwise 
inevitable dystopic calamity of life as it already exists for many in Lake Town. 
For some, this comforting presence is further augmented by the construction of 
an intricately woven statistical quilt designed to reaffirm the efficacy of those 
deemed to be the custodians of order. Collectively, these provide the ‘credible’ 
foundation upon which the dream myth is reciprocally formed, sustained and 
perpetuated, creating an enticing cultural sleep intended to “escape you from 
the world your living in” as Craig puts it.  
 
This cultural sleep and its comfortable dream are maintained by a 
sociosymbolic resistance to the ‘full visibility’ of society’s behavioural conduct 
(Merton 1968). This is secured by retaining publicly persuasive narratives of 
‘crime’ and a narrowly focused ‘crime decline’ tunnel of vision which preserve 
only a “functionally optimum degree of visibility” (Merton 1968:398; Pemberton 
2007). So successful has this induced myopia been that it was not uncommon 
for participants to demonstrate great difficulty in thinking beyond the discourse 
of ‘crime’. For instance, in response to the question ‘what do you consider to be 
harmful to the community that isn’t classified as a crime?’ Catherine stated that 
“most of the things that are quite harmful are already considered as crime”. 
Likewise, Rachel and Lewis respectively replied “I’d say a lot of the things that 
cause harm are probably already crimes really”, “I honestly can’t think of 
something”. Concomitantly, such myopia also serves to cultivate a narrow 
conceptualisation of victimhood (Elias 1986) as even Gavin and James who 
experience a great deal of socio-economic marginalisation and systemic 
violence respectively profess to having “not really been a victim of crime” or 
“wouldn’t class unemployment as being harmed”. 
 
The fundamental upshot is that the partial or complete assimilation into 
modernity’s ‘dream myth’, complete with its comforting statistical quilt, facilitates 
the perpetual obsessive denial of the reality of crime and harm. Moreover, with 
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the aid of its custodians of order who guard against the ‘loss of reality’ by 
ensuring the preservation of the fundamental fantasy, it enables uninterrupted 
access to a ‘sense of reality’ that allows one to continue in the capitalist rituals 
of conspicuous consumption and competitive accumulation as the global 
capitalist system nears its apocalyptic zero-point (Žižek 1999, 2011). It is this 
drive to retain a fantasised state of complete immersion within the dominant 
sociosymbolic order that the philosophical tradition of transcendental 
materialism and the theory of the ‘pseudo-pacification process’ help expound, 
and to which the developing theory of the ‘dream myth’ adds additional 
explanatory weight. Accordingly, it is to the delineation of these positions that 
the remainder of this thesis directs its attention.   
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Chapter Six: 
 
Paradigmatic Dominance and Eyes Wide Shut: 
Beyond Positivism and Constructionism.  
 
Before the above-mentioned positions are elucidated it is worth commenting 
briefly upon the current condition of contemporary criminology. On both sides of 
the Atlantic the mainstream criminological canon appears to be characterised 
by aetiological entropy, the marginalisation of intellectual curiosity and the 
institutionally celebrated production of ‘so what? criminology’ (Hall and Winlow 
2012; DeKeseredy 2012; Matthews 2009). What this effectively boils down to is 
a general intellectual standstill at the core of the criminological enterprise, 
precipitated in part by the rapid expansion of ‘market positivism’ and its 
attendant culture of selective research prevention (Winlow and Atkinson 2013; 
Squires 2013). Facilitating the marginalisation of penetrative critical and 
qualitative research, the solidification of this research prevention culture has 
resulted in the diminishment of criminology’s intellectual vitality (Squires 2013; 
Hall and Winlow 2012). Indeed, recent research has revealed a paucity of 
qualitative and theoretical studies amongst the voluminous output of prominent 
American, British and European criminology journals (Travers 2013; Smith 
2014). 
 
It is undoubtedly clear that positivism — particularly in its marketised or 
‘hard/strong’ form, with its obsessive fidelity towards quantification and the 
production of ‘suitable’ statistical facts (DiCristina 1995; Kvale and Brinkmann 
2009; Presdee 2004b) — constitutes the dominant paradigmatic force shaping 
and constraining contemporary criminology. However there is a subdominant 
paradigmatic force often referred to as social constructionism that exists in long-
running tension with the dominance of positivist empiricism (Hall and Winlow 
2012). Often advanced as the only serious challenger to positivism’s 
paradigmatic dominance (Hall and Winlow 2015), social constructionism, 
particularly in its ‘hard’ or ‘strong’ form, nevertheless exerts its own constraining 
presence on the ‘criminological imagination’ (Matthews 2009; Young 2011). 
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Certainly, denial of the conceptual comprehensibility of acts such as abuse, 
exploitation or oppression, by invoking the view that the harm endured only 
exists in the mind of the beholder since our susceptibilities to these acts are 
voluntarily constructed, undeniably inhibits any meaningful analysis of their 
aetiological complexity (Matthews 2009).  
 
Consequently, the constraining presence of these dominant and subdominant 
paradigms, and the intellectual coma they have induced, has effectively 
marooned the discipline in an undialectical bind between crude positivism and 
equally crude social constructionism (Hall 2012b). Since the success of a 
paradigm is determined largely by its promise of success rather than pure 
analytical efficacy (Kuhn 1996), the dominance of these paradigms is not the 
result of their ability to uncover or possess a monopoly over truth, but rather 
their ability to “exercise power and sustain dominance as ‘dogma’” (Jones 
2003:149). In such circumstances the acceptance of alternative positions 
developed in the interstices of a discipline deeply resistant to new ideas or 
explanations seems improbable, yet nevertheless perhaps represents the 
greatest chance of traversing this paradigmatic impasse (Hall and Winlow 2012; 
Sumner 2015).  
 
As a result, the need to rethink currently dominant philosophical and theoretical 
positions whilst stimulating the cultivation of new intellectual directions in 
criminology is of vital importance (Hall and Winlow 2012). Not least of all 
because the resolute adherence to the aforementioned dominant and 
subdominant paradigmatic forces continues to impede the criminological 
investigation of pertinent social issues and phenomena (DeKeseredy 2012; 
Matthews 2009; Squires 2013). The failure of criminology to as of yet “develop 
persuasive and theoretically nuanced accounts of the crime drop” (Winlow 
2014b:169) is a case in point. Such failure is due in large part to mainstream 
criminology’s over-reliance upon dated theoretical positions and unsuitable 
means of examination (Francis et al 2014). Indeed, any cursory glance over the 
voluminous ‘crime decline’ literature will reveal that its theoretical and empirical 
oeuvre is heavily informed and constrained by the dominant positivist paradigm 
and its attendant fidelity towards the “fetishism of numbers” (Young 2011:44). 
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Shored up by a dizzying array of statistical techniques designed to re-assuredly 
affirm an air of scientificity and a plethora of intra-scholarly cross-references 
which offer ‘proof by assertion’ (Aebi and Linde 2012b), the fragile house of 
cards built upon this paradigmatic dominance remains unshaken (Young 2011). 
Moreover, having not even really entered the ‘crime decline’ debate the ‘strong’ 
version of social constructionism, with its widely adopted view that crime is 
nothing more than a fictional and arbitrary construct (Matthews 2009), has 
offered little of value to those committed to shaking the fragile foundations upon 
which the ‘crime decline’ discourse has been built.  
 
Consequently it can be argued that the paucity of rigorous research capable of 
peering beneath the statistical quilt of the ‘crime decline’ discourse is a 
reflection of the theoretical and empirical poverty cultivated by the empirical 
imprecision and theoretical inertia of criminology’s dominant and subdominant 
paradigms. Accordingly, the purpose of this chapter is to move beyond these 
dominant and subdominant forces and begin to explore alternative positions 
capable of facilitating a more accurate and holistic examination of the purported 
‘crime decline’. It is however instructive at this point to offer a very brief yet 
more concentrated reiteration of the broad contours and well known criticisms of 
criminology’s dominant and subdominant paradigmatic forces. 
     
Positivism and Constructionism:  
Positivism, according to Silverman (2011:11), “is a very slippery and emotive 
term” but can however perhaps be broadly characterised as an approach to 
social science concerned with a number of distinct assumptions (Benton and 
Craib 2011). Primarily and broadly conceived, this approach assumes that 
methods derived from the natural sciences can be successfully applied to the 
investigation of human affairs (Hollis 2002). More specifically it accepts the 
empiricist view of science and its attendant doctrines, among which is the 
assertion that genuine knowledge-claims can be obtained and rendered 
testable only via direct experience or observation (Benton and Craib 2011; 
Robson 2011). Consequently, knowledge-claims regarding unobservable 
entities are strongly rejected as unscientific, as it is thought that only observable 
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facts provide a reliable basis for the development of sound propositions, 
testable hypotheses and causal relations identified by empirical regularities or 
constant conjunctions (Robson 2011; Sayer 2010).  
 
Displaying a constant tendency to limit our acquaintance with the world and our 
basic statements about it to the ‘brute facts’ of experiential knowledge, derived 
by reducing objects of study to their empirical grounds, positivism essentially 
remains trapped in the empirical domain (Hollis 2002; Bhaskar 1998, 2008a). 
Accordingly, this dominant paradigmatic force can tell us nothing of that which 
exists unperceived and thus provides only a very partial view of ‘open’ social 
systems (Hollis 2002; Bhaskar 1998). The criminological consequences of 
committing oneself to this ‘hard’ form of positivism, with its ‘common sense’ 
reliance upon the scientific method and simplistic ‘operationalisation’ of 
concepts artificially rendered amenable to statistical measurement and analysis, 
have been well rehearsed (Watts et al 2008). Nevertheless, such commitment 
remains prevalent within criminology and throughout the social sciences more 
broadly (Matthews 2010). 
 
“Typically light in theory and heavy on statistical manipulation” (Matthews 
2010:131), the voluminous ‘crime decline’ literature perhaps proves to be an 
excellent case in point. Indeed much of the ‘orthodox’ survey research, and the 
crude empiricism of the ICVS in particular (Matthews 2010), informing this 
seemingly persuasive discourse has wielded the positivist mysticism of ‘voodoo 
criminology’ to devastating effect (Dekeseredy forthcoming 2016; Young 2004). 
Certainly, the misleading notion of an ‘international crime decline’ is the result of 
successfully presenting the findings of a-theoretical quantitative research 
“trapped in the empirical realm of one-dimensional legally constructed 
definitions of crime that ignore a huge dark figure of ill-defined, systematically 
ignored, misperceived, non-criminalised, unreported and unrecorded harms” 
(Hall and Winlow 2015:1; DeKeseredy 2012).  
 
At this juncture it may be salient to recall that in chapter four the important 
distinction was made between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ positivism in an attempt to avoid 
the wholesale rejection of positivist inspired social scientific research. Indeed it 
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was argued that the proper utilisation of positivism in its ‘soft’ form, as an initial 
analytical method of identifying demi-regularities to be investigated more 
thoroughly by contextually sensitive qualitative research, offers a potential 
avenue of significant promise (Danermark 2002). However, it is perhaps 
unsurprising to note that despite such potential promise mainstream 
criminology, and social science more broadly, continues to be dominated by 
positivism’s ‘hard’ variant and its attendant concern only for the empirical 
(Matthews 2010; Yar 2004).  
 
Counterposed to this dominance, social constructionism operates from a 
distinctly different set of ontological and epistemological assumptions than its 
positivist counterpart (Houston 2001). Ontologically social constructionists focus 
primarily upon the conscious construction of reality (Lindgren 2005). Simply 
stated, they propose that rather than an objective reality existing independently 
from the imaginative subject, the social world is manufactured via human 
interaction and language (Quinney 1975; Houston 2001). Correspondingly, they 
tend to emphasise the epistemologically contingent and perspectival nature of 
knowledge, choosing to concentrate upon the world of pluralistic meanings 
created by social actors through a process of communicative interaction 
(Houston 2001; Quinney 1975). It is salient to note however, that social 
constructionists do not dogmatically deny the existence of an external reality, 
but contest the possibility of acquiring ‘truthful’ or objective knowledge of such a 
reality (Flick 2009; Burr 1998; Nightingale and Cromby 2002). 
 
Accordingly, social constructionists have often been charged with abandoning 
discussions of the real for those concerned with our knowledge of it and the 
claims we make about it (Baert et al 2011). Indeed it appears that they are 
content to confine their intellectual operations to the domain of the actual, 
concerned only with the phenomenology of events and subjective experiences 
(Bhaskar 2008a; Hall and Winlow 2015). Moreover, in their polemics against 
materialism constructionists often display the tendency to reduce everything to 
mental processes, including the creation of socially real entities (Lindgren 
2005), thereby slipping needlessly into what Fleetwood (2005:206) calls 
“ontological exaggeration”. In addition to suffering from what Nightingale and 
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Cromby (2002:710) refer to as “ontological muteness” — after acknowledging 
that ‘things’ exist we are hastily reminded that their nature remains unknowable 
since their demarcation is purportedly nothing more than mere social 
convention — social constructionism has a tendency to de-centre the human 
subject from analysis as ‘agency’ becomes little more than a language game 
(Houston 2001; Burr 1998).   
 
However it is pertinent to note that like positivism, social constructionism 
contains ‘hard/strong’ and ‘soft/weak’ variants (Sayer 2000; Iosifides 2011a). 
Whilst much of the above is perhaps more indicative of the former, a significant 
proportion of crucial elements undoubtedly still apply in varying degrees to the 
latter. For instance, ‘soft’ social constructionism maintains that factual accounts 
of the real are socially constructed and that such knowledge is contingent upon 
its social origins (Sayer 2000). Yet for its ‘hard’ variant this means that since the 
objects or referents of such knowledge are nothing more than social 
constructions, they cannot “adequately refer to and describe external 
circumstances which are either not social constructions or are the constructions 
of others” (Sayer 2000:62).  
 
Unfortunately many criminologists have adopted this ‘hard’ constructionist logic, 
applying it in extreme form in the claim that “crime is an arbitrary and fictional 
construct” (Matthews 2009:345). Whilst few would argue with the claim that the 
category of ‘crime’ is a socio-legal construction, such an assertion must be 
tempered with the acknowledgment that the harm it causes is very real (Henry 
and Milovanovic 1996). Yet without any of this moderation the simplistic 
articulation that crime is merely a social construction continues to pervade 
constructionist criminology, precluding its investigation of pertinent 
contemporary issues (Hall and Winlow 2015). Indeed social constructionism, 
particularly in its ‘hard’ variant, remains confined to the domain of the actual and 
is reluctant to venture beyond engaging in discussions regarding ‘crime’s’ 
socially constructed nature to consider the lived reality of crime and harm. 
Accordingly, it fares little better than its positivist counterpart as an adequate 
position from which to analyse the purported ‘crime decline’. 
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Evidently, both the dominant and subdominant paradigmatic forces that 
currently monopolise the mainstream criminological canon offer very little utility 
for a thorough analysis of the ‘crime decline’s’ multifaceted complexity. 
Nevertheless, it remains customary within social science to contrast positivism 
with constructionism as if these two positions exhaust all possible alternatives 
(Benton and Craib 2011). This tendency continues to persist despite the 
existence of alternative positions capable of facilitating an initial move beyond 
the correlationism that forms a common feature of both contemporary positivism 
and social constructionism (Iosifides 2011b), such as critical realism. 
 
Critical Realism; Beyond Positivism and Constructionism:  
As alluded to above, despite being largely neglected within mainstream 
philosophical and criminological circles (Baert 2005; Sumner 2015), the 
philosophical doctrine of critical realism is capable of moving our intellectual 
faculties beyond the confines of the aforementioned dominant and subdominant 
paradigms. Indeed it retains the ability to expose positivism and 
constructionism’s correlationist core (Iosifides 2011b). At the centre of this core 
resides the tendency to permanently dismiss any discussion of ‘reality’ as it 
exists independently of human access (Gratton 2014), in favour of maintaining 
instead that “knowledge of a reality independent of thought is untenable” 
(Bryant et al 2011:4). Facilitating, at least initially, the intellectual transcendence 
of the obsessive concern with correlations between thinking and being, critical 
realism maintains the tenability of capturing a glimpse of the real as it exists 
independently of our conceptions of it (Hall and Winlow 2015). Furthermore, it 
argues that we can attain some potentially fallible and always revisable 
knowledge of the real’s complex and not always directly observable structures, 
processes and generative mechanisms (Sayer 2000; Benton and Craib 2011).   
 
Although chapter four provided a detailed exposition of critical realism’s basic 
premises, it is perhaps instructive to offer here a very brief reiteration of its main 
principles in order to help convey with more precision the progressive 
intellectual space critical realism opens up. In the first instance it should be 
recalled that critical realism, or what is also referred to as transcendental 
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realism, essentially revolves around a number of key claims regarding the 
nature of reality and our knowledge of it (Benton and Craib 2011; Outhwaite 
1987). First and foremost, critical realism’s initial point of departure is the 
premise that the world exists independently of human consciousness, and that 
the nature of its reality is not easily apprehensible or conceivable to the human 
subject who therefore only experiences a portion of it (Sayer 2000; Danermark 
et al 2002; Wynn and Williams 2012). Accordingly, our knowledge of the world 
and its complex nature is necessarily partial, incomplete and fallible (Sayer 
2000; Maxwell 2012). This is of course not to suggest that we can have no valid 
knowledge about the world as it exists independently of us, but rather that social 
reality is complex and multidimensional and as such a great proportion of it 
remains hidden, operating beyond the partial experience social actors may 
obtain in the empirical domain (Iosifides 2011a). 
 
Therefore rather than remaining fixated upon regarding experiential 
observations in the domain of the empirical as constituting the ultimate objects 
of knowledge as positivism does, or focusing solely upon the differential 
interpretation of events in the domain of the actual as constructionism has a 
tendency to do, critical realism takes full cognisance of all three domains of 
reality (Bhaskar 2008a; Easton 2010a; see also Table 1 above). Recognition of 
this ontological depth enables critical realists to explore underlying relations, 
structures and tendencies that, under certain conditions, have the potential to 
generate causal changes or absences in the actual domain which social actors 
may experience either directly or indirectly in the empirical realm (Sayer 2000; 
Clark 2008; Bhaskar 2008b). Such exploration is particularly salient as it is 
argued that the acquisition of usable knowledge is dependent upon some 
understanding of the generative mechanisms that produce both observable and 
unobservable events and/or processes of absenting (Danermark et al 2002; 
Outhwaite 1987; Bhaskar 2008b).  
 
Accordingly, for critical realist inspired criminology the task is to elucidate the 
generative structures and mediating conditions of crime (Sumner 2015). 
Therefore, it is concerned not only with accurately describing and explaining 
criminal events and corresponding surface patterns, but with revealing the 
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underlying generative powers and forces that produce such patterns of events 
and their very real consequences (Sumner 2015; Hall and Winlow 2015). It is 
perhaps for this reason that critical realism has the potential to inform more 
penetrative criminological investigations of contemporary anomalies, such as 
the purported ‘international crime decline’, than its dominant and subdominant 
counterparts. Indeed, rather than getting bogged down in positivist accounts of 
descriptive correlations or constructionist analyses of the interpretation of 
constructed meanings, critical realist criminology recognises that crime 
possesses a reality and objectivity independent of human experience and 
consciousness (Hall and Winlow 2015; Matthews 2009). It retains a complexity 
that cannot be captured via simplistic analyses of its surface patterns nor 
explained away as a product of mental processes.  
 
It can thus be argued that a thoroughly developed critical realist approach to the 
study of crime and harm is capable not only of facilitating theoretically rich and 
penetrative research into contemporary social issues, but of transcending 
existing forms of ‘so what? criminology’ (Matthews 2009). However, it is 
pertinent to reiterate that some forms of critical realism nevertheless retain a 
debilitating tendency to analytically and ontologically separate structure and 
agency (Kivinen and Piiroinen 2006). Whilst this dualism of structure and 
agency is not always immediately obvious nor is it a necessary feature of all 
forms of critical realism, it is explicit in the traditional Bhaskarian (1998) and 
subsequent Archerian (1995) variants (King 2007). 
  
For Bhaskar (1998:37) “there is an ontological hiatus between society and 
people”. Rather than constituting a purely heuristic device used for analytical 
convenience, the above division is thought to be a purposive statement 
regarding the reality of the social world (King 1999b). It is intended to denote 
that neither structure nor agency is reducible to the other since both are real 
entities in themselves (Cruickshank 2004). Yet with the accompanying 
qualification that social structures are activity and concept dependent we are 
met with what King (1999b:270) refers to as “the first antinomy of structure”. 
This antinomy, expressed as “society is dependent on individuals: society is 
also independent of individuals” (King 1999b: 269), is apparently resolved via 
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recourse to the concept of emergence. That is to say that accumulated agentic 
activities and conceptions produce a wider social context that is simultaneously 
dependent upon yet irreducible to individual agents (Cruickshank 2010).  
 
However, for King (1999b) this entails a relapse into sociological reification in 
that structures are treated akin to a supra-individual moving force asserting in 
the last instance that society is independent of individuals (Cruickshank 2004). 
By postulating that social structure is “always already made” (Bhaskar 1998:33, 
original emphasis) and that individuals recreate this pre-existing social context 
rather than create it ex nihilo, Bhaskar perhaps absolves human beings of 
responsibility for their destructive creations (Cruickshank 2003; Hall and Winlow 
2015). This is arguably achieved by adopting a narrow conception of 
emergence and ontologising previous agentic interactions into an autonomous 
structure, seemingly irreducible to any individuals when viewed only in relation 
to those who reside in the present (King 1999b). Consequently, Bhaskar (1998) 
occupies a compromised position “committed to a dualistic social ontology of 
individuals and structure” (King 1999b:274).  
 
Whilst Bhaskar (2008b) later appears to make a tactical retreat from the 
ontological hiatus between structure and agency, which he so vehemently 
insisted upon within his Transformational Model of Social Activity (Dean et al 
2005), Archer (1995, 1998) maintains a hard-line approach towards the 
aforementioned analytical and ontological dualism (Porpora 2007). Indeed, 
perhaps no one more than Archer has provided the most sustained attack upon 
elisionist approaches that conflate structure and agency (Porpora 2007; Benton 
and Craib 2011). Although remarkably similar, Archer’s morphogenetic social 
theory perhaps introduces a more explicit and analytically deeper temporal 
dimension than that associated with Bhaskar’s original formulation of TMSA 
(Jessop 2005). Underpinning the morphogenetic approach is the claim that 
social structure necessarily pre-dates the actions of individuals who in turn 
contribute towards either its reproduction or transformation (Archer 1995). Any 
claim to the activity dependency of structures is thus tenable only in the past 
tense. That is to say, structures may arise as emergent consequences of the 
past with distinct properties which are irreducible to the people of the present, 
Justin Kotzé  PhD Thesis 
185 
 
yet nonetheless influence and condition rather than determine their agency 
(Cruickshank 2004; Kivinen and Piiroinen 2006).  
 
Although initially maintaining that such a temporal divide is merely an analytic or 
artificially imposed methodological distinction (Kivinen and Piiroinen 2006), 
Archer (1995:63-64) later articulates this dualism in a strong ontological sense 
by claiming that structure and agency are “indeed different entities with different 
properties and powers”. Rather than being two sides of the same coin structure 
and agency, and their attendant emergent properties, are expressed as being 
“distinct from each other and irreducible to one another” (Archer 1995:14, 
original emphasis). Whilst particular emphasis is placed upon prioritising the 
temporality of structure, which is thought to necessarily render it autonomous of 
subsequent agency, King (1999a:211) argues that this is merely a conversion of 
“the temporal priority of other people’s actions into the ontological priority and 
autonomy of structure”. Ultimately, it can certainly be suggested that in 
solidifying the independence of structures from agents Archer appears to 
commit to philosophical dualism (King 1999a; Cruickshank 2004). 
 
Archer further widens the gap between structure and agency by advancing the 
position that the human self autonomously pre-exists the social self (Archer 
1995). Rather than one’s sense of self emerging from exposure to and 
interaction with the social, it is argued that the self-conscious individual is a 
natural product of embodied and practical relations with the non-social 
environment (Kivinen and Piiroinen 2006). Indeed it is noted that the very 
location of the self in a pre-social living body, which is necessary for our 
identification as persons, necessarily precludes “our humanity being construed 
as a gift of society” (Archer 1995:286). Essentially, what this appears to imply is 
that the pre-social, autonomous yet somehow self-conscious agent is engaged 
in a “direct and culturally unmediated relationship with a primordial nature” (King 
1999a:218). Moreover, it is suggested that this non-social experience of the 
natural world is essential for fostering the propensities, capacities and aversions 
that inevitably frame social experience and the social identity we subsequently 
assume (King 1999a; Archer 1995).  
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However, the practice of illicitly cleaving agents from social structures and the 
tendency to separate out subjectivity as the naturally self-conscious and 
creative agent, are crucial mistakes of considerable importance that reside at 
the heart of Bhaskarian and Archerian critical realism (Brown 2014; Hall and 
Winlow 2015). Indeed the tendency to overemphasise the ontological 
separation of structure and agency, in such a way as to endow the agent with 
undue autonomy and command over the self’s drives and desires, pays little 
regard to the complex interplay between the agent’s traumatic exposure to the 
Real primordial natural world and his/her active solicitation of the Symbolic 
Order (Kivinen and Piiroinen 2006; Winlow and Hall 2012). Failure to take 
cognisance of this subjectivization process perhaps implies a concomitant 
failure to adequately acknowledge and explore the cultivation of criminogenic 
subjectivities, which is of vital importance for analysing not only crime in general 
but the purported ‘crime decline’ in particular (Kotzé and Temple 2014).  
 
Thus, despite the additional insight provided by critical realism’s move beyond 
the correlationism of the dominant and subdominant paradigmatic forces, it 
remains unable in its ‘stock form’ to provide a holistic account of harmful 
subjectivities and the aetiological complexities of crime and harm, or indeed the 
supposed ‘crime decline’. Accordingly, we are in need of a more robust 
philosophico-theoretical framework capable of augmenting the critical realist 
paradigm. Together, the philosophical tradition of transcendental materialism 
and the theory of the pseudo-pacification process, which constitute crucial 
ingredients of the new ultra-realist position (Hall and Winlow 2015), provide 
such a framework and it is to their delineation that this chapter now turns.  
 
The Turn to Speculative Realism and Transcendental Materialism:   
In a similar fashion to critical realism, the contemporary philosophy of 
speculative realism is committed to giving the real its due, by contending that 
not only can we know there is an external reality but that we can at the very 
least speculate about it (Gratton 2014). It rejects the idea that the real can only 
be thought through its phenomenal representations and correlations, accepting 
that although we cannot describe its totality we can nevertheless think through 
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the noumenal real (Gratton 2014; Hall and Winlow 2015). What is more, such 
thinking can be done without being constrained by the long shadow cast by 
liberalism’s catastrophist doctrine (Burns and Smith 2011; Hall 2012c). In 
essence then, speculative realism is encouraging us to return to what 
Meillassoux (2009:7, original emphasis) refers to as “the great outdoors”, to the 
reality that lies beneath the correlationist surface (Gratton 2014).   
 
Although critical of certain aspects of speculative realism and thus by no means 
a strict advocate of the movement, Adrian Johnston is a prominent fellow-
traveller whose recently developed transcendental materialism can perhaps be 
said to be broadly compatible with this new area of philosophy (Burns and 
Smith 2011; Johnston 2014). At the very least it could be suggested that 
transcendental materialism can be conceived as being in the speculative realist 
stable, as the stall that deals specifically with the reality of biology and its 
relation to ideology by drawing upon the latest developments in contemporary 
neuroscience (Johnston 2013a, 2014). As briefly mentioned in chapter four, 
transcendental materialism explains how ideology congeals in the body’s 
malleable neurological circuits, structuring our consciousness and fashioning 
our emotional commitment to the dominant ideology that is then accepted as a 
timeless fact of life (Winlow and Hall 2013). However, in its current configuration 
the dominant ideology to which we are emotionally encouraged to commit is 
characterised by capitalist realism, where a functionally destructive subjectivity 
oriented towards egoistic individualism and special liberty is forged and 
reproduced (Hall 2015, 2012c). In essence then, where critical realism fails, in 
its persistent separation of structure and agency, to adequately explore the 
cultivation of this subjectivity so susceptible to criminogenesis, transcendental 
materialism succeeds with explanatory precision. 
 
Its initial point of departure is the radical reversal of traditional philosophy’s 
foundational view of the relation between the material and the ideal (Winlow and 
Hall 2013). Rather than viewing the material as fixed and the ideological 
sociosymbolic system as flexible, transcendental materialism views the human 
subject’s material neurological system as permanently malleable and the ideal-
symbolic as rigid and durable (Winlow and Hall 2013). Indeed, it is argued that 
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although the human body is essentially a hard-wired mechanism, it is hard-
wired specifically for a certain dysfunctionality and plasticity (Johnston 2008). 
This neural plasticity is an essential evolutionary trait that has enabled the 
fragile human organism to survive in multiple environments by utilising its pre-
programmed ability to redesign its nature to shape and reshape itself in relation 
to worldly experiences, which help form and modify neural connections 
(Johnston 2008; Malabou 2013). 
 
Conversely, the sociosymbolic system has evolved to fulfil the purpose of 
providing social groups with the rigid communicative comprehensibility required 
to allay the trauma of pre-symbolic life (Hall 2015). Because our ontogenetic 
starting point is characterised by a terrifying and anxiety-suffused state of 
prolonged pre-maturational helplessness, we are compelled to actively solicit 
inclusion within a comprehensible memosphere; or what Lacan refers to as the 
Symbolic Order (Johnston 2008). Incorporation into this sociocultural organising 
system, complete with its cohabitants and widely shared symbols, codes, 
practices and meanings, is absolutely essential for both psychic and material 
survival (Winlow and Hall 2013). This need to seek symbolic comfort and 
psychic security in a condition of homeostasis is illustrative of Spinoza’s theory 
of the conatus (Hall 2012a). Briefly stated, the conatus is an ontological 
tendency of both the mind and the body to continuously endeavour to persist in 
their own being (Malabou 2013). Put simply, it is the simple drive of the human 
organism to ensure its own survival.  
 
According to transcendental materialism this survival is secured via a natural 
process of “denaturalising our physical selves into dematerialised forms of 
subjectivity” (Hall 2012b:206). This naturally determined process essentially 
entails a passage from a raw state of nature to a recognisable state of culture 
(Winlow and Hall 2013). That is to say from the lone expanse of the Lacanian 
Real where raw impulses, forces and events surround us and forcefully erupt 
upon our senses with complete incomprehensibility, to a comprehensible 
symbolic order from within which we can begin to make sense of our terrifying 
pre-symbolic perceptions of a monstrous and self-distorting external nature 
(Winlow and Hall 2012; Johnston 2014). Importantly, without this self-
Justin Kotzé  PhD Thesis 
189 
 
denaturalising nature human subjectivity could not arise (Johnston 2013b), for it 
is only through this natural self-sundering that one can proceed through the 
process of subjectivization to the subsequent genesis of subjectivity (Johnston 
2014; Winlow and Hall 2012).  
 
Since the incessant pressure exerted by the Real can only be offset by the 
structured subjectivity of an operative symbolic order, individuals must actively 
solicit the dominant sociosymbolic order and successfully assimilate its 
attendant values and norms in order to become de-naturalised social subjects 
(Johnston 2008; Hall 2015). Once incorporated the subject naturally resists re-
assimilation back into the obscene Real of our pre-symbolic biological being. 
Failure to do so would result in the loss of ‘our reality’ and an inevitable 
confrontation with the horror of our own nonbeing, as we are forced to once 
again inhabit a terrifying world devoid of any comprehensible meaning (Winlow 
and Hall 2013). Accordingly, it can be argued that the subject is not created by 
being forcefully coerced into an operative symbolic system by some external 
authority, but rather the subject purposively solicits, for the sake of its own 
material and psychic survival, inclusion within the dominant sociosymbolic order 
(Winlow and Hall 2013). 
 
However, rather than constituting some liberating mecca of freedom the current 
dominant sociosymbolic order to which we so eagerly commit ourselves is 
characterised by symbolic inefficiency — the general loss of elements of social 
knowledge that carry with them a certainty of truth having been endorsed by the 
Big Other — and deaptation (Winlow and Hall 2012; Johnston 2008). According 
to Johnston (2008:175) deaptation refers to “an initially adaptive memetic 
strategy [that] later becomes useless or even counter-productive”. This descent 
into redundant dysfunctionality occurs when systems of memes, or ideologies, 
continue to persist long after the disappearance of the original material 
conditions that spurred their genesis and within which they were functional (Hall 
2012a). What we are then left with is a stubbornly inert memetic material, a rigid 
supra-material system that remains detached from its precipitative conditions 
but yet continues to exert its influence over living beings whose interests are 
detrimentally displaced by it (Hall 2012b; Johnston 2008). Evidently, and in 
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accordance with transcendental materialism’s great reversal of the normal 
relation between the material and the ideal, it is within the ideal-symbolic that 
rigid ideologies are reproduced despite drastic changes in the underlying social 
conditions (Winlow and Hall 2013).  
 
Permanently insulated from major shifts in socio-material conditions and 
brimming with reproductive independence, the deapted hegemonic negative 
ideology of capitalist realism remains the memetic strategy underpinning the 
current dominant sociosymbolic order to which we are committed (Hall 2012b). 
This order and its attendant values, norms and practices are temporarily re-
naturalised in the neurological circuitry of those recruited at the deep 
psychosocial level as they attempt to escape the primary trauma of the un-
symbolised Real (Hall 2015). However, it is worth emphasising that this 
recruitment is far from contingent upon some catalogue of alternative choices, 
but is instead a primal imperative, a deaptive trap that must be solicited and 
within which one must become completely assimilated (Winlow and Hall 2013; 
Hall 2012a).   
 
It is from here that we can perhaps begin to see and explicate the link to 
criminogenesis. Firstly, it is perhaps now apparent that the self-conscious 
subject does not miraculously emerge out of nature as a natural product of 
some essential organic tutelage from a nurturing primordial nature as Archer 
(1995) seems to imply. Rather, it is only by frantically retreating from this 
monstrous and self-distorting nature into a denaturalised subjectivity, via 
soliciting incorporation into the organising framework of the dominant 
sociosymbolic order, that the subject truly begins to emerge (Johnston 2014; 
Winlow and Hall 2012). Once incorporated, the hegemonic negative ideology of 
capitalist realism becomes part of the subject’s neurological circuitry. This co-
optation of the neuronal system facilitates the formation of a very specific set of 
drives, desires and fears that influence and restrict behaviour in accordance 
with the interests of liberal-capitalism (Hall 2012a). In particular, individuals are 
compelled to solicit and buy into a deapted negative ideology that purposively 
cultivates cynicism, competitive individualism, depoliticisation, anxiety, 
inequality, and socio-economic instability and insecurity which often foster 
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criminal responses in either ameliorative or hyper-conformist capacities (Hall 
2012b).  
 
The upshot is that the emergent subject is fundamentally a subject of a 
criminogenic ideology, an ideology that, in some strange counter-trajectory from 
deaptation to exaptation, remains functional to an inherently criminogenic 
system (Johnston 2008; Hall 2015). That is to say that, as will soon be 
explicated when we explore the pseudo-pacification process, the consequences 
of deaptation become constituent parts of a form of ‘economic exaptation’ in so 
far as they serve to foster the ideological tenets necessary to stimulate 
economic expansion (Hall 2012c). The emergent subject thus becomes 
precisely that which is preferred by liberal-capitalism’s desire for ideal-type 
subjects, who are capable of driving economic expansion by wilfully inflicting 
harm onto others in the pursuit of commodified self-interest (Winlow and Hall 
2013; Hall 2015). Accordingly, it can be argued that crime committed for 
personal gain or non-political reasons constitutes a transgression of liberal-
capitalism’s prohibitive norms and technical laws rather than of its Symbolic 
Law (Hall and Winlow 2015). Indeed such crimes and the harms they cause are 
not mere aberrations of the liberal-capitalist system, but are rather constitutively 
embedded within its operational core and attendant culture and subjectivity (Hall 
2012b).   
 
More specifically, they are the result of a purposively cultivated dissociated 
subjectivity that enjoins individuals to “simply act in accordance with drives and 
desires oriented to success in the socio-symbolic competition” (Hall 2015:134, 
original emphasis). By facilitating a psychological by-pass that effectively 
disconnects the individual from their relation to collective individuation, this 
scalar mode of dissociation serves to engender an affinity towards short-
termism, desublimation, social irresponsibility and other toxic behaviours 
(Stiegler 2010). It allows individuals to perceive themselves in possession of 
special liberty, a self-affirmed fantasised state of exception that grants the 
beholder the freedom to act with exploitative impunity, whilst inflicting a 
multitude of harms upon the social body in pursuance of enacting with 
devastating precision the competitive logic of the market (Hall 2015, 2012b).  
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Consequently, in our frantic effort to escape the primary trauma of the obscene 
Real experienced by our pre-symbolic selves, we are wilfully recruited at the 
emotional and material level into a sociosymbolic order that produces and 
inflicts severe harms upon its subjects (Winlow and Hall 2013). In a cruel sense 
of irony the subject’s solicitation of the alluring trap, which promised to alleviate 
its anxiety-suffused state of pre-maturational helplessness, has served only to 
repackage such anxiety in objectless form to be repeatedly delivered by a 
deapted and symbolically inefficient memetic system (Hall 2012a). Moreover, 
temporary relief from this unhappiness can now only be secured by obtaining 
fleeting pleasurable sensations found in the realm of capitalist consumerism 
(Winlow and Hall 2013). As demonstrated by numerous participants in chapter 
five, whether they are fake, illegal, genuine or legal, the need to experience 
these temporary ameliorative sensations becomes a potent source of desire, 
driving the active social subject ever deeper into the sociosymbolic competition 
for identity and distinction (Hall 2015; Winlow and Hall 2013). Thus, the ‘conatic’ 
drive to ensure survival by escaping the terror of pre-symbolic being has 
unintentionally thrown us into a sociosymbolic order that cultivates and feeds off 
anxiety, intensifies social atomisation and encourages hyper-competitive 
individualism in such a way as to create a latently criminogenic society of 
enemies (Hall and Winlow 2015; Hall 2012d).  
 
In light of the above, the position advanced by Pinker (2011, 2012), that 
historical rates of violent crime have declined due to some greater engagement 
of the ‘better angels of our nature’, seems particularly untenable. Indeed, our 
continued immersion within a sociosymbolic order that purposively and 
unrelentingly cultivates subjectivities highly susceptible to criminogenesis, casts 
even more doubt upon this and other ‘crime decline’ discourses’ incautious 
optimism (Hall and Winlow 2015). Similarly, as previously explicated, the 
inability of criminology’s current dominant and subdominant paradigms, along 
with critical realism in its ‘stock form’, to adequately connect structure and 
agency renders their ability to explain the aetiology and purported trajectory of 
crime and harm moot at best (Hall 2015). Conversely, transcendental 
materialism enables us to analyse the interaction between structure and agency 
and helps us to understand the formation of criminogenic subjectivities. It 
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therefore offers us a convincing new framework from within which we can begin 
to explore the complexities of crime and harm with greater explanatory precision 
(Winlow 2014b).  
 
A transcendental materialist inspired criminology therefore involves a concern 
for analysing the orientation of human energy, and understanding the 
connections between harm and actively stimulated yet loosely controlled drives 
and desires without attempting to naturalise or trans-historicise them (Hall and 
Winlow 2015; Hall 2015). In doing so it helps to explain how “capitalism has 
temporarily captured the majority of Western individuals at the deep 
psychological level of drive and desire as subjects of its ideology” (Hall 
2015:133). According to Hall (2015), the purpose of this capture is to 
simultaneously stimulate and sublimate the subject’s drives in order to solidify a 
culture of consumption and drive economic expansion. Recognising the 
potential economic value in cultivating a state of permanent dissociation and its 
attendant anxious energy, the market-capitalist system has simultaneously 
stimulated and harnessed this energy from individuals who find themselves 
vulnerable and isolated within a competitive market society, in order to promote 
aggressive socioeconomic competition (Hall and Winlow 2015; Hall 2015; Hall 
and Winlow 2004). Indeed, in their ‘conatic’ drive to secure their tenure within 
the sociocultural organising system supplied by the dominant sociosymbolic 
order, individuals are compelled to assimilate its competitive orientation and 
employ with ruthless zeal the special liberty associated with their solicited 
dissociated subjectivity.  
 
The successfully dissociated subject is thus encouraged to become ruthlessly 
competitive in order to stimulate the market economy, yet is suitably pacified so 
as to secure the optimum sociocultural environment within which the market can 
remain fully functional (Hall 2015). As alluded to earlier, it is in this respect that 
the consequences of deaptation — symbolic inefficiency, heightened anxiety, 
and hyper-competitive individualism — can be seen as forming constituent parts 
of what can be termed ‘economic exaptation’. That is, an initially maladaptive 
economic alteration which quickly becomes exploitable for liberal-capitalism, by 
harnessing the derivatives of deaptation that serve to foster the ideological 
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tenets that drive contemporary economic expansion. This complex state of what 
Hall and Winlow (2015:118, original emphasis) refer to as “permanent managed 
deaptation” is precisely what constitutes the intended function of the pseudo-
pacification process. By exploring the developing theory behind this cultural-
historical practice, we can begin to understand the long-term historical process 
by which the logic of capitalist realism, and its attendant cultural drives, is 
established as a practical norm that intrudes upon individuals’ emergent 
subjectivity.  
 
Managed Deaptation through the Pseudo-Pacification Process:  
As intimated above, the capitalist project has from its very inception never been 
concerned with ‘liberating’ social subjects, but has instead focused upon 
harnessing “the inexhaustible reservoir of thymotic human energy to advance its 
circulation and establish itself as the dominant global socioeconomic system” 
(Winlow 2014b:173). However, the incessant stimulation of such energy 
requires strict cultural-legal regulation so as to ensure that its subsequent 
competitive human relations remain socially acceptable and economically 
functional (Hall 2012b). This inevitably creates a dynamic tension between the 
simultaneous stimulation and repression of human energy, and it is this tension 
between these two poles that constitutes the pseudo-pacification process.  
 
Originally cultivated by the nascent European bourgeoisie, the fundamental 
purpose of this process was twofold. Firstly, it served to evacuate from civil 
society as much physical violence as possible, in order to protect property rights 
and lubricate the arteries and nodes of trade and exploitative business 
practices. Secondly, it was intended to foster, energise and diffuse throughout 
the social body an affinity towards the non-violent sociosymbolic competition 
and culture of consumption required by the early market economy (Horsley et al 
2015). However it should be noted that the evacuation of violent energy did not 
result in its actual diminution, for instead of simply dissipating it was converted 
into a more pacified and expansive form of aggressive libidinal energy (Hall 
2014b). This energy was then redirected in order to fuel aggressive competition 
in the socioeconomic field of market-capitalism (Hall 2014b). Forming a 
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reciprocal relationship then, these two interactive functions continuously 
feedback upon each other. They serve to both create and maintain a relatively 
safe trading environment, by attenuating physical violence which is then 
sublimated into an economically functional competitive driving force that further 
contributes towards the expansion of trading activity (Hall and Winlow 2015).   
 
Consequently as capitalism developed, the high levels of murder and 
interpersonal violence that formed constituent parts of everyday pre-modern 
European life began to decline (Hall 2007; Winlow 2014b). This decline 
however was not accompanied by a general drop in crime, but rather by an 
increase in the rates of non-violent crime and a proclivity towards new and 
systematised forms of symbolic violence (Horsley et al 2015; Winlow 2014b). 
This more durable and socio-politically powerful dimension of the dimorphic 
nature of violence (Hall 2000), is a product of the conversion process alluded to 
above. Indeed, the ability to harness the socioeconomic potential of symbolic 
violence is predicated upon the fervent repression of physical violence (Hall 
2007). The consequence of elevating this dimension of the dimorphic form was 
the inexorable expansion of competitive individualism as an effective economic 
driver (Hall 2007; Hall et al 2008).  
 
Accordingly the entitlement to symbolic violence was, throughout the history of 
the capitalist project, democratised in precise concomitance with the state’s 
monopolisation of the entitlement to physical violence and its subsequent 
restriction in the realm of civil society (Hall et al 2008). Essentially, it was 
recognised by the proto-capitalists that a market economy cannot flourish in 
conditions of extreme and brutal arbitrary physical violence (Hall and Winlow 
2015). Therefore if trading commodities and money were to be circulated 
effectively it was necessary to protect property rights by controlling, or at least 
attenuating, theft and violent brigandage (Winlow 2014b). However, they also 
realised that social conditions structured and driven by ethico-legal regulation 
and institutionalised altruism severely hampered market economies (Hall 2015; 
Horsley et al 2015). Consequently the truncation of these two polar extremes, 
for the socioeconomically functional purpose of cultivating within the populous 
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diffused domestication and suitably pacified yet highly competitive drives, was 
an essential function of the pseudo-pacification process (Hall 2014b, 2012b). 
 
Subsequently oscillating between these two poles the social order and its 
subjects were, and continue to be, forced to occupy a third space of ‘orderly 
disorder’ (Horsley et al 2015). Within this pseudo-pacified space physically 
violent aggression was sublimated into economically charged sociosymbolic 
competition, whilst institutionalised altruism dissolved into abstract 
sentimentalism (Hall 2012b). The fundamental purpose of unlocking this third 
space was, and still is, to systematically tap into and harness the dynamic force 
generated by the tension between stimulation and pacification, in order 
ultimately to forge a culture of entrepreneurial individualism at the heart of a 
pseudo-pacified socioeconomic competition (Horsley et al 2015; Hall and 
Wilson 2014).   
 
Crucial in abetting this central objective were the political adjustments made to 
Medieval cultural customs and laws. For instance, laws that attempted to 
institutionalise altruism, facilitate the growth of a Distributivist economy and 
insert within everyday economic practice a modicum of social justice were 
repealed (Hall and Winlow 2015). The simple reason for such rescindment is 
that these practices were dysfunctional to a burgeoning capitalist market 
economy dependent upon the extraction of surplus value and diffusing 
throughout the sociosymbolic field the culture of non-violent competitive 
individualism (Horsley et al 2015). In their place emerged new laws and 
customs intended to simultaneously remove the economically inhibiting 
presence of both physical violence and the relatively altruistic codes that had 
hitherto governed socioeconomic transactions (Hall and Winlow 2015). Among 
the most important of these was the introduction during the twelfth century of 
the laws of primogeniture and entail (Hall 2014b).  
 
The law of primogeniture governed inheritance in the case of intestacy, 
stipulating that the eldest son be the successor to all real property to the 
exclusion of all others, including the widow and any siblings (Jamoussi 2011). 
Operating within a legally enforceable framework known as an entail (Jamoussi 
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2011), the law of primogeniture effectively served to stimulate an aggressive 
social deracination of familial and communal units (Hall 2013). Forcefully 
ejected from these hitherto defensive entities, atomised individuals were thrown 
into an economically and socio-symbolically hostile milieu of unforgiving 
socioeconomic competition where the symbolically unsuccessful ceased to exist 
(Hall 2013). This intentionally instigated form of social mitosis served to expand 
libidinal drives by fostering an anxiety-driven affinity towards participation in 
non-violent competition for the ‘death defying’ sociosymbolic status obtained 
only via successful involvement in the capitalist market (Horsley et al 2015; Hall 
and Wilson 2014; Becker 1975). As Hall (2014b:19) figuratively explains: 
The psychosocial process was analogous to biological cell-splitting and 
growth, creating a sort of socioeconomic tumour as anxious individuals 
were cast out into competitive markets to seek wealth and establish 
their own domains.  
 
During this process a libidinal void was carved into the expelled subject, a well 
susceptible to the flow of a new capitalist ideology and the emergence of an 
insecure and competitive subjectivity innately functional to the developing 
market economy (Hall 2013, 2014b). Imbued with the attendant ideals of this 
economically functional subjectivity, new generations of anxious proto-
entrepreneurs were dispersed outwards throughout the social structure (Horsley 
et al 2015). With the exploitative stimulation of their primary pre-maturational 
anxiety and the incessant incitement of their libidinal drives such individuals 
have, throughout the history of the capitalist project, constituted its psychosocial 
fuel (Hall 2013). Indeed, the potent mix of anxiety, competitive individualism and 
ruthless ambition now congealed in the psychic core of each individual was, and 
continues to be, simultaneously stimulated, harnessed and mollified so as to 
encourage highly competitive, non-violent social action capable of driving 
economic growth (Hall 2012b, 2013). Therefore, behind the ostensible face of 
pacified civility lay the foundations of an aggressive instrumentalism stimulated 
and harnessed for the central purpose of expanding the capitalist market 
economy (Winlow 2014b; Hall 2002). 
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Accordingly, it is argued that rather than constituting some blind teleological 
civilising force responsible for spurring a benevolent historical reduction in 
violent crime as Elias (2000), Pinker (2012), De Wolf (2012) and others seem to 
suggest, capitalism has throughout its history been a pseudo-pacification 
process (Hall 2015; Hall et al 2008). This process has subsequently been 
widely diffused, permeating all regions of the world that operate within a 
capitalist market economy (Hall and Winlow 2015). Countless individuals are 
thus captured within a dynamic tension between the economically functional 
overstimulation of libidinal energy and the tenuous internalisation of pacifying 
codes enforced by external systems of control (Hall 2012b). Encouraged to 
regard communal ties as outmoded sites of competitive hostility akin to some 
contemporary manifestation of primogeniture, or as little more than instrumental 
ports from which to temporarily advance personal endeavours, individuals are 
licenced to compete with greater intensity (Hall and Winlow 2005a, 2015). 
Brutally unleashed within the fragile spillway of rule-bound sociosymbolic 
competition, this intensity is relentlessly stoked by harnessing the envy and 
insecurity that consumer society inevitably cultivates within the subject (Hall and 
Winlow 2004; Hall et al 2008).  
 
The capitalist subject is therefore caught in a double-bind between the 
compulsion to succumb to the fervently overstimulated drives and desires 
required by consumer capitalism, and the socially acceptable pacified forms by 
which one is expected to gratify them (Hall 2013). This double-bind generates 
an immense amount of pressure, an undialectical tension that resides right at 
the heart of the pseudo-pacification process between the overstimulation of 
obscene drives and desires harnessed to the market economy, and the 
necessary degree of sublimation and pacification required to ensure that they 
remain economically functional (Hall 2014b, 2012d). However, it should be 
acknowledged that the pseudo-pacification process does not stimulate, 
sublimate and pacify drive and desire in “equally intense measures” (Hall 
2012b:231). Rather, in order to successfully energise and drive the capitalist 
economy, the process on balance has a tendency to lean more towards 
stimulation than pacification (Horsley et al 2015). As a result the whole process 
is prone to breakdown as deviant, yet often economically functional activity, 
Justin Kotzé  PhD Thesis 
199 
 
inevitably spills over its insulating boundaries (Horsley et al 2015; Hall et al 
2008). Indeed, as Hall (2014a:409) notes: 
The dynamic tension operates at such a pitch that spillage is inevitable 
throughout the social order. Controlled deviance overheats and breaks 
through the control system at its weakest points to appear as plural 
forms of uncontrolled deviance.     
 
This is not to suggest that deviance is entirely anathema to the pseudo-
pacification process. The market dynamics it helped generate in fact thrive in 
conditions of moral transgression and corresponding measures of control, as 
long as such practices remain embedded within the circuitry of capitalism’s 
market logic (Lippens 2012). Rather, what is being argued is that today’s 
neoliberal system and its attendant culture of consumption, with its requisitely 
high levels of aggressive competition and instrumentalism, has strained the 
pseudo-pacification process beyond its limits and ability to pacify, insulate and 
redirect the noxious residual energy generated towards socially acceptable 
activities (Hall and Winlow 2004, 2015). The overheated libidinal energy 
generated by the unstable pseudo-pacification process has begun to seep 
through the system’s proverbial radiation shielding, once held relatively firmly in 
place by the internalisation of inhibiting cultural codes and the restraint of the 
super-ego (Hall 2013, 2014b; Hall and Winlow 2005a). Indeed, this highly 
criminogenic energy can no longer be held in check by a super-ego 
fundamentally reorganised to enjoin pleasure rather than demand restraint (Hall 
2013; Hall and Winlow 2005b). Consequently, we are now over-reliant upon 
external mechanisms and systems of control to help contain the criminogenic 
libidinal economy that consumer culture both organises and reproduces (Hall 
2015, 2013).  
 
However, as evidenced in the last chapter, the current external systems of 
social control are largely inadequate for this task. Geared towards providing 
only partial restraint in the libidinal culture as the threadbare insulating pole of 
the pseudo-pacification process, such systems have for the most part failed to 
control the deapted visceral habitus still fervently reproduced throughout many 
anelpic micro-communities (Hall 2013; Hall and Winlow 2004; Hall et al 2005). 
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Lake Town is but one of many examples where commitment to such an 
unrestrained and de-sublimated habitus continues to generate visibly hostile 
and destructive forms of crime and harm (Hall and Winlow 2004). Evidently the 
pseudo-pacification process is collapsing into a state of disrepair, stimulating 
more aggressive libidinal energy than it is capable of sublimating and pacifying 
(Hall and Winlow 2005b). Accordingly, despite endeavouring to operate at peak 
efficiency in order to try and contain this explosion of energy (Hall and Winlow 
2015), it could be argued that the pseudo-pacification process is not a form of 
‘permanently’ managed deaptation for it often falters in this regard. Its inability 
to continuously mollify and insulate itself from enduring forms of economically 
dysfunctional criminality, whilst attempting to appropriate the consequences of 
deaptation as functional components of economic exaptation, is perhaps 
evidence of this (Hall 2012b).  
 
In its current configuration it may be more accurate to refer to the pseudo-
pacification process as a systematised attempt to appropriate the 
consequences of deaptation for the continued development of economic 
exaptation; an attempt that episodically succeeds in pacifying and containing 
the residual energy generated by this process. In light of the pseudo-pacification 
process’ contemporary descent into disrepair the latter function of this dual 
process is evidently failing to operate at peak efficiency. The upshot of this 
failure is the unrestrained dispersal throughout the social structure of 
dissociated subjects, imbued with a self-affirmed sense of special liberty and 
willing to do extreme harm to others in the process of acting out their 
overstimulated drives and desires (Hall 2015). Occupying a multitude of spaces 
across the globe from anelpic micro-communities to corporate boardrooms, 
these ‘criminal undertakers’ operate with impunity to advance self-interests and 
elevate the self above the herd of socioeconomic ‘losers’ (Hall 2012b; Hall et al 
2008). This is the reality of the criminogenic milieu we now inhabit and within 
which the purported ‘crime decline’ is said to have occurred (Hall and Winlow 
2015).  
 
Moving beyond the aforementioned inadequacies of the discipline’s dominant 
and subdominant paradigmatic forces, as well as the ‘stock form’ of critical 
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realism, the ultra-realist amalgamation of transcendental materialism and the 
theory of the pseudo-pacification process is capable of painting a more accurate 
picture of our current landscape. It affords us detailed insights into the 
purposive formation of a latently criminogenic subjectivity, whilst explicating the 
way in which social subjects actively solicit and employ the ideals of a dominant 
sociosymbolic order that attempts to stimulate and pacify intense libidinal 
energy to be harnessed to the market economy. These insights provide us with 
a more holistic understanding of the condition of our contemporary 
socioeconomic terrain. Accordingly, such acumens have been put to work in 
this chapter to form the basis of a robust theoretical antidote to the 
administration of the prematurely triumphant ‘crime decline’ discourse. 
Together, the theoretical components that comprise the unique framework 
employed by this research serve to both frame and contextualise the 
relationship between the empirical data and its foundational work in developing 
the theory of the dream myth presented in the next chapter. Moreover, such 
theoretical contextualisation clearly demonstrates the absurdity of celebrating 
an imagined peaceableness. 
 
At the very least these theoretical insights certainly reveal quite clearly that the 
criminogenic and zemiogenic state of our current social condition is anything but 
conducive to an ‘international crime decline’. If anything, the more frequent 
display of deep lacerations in the pseudo-pacification process’s tattered veneer 
of pacified control serves to cogently demonstrate that all is not well in liberal-
capitalist society (Hall and Winlow 2005b). Nevertheless, despite the existence 
of copious amounts of evidence to suggest that “we cannot go on as we are” 
(Winlow 2013:32, original emphasis), it appears that many of those who occupy 
the political, criminological and communal spheres of both the liberal left and 
conservative right are unwilling to accept this. Driven towards interpassivity and 
the tendency to fetishistically disavow our anthropocentric complicity in the 
criminogenic conditions we inhabit, they demonstrate a remarkable ability to 
simply ignore the visible consequences of a deapted social system 
disintegrating before their very eyes (Winlow 2013).  
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It is not that the vast majority of us do not know that this is happening, but rather 
it is the fact that we do know that allows us to continue in the fantasised rituals 
of everyday life, confident in the knowledge that we have not been conned by 
the system (Winlow and Hall 2012). However, despite not being ideological 
dupes, we retain a tendency to repress into our unconscious that which we 
know but do not want to know (Hall and Winlow 2015). Thus, in 
acknowledgment of our impending socioeconomic disintegration and the 
concomitant rise in levels of public displays of violence, expressive 
aggressiveness, fear and insecurity (Fletcher 1997), we must continue to act as 
if the pseudo-pacification process can permanently manage deaptation. Shorn 
of its actual capacity to do so however, this placatory task is aided by the 
carefully crafted dream myth and its intricately woven statistical quilt, which, as 
alluded to previously, has been fabricated by the imposition of a strict tunnel 
vision that limits ‘full visibility’ and thus preserves only a “functionally optimum 
degree of visibility” (Merton 1968:398). The dream myth thus effectively utilises 
a significant degree of understatement as a suitable means of upholding the 
ostensible validity of liberal-capitalism and the ‘crime decline’ discourse (Hall 
2002).      
 
Indeed, it is in the broad sense systematised counter-alarmism par excellence. 
Rather than constituting an additional strand to the already strained pseudo-
pacification process, the dream myth should be understood more as an ancillary 
mechanism that is both aided by and reciprocally helps to legitimise the external 
control system. In terms of the latter in particular, it functions to credit this 
system with fabricated forms of success in the shape of the ‘crime decline’. 
Such accreditation serves to reaffirm the system’s credibility whilst 
simultaneously obfuscating its inefficiency as a suitable means of insulating the 
overstimulated drives and desires that continue to propel capitalism forward. In 
essence then, as will be explicated in the next and last substantive chapter, the 
dream myth is integral to the maintenance of both the pseudo-pacification 
process and Žižekian bio-politics; that is to the politics of the efficient 
management of human life (Žižek 2005, 2009a).  
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Chapter Seven:   
 
Dreaming Comfortably: Theorising the ‘Crime 
Decline’ and Modernity’s Dream Myth. 
 
Within the dispiriting academic milieu alluded to in the previous chapter, in 
which the mainstream criminological canon not only continues to discourage 
intellectual curiosity but remains hostile to new ways of thinking, to risk 
presenting a genuinely new idea is an incredibly disconcerting prospect (Hall 
and Winlow 2012; Sumner 2015). It is however a necessary risk if we are to 
explore and explain with more accuracy and vigour the complexities of the 
purported ‘international crime decline’. To this end the purpose of this chapter is 
to begin to apply the new theoretical lens of the dream myth to what has 
become a rather mired if not altogether stale ‘crime decline’ discourse.   
 
Perhaps one of criminology’s most enduring lessons is that one cannot divorce 
crime and harm from the wider politico-cultural and socio-economic contexts 
within which they occur. Nor is it possible to explore and explain such social 
phenomena and the responses they invoke in isolation from these wider 
variables (Whitehead 2010). Nevertheless, a sterile politico-cultural and socio-
economically detached view of ‘crime’ is precisely what the ‘crime decline’ and 
cognate liberal progressive discourses have managed to so successfully 
articulate. Indeed, despite continuous eruptions of social discontent and copious 
other examples of the rapid unravelling of our fragile sociosymbolic order, as 
the global capitalist system approaches its apocalyptic zero-point (Žižek 2012, 
2011), the message conveyed is one of incautious and unqualified optimism.  
 
It has already been suggested that perhaps one reason for such ardent 
articulations of declining rates of crime (Pinker 2011; De Wolf 2012) and similar 
expressions of “systemic stupidity” from “those with buried heads” (Stiegler 
2010:5), is the need to secure for the capitalist economy a retention of the 
consumer confidence required to ensure its smooth operation (Wood 2012; 
Winlow and Hall 2012). Certainly the ever-greater priority accorded to the 
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interests of capital has ensured that post-political governance is reduced to little 
more than providing a secure environment for market forces, whilst maintaining 
for the populous only a minimum standard of protection from some forms of 
crime (Bell 2011; Winlow and Hall 2012; Chan 2005). Crucial in this respect is 
the role played by the narrow ‘crime decline tunnel of vision’ and the intricately 
woven statistical quilt in helping to maintain the ‘idyllic’ image of liberal-
capitalism and Western civilisation, by placing limits upon full visibility as a form 
of insulation from the burden of ‘excessive knowledge’ (Žižek 2008a; Merton 
1968). However, rather than serving to merely mask the true state of things like 
some ideological illusion, such insulation retains a functional character precisely 
because many individuals know very well the reality of crime and harm but must 
act as if they do not know in order to deny the consequences of this knowledge 
(Žižek 1994a, 2009a). 
 
Posed at the end of chapter one was the question of whether this seemingly 
collective state of fetishistic disavowal, bolstered by the above mentioned 
insulators from full visibility, is a symptom of our inclusion within modernity’s 
dream myth. Finally, having laid numerous pages of contextual and empirical 
groundwork this question can, with some important qualifications, be answered 
in the affirmative. However whilst a number of key theoretical and empirical 
elements of the dream myth have already been articulated in previous chapters, 
such an answer must necessarily prompt a detailed and thorough analysis of its 
fundamental premise and constituent components. Accordingly, it is to the 
undertaking of this analysis that this chapter will now turn. 
 
Analysing Modernity’s  Dream Myth: 
Stripped down to its essential premise, the dream myth can simply be 
understood as the dream that sustains the myth of perpetual incremental liberal 
progressivism in general and the ‘crime decline’ in particular. These two 
separate yet interrelated myths form a reciprocal relationship, in that the ‘crime 
decline’ is purported to be both the result of and affirmatory evidence for a form 
of ‘Long Peace’ to which we are encouraged to credit liberal progress (Pinker 
2012; De Wolf 2012). These reciprocal delusions of peace are maintained by 
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the complex inner workings of the dream myth which, aided by the statistical 
quilt and concomitant insulators from full visibility, ultimately serve as an 
artificial vista from which to view the world not as it is but as some imagine it to 
be (Žižek 1999). Crucially, what is guaranteed as one enters into the 
fundamental fantasy-construction of the dream myth is uninterrupted access not 
to reality as such, but to a ‘sense of reality’ that allows one to continue in the 
capitalist rituals of everyday life whilst the anthropocentric reality of crime and 
harm remains fetishistically disavowed (Myers 2003). As previously stated, 
passage into this fantasy-construction is akin to entering an enticing cultural 
sleep maintained by a carefully constructed dream. Specifically designed to 
sustain the comfortable myth of liberal progressivism and declining rates of 
crime, this dream serves to preclude one encountering the hiatus that exists 
between these imagined ideals and reality (Žižek 2008a; Box 1981).     
 
In an excerpt from which the researcher drew much inspiration for the creation 
of the dream myth theory, Box (1981:157) neatly captures its basic shape whilst 
arguing that:    
As dreamers, we imagine ideals which because of their very nature 
(and ours!) are difficult to realise; but, not wanting to confront our 
shortcomings directly, we frequently bridge the gap between ideal and 
reality by constructing a comforting myth that the hiatus does not exist.  
 
Not only does the above passage roughly sketch out the dream myth’s basic 
premise and essential function, but in doing so it explicitly draws attention to the 
two fundamental components which comprise the theory’s name. Rather than 
merely serving some linguistic convenience it must be noted that the use of the 
terms dream(s) and myth serve an important practical function. That is to say 
that they offer precise, if analogous, explanatory value and therefore need to be 
dealt with in sufficient detail.  
 
In the first instance it is perhaps instructive to note that there is in some 
respects a similarity between dreams and myths (Arlow 1961). Early 
psychoanalysts such as Abraham (1913 [2012]) identified within both dreams 
and myths an analogue tendency towards wish fulfilment. Similarly, for both 
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Freud and Jung parallels could be drawn between these two components in 
respect of their shared genesis from the unconscious and their ostensible 
proneness to symbolic interpretation (Segal 1999). Congruently, other scholars 
have drawn attention to the somewhat dream-like appearance of myths (Flood 
2013) and have noted how myths have been widely interpreted as collective 
dreams (Lévi-Strauss 1963) or as a “day-dream of the race” (Malinowski 
1971:16). Although one is free to take as much or as little from such analogies 
as deemed appropriate, it must be acknowledged that to suggest a direct 
correspondence between dreams and myths is to risk severe oversimplification 
for there are significant differences (Segal 1999; Tudor 1972). Indeed for many 
contemporary psychoanalysts myths are quite unlike dreams, for whilst the 
utterances of the latter are private those of the former are pre-eminently public 
(Segal 2015; Tudor 1972). True as this may be, the possibility of some form of 
relationship between dreams and myths cannot be easily dismissed for the 
simple fact remains that when we dream we are essentially telling ourselves 
myths about ourselves and our surroundings (Hobson 2005). 
 
The Myth-Sustaining Dream: 
For Freud, perhaps considered to be the best known dream investigator, 
analysis of the surreal and indeed mythopoeic content of dreams promised to 
yield exciting insights into the unconscious (Hobson 2005; Segal 1999). 
Although unable to stand the test of time, having succumbed to fierce and 
penetrating criticism, elements of Freud’s theory of dreams remain influential 
and certainly retain some analytical utility apropos the dream myth theory (Storr 
2001; McCarley and Hobson 1977). Of particular interest is Freud’s notion that 
dreams are essentially realisations of wishes and that this holds true for both 
children and adults (Freud 2001). However, whilst the dreams of children are 
arguably direct wish fulfilments of desires unsatisfied in waking life, those of 
adults are more complex in that they are thought to be the disguised fulfilment 
of repressed desires or wishes (Stafford-Clark 1992). The basic premise of this 
wish fulfilment-disguise theory is that dreaming is a reactive process that occurs 
following the release of unconscious wishes during sleep deemed unacceptable 
to consciousness (Hobson and McCarley 1977). These ‘unacceptable wishes’ 
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are defensively modified and rendered less disturbing by the ‘dream work’ 
process, which transforms the distressing latent dream content into an 
adequately censored manifestation in the interests of preserving sleep (Storr 
2001; Freud 2001). Herein lies what Freud held to be the essential function of 
dreams, that is their capacity to act as the guardians of sleep, securing a 
psychical release for otherwise suppressed wishes by presenting them as 
fulfilled (Freud 1997, 2001). 
 
Such an analysis undoubtedly offers valuable insights from which the dream 
myth theory can draw. It can certainly be suggested that the dream that 
sustains the myth of the ‘crime decline’ can be viewed as an expression of an 
unfulfilled desire or wish for a secure socioeconomic order. Indeed, prevented 
from realising such an ideal in waking life we fashion this comforting dream that 
gifts to us the feelings of security and serenity we so desperately desire, and in 
so doing secures the preservation of a cultural sleep that precludes our 
awakening into the reality of our times (Becker 2011; Freud 2001). Whilst 
caution must be exercised when extrapolating in this way from such heavily 
criticised Freudian insights, one is justified in doing so provided that sufficient 
distance is maintained from their original form. For instance, it must be 
acknowledged that although not all dreams are concerned with the fulfilment of 
wishes or desires some certainly are (Storr 2001). Similarly, it can be conceded, 
without doing irreparable damage to the overall premise upon which the dream 
myth theory draws, that rather than serving as a guardian of sleep at the 
psychological level, a dream serves this function by virtue of “having a sleep 
maintenance mechanism built into its physiological substrate” (Hobson and 
McCarley 1977:1338).  
 
Accordingly the theory of the dream myth can, in modified form, safely draw 
upon a number of key components from Freud’s theory of dreams. However, as 
intimated above, despite the analytical utility already derived from Freud the 
empirically grounded insights yielded by cellular and molecular neuroscience 
and psychophysiological dream science in particular, arguably provide firmer 
ground upon which to build and enunciate the theory of the dream myth 
(Hobson 1999, 1988). Concerned more with the formal features of dreams than 
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with their content, contemporary psychophysiological dream science represents 
a discernible break from earlier forms of the science (Hobson 2005, 1988). Of 
specific importance in this regard is the dream theory referred to as the 
activation-synthesis hypothesis (Hobson and McCarley 1977; Hobson 1988). 
Faithful to the notion of mind-body isomorphism, this hypothesis “postulates 
close parallels between characteristic psychological features of dreams and the 
characteristic physiological events in the brain during REM [Rapid Eye 
Movement] sleep” (McCarley and Hoffman 1981:904). What is of particular 
interest is the precise delineation of the cardinal characteristics of dreaming, 
some of which include vivid hallucinoid imagery; bizarre spatiotemporal 
distortions; the delusional acceptance of such phenomena as real; and a 
reduction in logical reasoning and critical thinking (Hobson and McCarley 1977; 
Hobson 1988, 2005). The cause of these ‘dream features’ lies in the dramatic 
changes in the chemical state of the brain-mind accompanying the alteration in 
neuromodulation that differentiates waking from REM sleep (Hobson 1999, 
2005, 2001).  
 
Despite the intense incongruities of dream bizarreness — resulting from the 
relative absence of norepinephrine and serotonin which impede the functioning 
of the cerebral cortex and hippocampus (Hobson 2001) — we remain 
hopelessly delusional during dreams, readily accepting as real the powerful 
hallucinoid experiences (Hobson 2005, 1988). This delusional acceptance of 
such experiences, despite their extreme improbability, is aided by the 
suppression or loss of critical perspective and thought due to the production of 
less norepinephrine, and the exclusion of external stimuli via the phasic 
presynaptic inhibition of sensory-input (Hobson 1988, 1999). In many respects 
then, dreaming not only resembles a form of psychosis but is in fact a psychotic 
state (Hobson 2005). More specifically dreaming is akin to the organic mental 
syndrome known as delirium (Hobson 1999). Indeed, the common features of 
dreaming closely mirror those of delirium and are both caused by a dramatic 
shift in the balance of brain chemistry (Hobson 1999).   
 
The analogical efficacy of this brief psychophysiological look at the formal 
features of dreams is significant for the delineation of the dream myth theory. 
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The reason for this is that it serves to explain precisely how the ‘dream’ into 
which we have entered to varying degrees sustains the myth of the ‘crime 
decline’. Indeed, within this analogous dream state we are so enthralled by the 
strong hallucinoid world view painted by liberal progressive discourse that we 
retain a delusional acceptance of the bizarre articulations of declining rates of 
crime as experiential reality (Hobson 1988). Since critical perspective and 
thought have been successfully repressed and external intrusions of 
increasingly visible social dislocations continue to be excluded from public 
consideration, both the illusions of the dream and the cultural sleep are 
maintained (Hobson 1988). Accordingly, whilst the disjuncture that exists 
between the ideal of declining rates of crime and the experiential reality of crime 
is insurmountable in ‘waking’ life, such discrepancy is bypassed in the dream 
state by the strength of conviction we retain in the hallucinoid effects that 
emanate from the elaborate discourse, which we readily accept despite its 
bizarre incongruities (Hobson 1999, 2005). Consequently, no matter how 
bizarre or incongruent the utterances of the ‘crime decline’ discourse, they are 
nonetheless maintained by the formal features of the ‘convenient’ dream state 
we have to varying degrees entered into.   
 
Retaining many of the hallmarks that lead to the equation of dreaming as 
delirium (Hobson 1999), incorporation into this myth-sustaining dream state can 
perhaps, in congruent analogous fashion, be conceived as an ailment of liberal-
postmodern capitalism. However rather than resembling anosognosic patients 
(Malabou 2013), those who enter this dream state are not unaware that they 
have succumb to liberal progressivism’s hallucinoid projections, or that their 
delusional acceptance of its absurdity is a façade that must be maintained if 
they are to retain access to their ‘sense of reality’ (Myers 2003). For all intents 
and purposes they have entered into and accepted what could perhaps be 
regarded as a mass ‘consensual’ hallucination (Taylor 2013).  
 
In this regard the dream that sustains the myth of the ‘crime decline’ is a lucid 
one (Green and McCreery 1994). That is to say that whilst those who 
experience the dream remain enthralled by it, they are nonetheless aware that 
they are dreaming and that what they are encountering is simply a hallucination 
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(Hobson 1999; McCarley and Hoffman 1981). Remarkably, despite exhibiting 
certain deficiencies in cognitive abilities when compared to waking life and an 
occasional failure to fully appreciate the illusory status of the dream, the lucid 
dreamer is nevertheless intellectually present (Green and McCreery 1994). It is 
perhaps because of this that lucid dreams are, generally speaking, devoid of 
unpleasant elements and easier than their ‘ordinary’ counterparts to regard as 
the product of the desire for wish fulfilment (Green and McCreery 1994). 
Accordingly, rather than constituting a fully veiled deception or mystification the 
characteristically lucid dream that sustains the myth of the ‘crime decline’ can 
be properly conceived as a state of make-believe, that is a wilful and convenient 
self-deception (Tudor 1972).  
 
Essentially this lucid dream state functions, for those who experience it, akin to 
fetishistic disavowal. Indeed they know very well that, in their mental activity, 
they are following an illusion but still they proceed precisely because such 
commitment allows them to retain access to their fundamental fantasy-
constructions and their ‘sense of reality’ (Žižek 1994a, 1999). This 
phantasmatically constituted reality is one in which the sociosymbolic 
inconsistencies and antagonisms produced by the Real of capitalism are 
successfully repressed (Wood 2012). Plastering over these otherwise manifest 
discrepancies, the fantasy-constructions that support our ‘sense of reality’ 
provide an air of completeness and closure which effectively serves to shield us 
from the trauma of capitalism’s obscene Real (Wood 2012). Carrying the 
analogy through to its conclusion, it is being argued that the formal features of 
the lucid dream state sustain the myth of the ‘crime decline’ by ultimately 
facilitating access to one’s phantasmatically constituted ‘sense of reality', and 
thereby preserving the cultural sleep induced by liberal progressive discourse.  
 
However, this assertion is seemingly at odds with Lacan’s contention that it is 
actually within the dream itself that we approach the hard kernel of the Real 
(Žižek 2008a). As Žižek (1994a) explains, having constructed the dream in the 
interests of preserving sleep and to avoid awakening into external reality, we 
are confronted with the terrifying Real of our desire which announces itself in 
the dream. Consequently, in order to allay the impending psychic trauma we 
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awake from the dream, escaping into so-called ‘reality’ so as to continue 
sleeping and avoid confronting the obscene Real (Žižek 1994a). That is to say 
that the fragile reality into which we awaken is in fact an illusory one that 
depends upon the successful repression of the Real encountered in the dream 
(Žižek 1992). Yet instead of departing from this ostensibly antagonistic 
Lacanian view, the theory of the dream myth incorporates and extends it.  
 
The position being advanced is that having been confronted with the obscene 
Real that announces itself in the initial dream we awake into another dream, 
that is into the analogous lucid dream state of the dream myth, so as to 
continue sleeping. What we experience then can perhaps be best described as 
something akin to a false awakening (Green and McCreery 1994). It is through 
this false awakening into the lucid dream state that we maintain access to our 
‘sense of reality’, a phantasmatically constituted social reality within which ‘all is 
well’ with liberal-capitalist society as demonstrated by ‘internationally declining’ 
rates of crime. Accordingly, the fundamental upshot is that via this lucid dream 
state, complete with its aforementioned formal features, individuals can avoid 
confronting the reality of crime and harm and other inconvenient truths as they 
retain uninhibited access to the protective fantasy-construction that is ‘their 
reality’ (Žižek 1994a). Crucially, the comfortable myth of liberal progressivism 
and declining rates of crime is sustained by this lucid dream state and it is 
perhaps in this regard that one can analogously suggest, as Jung does, that we 
“dream the myth onwards” (cited in Segal 1999:73). As the next section will 
demonstrate, the concerted perpetuation of this myth allows those who believe 
in it to feel more at home in the world by offsetting the sickness-by-truth that 
inevitably befalls those unable to buy into the falsehoods that sustain everyday 
life (Segal 1999; Jeffery 2011).  
 
The Myth of the ‘Crime Decline’ : 
Despite considerable variance in the usage of the term myth (Eliade 1964; 
Tudor 1972), it is widely held that myths both originate and function to satisfy a 
particular need (Segal 1999, 2015). In this regard it could be suggested that the 
myth of perpetual liberal progress and its attendant ‘international crime decline’ 
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serve to disconnect those who adhere to it from the reality of the external 
world’s dark heart (Segal 1999; Davies 1997). In other words it fulfils the need 
of the human subject to both imagine and believe in the possibility of living in a 
‘second’ reality or better world than the one currently occupied (Becker 2011). 
This inescapably conciliatory function can in many ways be viewed as being 
politically charged (Segal 2015). In fact the very notion of a ‘crime decline’ 
should be considered a political myth (Tudor 1972; Flood 2013). Indeed, in 
accordance with the definitions of political myth laid down by Tudor (1972) and 
Flood (2013), the enunciation of the ‘crime decline’ is a politically charged and 
ideologically marked narrative purported to be an unadorned account of events, 
articulated in an intelligible and meaningful manner for the purpose of promoting 
and sustaining a liberal progressive world view.     
 
However, it is salient to note that the success of this particular myth is not 
necessarily predicated upon the faithful belief of its intended audience. Rather, 
as will be explicated in more detail later, its efficacy is secured by a combination 
of fetishistic disavowal and a habitual following of the ‘rituals of belief’ (Žižek 
1999). In other words, belief in the myth is to some extent retroactively attained 
only by those who act as if they already believe, that is by those who exhibit a 
belief before belief (Žižek 1994a; Myers 2003). Accordingly the myth of the 
‘crime decline’ constitutes a miraculous pseudo-event visible only to those who 
believe or desire to see it (Anderson 1990; Žižek 2012). Interestingly, such 
belief or desire to see even the smallest grain of truth in politicised utterances of 
a ‘crime decline’ is often maintained despite acknowledgment that we now live 
“in a post-truth political environment” (Oborne 2005:6). Nor does the fact that 
mythmaking constitutes both a normal and persistent feature of political life 
(Flood 2013; Tudor 1972), seamlessly woven into the script of political theatre 
(Anderson 1990), appear to diminish the validity of this particular political myth 
for those who adhere to it. 
 
Quite the contrary, in fact in many respects the transcendental materialist 
subject actively solicits from its political leaders the untruths required to mitigate 
the raw experiential burden of seeing the world as it really is (Becker 2011; 
Oborne 2005). Unimbued with a natural defence against the horrors of full 
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visibility, assurance of equanimity can only be achieved by artificially closing off 
or limiting subjects’ perception of the world (Becker 2011). It is for this reason 
that individuals tend to gravitate towards “discourses and practices which 
appear to offer the hope of order and control” (Hollway and Jefferson 
1997:260). This air of serene security is precisely what the myth of the ‘crime 
decline’ offers, by way of maintaining a “functionally optimum degree of 
visibility” (Merton 1968:398) via limiting its adherents’ view of crime to those 
‘conventional’ forms contained within the ‘crime decline tunnel of vision’. In 
essence, it works ‘creatively’ with the dark figure of crime and harm to maintain 
a blissful state of ignorance by illuminating only politically useful forms of 
‘conventional’ crime purported to be in persistent statistical decline, whilst 
omitting the plethora of ‘non-conventional’ forms of crime and ‘non-ideal’ victims 
that would necessarily disturb the myth (Fattah 1997; Spalek 2006). In this way 
the politically charged myth is capable of both defining the threats and 
portraying their well-orchestrated resolution in order ultimately to maintain a 
conciliated “mood of optimism and political pragmatism” (Hall and Winlow 
2015:127; Elias 1986). 
 
Essential in achieving this placation is the constant dissemination of officiated 
data streams that persistently ‘define down’ crime and harm, and downplay the 
underlying criminogenic and zemiogenic conditions from which they emanate 
(Hall and Winlow 2015). These carefully crafted data streams both facilitate the 
generation of the myth and function as its index (May 2011; Flood 2013). 
Importantly, as Arlow (1961:379) reminds us, “only the shadow of a real event is 
necessary on which to build the structure of [a] myth”. For the myth of the ‘crime 
decline’, the persistent overgeneralisation of ostensible reductions in certain 
volume crimes in a geographically limited number of Western countries to 
reductions in all types of crime everywhere constitutes just such a shadowy 
catalyst (Aebi and Linde 2012b). Subsequently the flimsy structure upon which 
the myth has been built has been shored up simply by its attainment of ‘proof by 
assertion’ (Aebi and Linde 2012b). Whether this particular political myth is true 
or not is inconsequential to its perpetuation; all that is required for the myth to 
function effectively is that its adherents ‘believe’, or at least act as if they 
believe, it to be true (Segal 2015; Tudor 1972).  
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Crucially, such belief is capable of affecting people’s view of reality and 
influencing how they act within it (Becker 2011). Herein lies the very function of 
political myths in general and that of the ‘crime decline’ in particular (Tudor 
1972). Its primary purpose is a placatory one designed to facilitate the constant 
repression of reality to ensure the citizenry continue to remain functionally 
operative in the rituals of capitalist life (Jeffery 2011). The myth of the ‘crime 
decline’ provides a convenient, if not entirely convincing, diversion from having 
to directly confront and deal with the unceasing miseries of contemporary 
existence, thereby offering its adherents the requisite dosage of oblivion needed 
to retain psychic health (Jeffery 2011). Consequently, not only is it a convenient 
myth to believe in but in many respects it is a necessary one for it serves to 
conceal from everyday view the inconsistencies produced by the Real of 
capitalism; or at least makes it easier for them to be fetishistically disavowed 
(Tudor 1972; Wood 2012). Moreover, in doing so the myth of the ‘crime decline’ 
serves to re-legitimise the authority of governments and the efficacy of their 
‘hard’ and ‘soft’ agents of control (Tudor 1972). 
 
Accordingly, it may by now be evident that the myth of the ‘crime decline’ can 
be thought of as a form of ideological discourse (Flood 2013). Certainly the 
concepts of myth and ideology are considered to be intimately related, often 
carrying with them connotations of deceit which emanate both from within and 
outside the subject (Halpern 1961). However, the ideological discourse 
permeating the ‘crime decline’ myth has nothing to do with illusion or 
mystification in the sense commonly associated with the concept of ideology 
(Žižek 1994b). Instead, its lexicon is oriented towards the propagation of 
fetishistic disavowal in accordance with the cynicism that now constitutes the 
prevailing form of ideology (Žižek 1994a). Cynical subjects are by no means 
unaware of the discrepancies contained within the ‘official’ version of reality, or 
that their own understanding of reality is distorted, but nevertheless do not 
reject the falsehoods on offer (Myers 2003). On the contrary, they insist upon 
retaining the flawed view and all that accompanies it whilst maintaining a cynical 
distance (Žižek 1994a). That is to say that “they know very well what they are 
doing, but still, they are doing it” (Žižek 2008a:30).  
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For some this demonstration of cynical reason is evidence that we now live in a 
post-ideological society. This assertion would hold true if ideology were to be 
solely located in what we purport to know, but as it happens it is located in the 
reality of our own and others activity (Myers 2003; Žižek 2008a). Accordingly, 
we can simultaneously retain a cynical distance from the ideologically marked 
myth of the ‘crime decline’ whilst continuing to participate in the rituals of belief, 
precisely because we know that in our activity we are following an illusion (Žižek 
2008a; Winlow and Hall 2012). We can, in other words, privately think whatever 
we want whilst demonstrably believing (Žižek 2008a). Consequently, the cynic 
is not free from ideology but is in fact considered to be a pure subject of 
ideology so deeply immersed within its fantasies, which both constitute and 
preserve symbolic reality, that he/she believes in its attendant myths now more 
than ever; even if such belief is to a large extent ‘externalised’ (Wood 2012).  
 
One must not make the mistake of thinking that such belief is irrational, for as 
already mentioned there are a number of placatory benefits for those who 
believe in the myth of the ‘crime decline’; or at the very least believe that 
someone else believes on their behalf (Flood 2013; Wood 2012). Certainly, to 
renounce the conciliatory gift offered by the myth is to risk a confrontation with 
the obscene Real of capitalism and enter a rapid descent into depressive 
realism (Jeffery 2011). This is the inevitable trauma that awaits those who are 
unable to remain immersed within the lucid dream state that sustains the myth, 
and guarantees access to the phantasmatically constituted ‘sense of reality’ 
secured by its prolongation.  
 
To recapitulate, by way of recoupling the constituent components of the dream 
myth theory, the ‘crime decline’ myth is sustained by the formal features of the 
lucid dream state experienced by its adherents. The extreme improbability of 
declining rates of crime is readily accepted as reality by those who lucidly 
remain enthralled by the hallucinoid picture of a more peaceable society, whilst 
desperately occluding the sensory-input of inconvenient truths that would 
undoubtedly disturb the dream and undermine the myth (Hobson 1988, 2005). 
Put simply, this is how the core components of the dream myth work in 
collaboration in order ultimately to maintain, for those partially or fully 
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assimilated, uninhibited access to their ‘sense of reality’ (Myers 2003). 
Essentially this is the primary function of the dream myth, but towards this end it 
is worth noting that the dream myth also helps to perform a number of 
reciprocal and interrelated functions. 
 
A Multipurpose Dream Myth:  
Perhaps chief amongst them is its integral role in facilitating the maintenance of 
the pseudo-pacification process. As mentioned at the end of the previous 
chapter, the dream myth helps to maintain the impression that the pseudo-
pacification process can permanently manage the consequences of deaptation. 
Crucially, it does not function to recover the breakdown of the pseudo-
pacification process but simply helps to mask the extent of this faltering. This is 
achieved by crediting this process’s insulating capabilities and cognate systems 
of external control with fabricated forms of success such as the ‘crime decline’, 
thereby making it look as though its pacifying function is still operating at 
optimum proficiency (Hall and Winlow 2015). With such success demonstrably 
stitched into the intricately woven statistical quilt carefully fabricated by the 
imposition of a strict ‘crime decline tunnel of vision’, there is seemingly little risk 
of experiencing a loss of ‘our reality’ that would inevitably accompany the 
shattering of our fundamental fantasy (Žižek 1999). 
 
Accordingly, those who are assimilated into the dream myth to varying degrees 
can comfortably continue sleepwalking to disaster as they habitually perform the 
rituals of capitalism content that all is well in liberal-capitalist society (Hall 
2012b). Again, rather than constituting the outcome of some ‘top down’ 
imposition of a mystifying veil masking the true state of things, such oblivion is 
self-imposed, it is a necessary self-deception, a product of their entrance into a 
convenient state of make-believe precisely because they know all too well the 
reality of our times (Tudor 1972; Winlow and Hall 2012). It is the very nature of 
our anxiety-suffused lives that compels us to both construct and enter the 
dream that sustains the comforting myth of the ‘crime decline’ (Hobson 2005). 
Whilst not everyone can enter the dream myth, for reasons to be discussed 
later, those who are partially or fully assimilated within it obtain the necessary 
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ideological symbolism required to repress the terrifying raw state of the world as 
it really is (Becker 2011). By limiting full visibility via custom fitting both the form 
and scope of crime and harm to the systematised solutions on offer, the dream 
myth supports the vital lie we have fashioned about ourselves and our 
surroundings, which functions to preserve the imagined infallibility of the world 
around us (Hall 2015; Becker 2011).  
 
Essentially, the dream myth makes expedient use of understatement by 
engineering a false split between real knowledge and symbolic belief (Žižek 
1992). That is to say between our knowledge of the fact that the experiential 
realities of crime and harm extend well beyond the ‘conventional’ forms 
purportedly in statistical decline, and our reluctance to believe that which we 
already know to be true (Žižek 1992). Thus, as capitalism approaches its 
apocalyptic zero-point whilst social dislocations widen and the stockpile of 
wasted lives rapidly increases, those who enter the dream myth can go on 
acting as though the neat bundle of carefully selected illegalities are all that ails 
the world (Žižek 2011; Bauman 2004; Winlow 2013). Moreover, news of their 
miraculous decline makes for comforting reading and further endorses 
widespread delusions of a more peaceable society imbued with a new morality 
scathing of uncivilised behaviour (Ellis 2015; Gray 2011). 
 
In what equates to systematised counter-alarmism par excellence, the dream 
myth gifts to its adherents the symbolic means to fetishistically disavow with 
more ardency the obscene Real of capitalism and their anthropocentric 
complicity in criminogenesis. In doing so the dream myth serves to further 
solidify its adherents’ assimilation into the dominant sociosymbolic order and its 
attendant negative ideology of capitalist realism (Fisher 2009). More deeply 
embedded, these individuals enjoy uninhibited access to the protective fantasy-
construction that is ‘their reality’ (Žižek 1994a). Perhaps more to the point, such 
solidification ensures that they avoid re-assimilation back into the traumatic 
milieu of pre-symbolic life (Winlow and Hall 2013).  
 
In many ways the dream myth can be understood as an ‘end of history’ 
discourse (Fukuyama 1992). That is as a systematised declaration assuring its 
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believers that the future will remain faithful to the current placatory image of the 
present (Flood 2013). The embedded message is deceptively alluring, offering 
us precisely what we want to hear; that crime is declining internationally and will 
continue to do so in the future due primarily to the greater engagement of the 
‘better angels of our nature’ and the inherent benevolence of ‘gentle commerce’ 
(Pinker 2011; De Wolf 2012). What is more, all we need do in order to secure 
such a future is carry on as normal, or more specifically continue participating in 
the capitalist rituals of everyday life (Hall and Winlow 2015). In essence then, 
what the dream myth helps to provide is “the appearance of change so that 
nothing has to change” (Winlow and Hall 2012:402, original emphasis). 
Therefore not only are we systematically mobilised against change but we 
remain actively complicit in the perpetuation and reproduction of the dominant 
and less than benign sociosymbolic order (Southwood 2011). 
 
Consequently, the dream myth is geared towards maintaining the predominant 
mode of politics that has currently taken the form of post-political bio-politics 
(Žižek 2009a). Indeed in congruence with the overt goal of state bio-politics, the 
dream myth functions to promote and preserve, if only ostensibly, individual 
happiness, serenity and security by occluding traumatic shocks that would 
necessarily disturb or otherwise undermine one’s ‘sense of reality’ (Žižek 
2009b). Since external reality is what constitutes the real misery, inundated as it 
is with a relentless barrage of traumatic shocks such as financial recession, 
poverty and climate change, it must be successfully repressed in order for us to 
function properly for liberal-capitalism (Becker 2011; Jeffery 2011). Therefore, 
we tend to grant precedence to the unreal over that which is real as a 
comforting diversion from the omnipresent misery of the latter, with such 
precedence acting as a balm soothing the otherwise intolerable discomfort of 
life in the ‘real world’ (Becker 2011; Jeffery 2011).  
 
It is in this respect that the dream myth can perhaps be understood as a 
palliative ‘opium of the people’ keeping those who are partially or fully 
assimilated within it dreaming comfortably (Jeffery 2011). Undisturbed by the 
traumatic shocks kept beneath the thin veil of the diaphanous statistical quilt, 
these adherents can retain uninhibited access to their phantasmatically 
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constituted ‘sense of reality'. It is precisely because the dream myth facilitates 
such access, by providing the symbolism required to fetishistically disavow the 
obscene Real of capitalism more effectively, that individuals variably adhere to 
it. As mentioned previously, not everyone can enter the dream myth and bask in 
the comfort of its mediated fetishistic disavowal of crime and harm. For this 
reason it is perhaps inaccurate to speak of an all-encompassing “state of 
collective fetishistic disavowal” (Žižek 2011:x) when discussing modernity’s 
dream myth. Instead, it is arguably more accurate to refer to the fetishistic 
disavowal of certain collectives. Rather than constituting a meaningless 
exercise in linguistic refabrication, this is an important clarification that draws 
attention to pertinent differentials in the scope of the dream myth and prompts a 
delineation of its range or degrees of assimilation.  
 
Degrees of Assimilation:  
In chapter five it was suggested that the disparity in participants’ belief in or 
acceptance of the ‘crime decline’ discourse is indicative of their degree of 
assimilation within modernity’s dream myth. Moreover, it was intimated that 
such assimilation is mediated by what can be described as a range of 
proximity/situation, epistemological and communication effects (Boudon 1989). 
As previously alluded to, full assimilation into the dream myth is facilitated in 
part by maintaining a limited proximity to the deleterious effects of crime and 
harm. By retaining a physical and mental distance from the reality of crime and 
harm the ability to fetishistically disavow their existence remains inviolate (Žižek 
2011; Pemberton 2004). Indeed such situation effects of those who attain this 
status allow them to interpret external reality in a distorted or incomplete way, 
thereby legitimising ascription to dubious notions of internationally declining 
rates of crime (Boudon 1989).  
 
Strengthening this ascription is the way in which the ‘crime decline’ discourse is 
communicated. Supported by scores of complex statistical analyses emanating 
from ostensibly credible data sources, the discourse is delivered to this 
receptive audience by scholars, reporters and political figures who possess the 
appropriate persuasive status necessary to grant authority to what is being 
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articulated (Flood 2013). Moreover, the passage of time stamps its own 
authoritative mark both in terms of the purported longevity of the statistical 
decline and the sustained circulation of the discourse, which in turn secures its 
proof via repeated assertion (Flood 2013; Aebi and Linde 2012b). The symbolic 
power extolled by those who utter the ‘crime decline’ discourse is granted to 
them by the very audience in willing receipt of this comforting message, for they 
often lack the inclination or knowledge required to interrogate its validity (Flood 
2013). Thus the belief before belief exhibited by the fully assimilated results not 
only from their desire to see declining rates of crime but from the monopoly over 
‘truth’ possessed by the dominant voices behind the ‘crime decline’ discourse 
(Žižek 1994a; Boudon 1989). 
 
Indeed, the fine aetiological intricacies of the purported ‘crime decline’ are 
perhaps considered to be the purview of esoteric knowledge to which the fully 
assimilated are not privy (Boudon 1989). Accordingly — unimbued with 
sufficient statistical ‘pre-knowledge’, reflected in the high levels of innumeracy 
amongst the ‘average’ consumers of crime statistics (Sacco 2005) — it is 
perfectly rational for those who comprise the fully assimilated to rely upon what 
appear to be authoritative accounts and accept repeated assertions of statistical 
certainty (Boudon 1989; Dorling and Simpson 1999). As demonstrated by 
Natasha in chapter five, this reliance upon ‘expert’ knowledge, in conjunction 
with the subjective desire to believe it, serves to offset any lingering residue of 
statistical scepticism (Boudon 1989). Evidently, the combined effects of 
seemingly legitimate and authoritative communications of the ‘crime decline’ 
discourse, and the maintenance of a limited proximity to the realities of crime 
and harm, can to a large extent account for the belief the fully assimilated 
exhibit in what has been shown to be a false notion (Boudon 1989; Flood 2013).  
 
Whilst such effects are pertinent to understanding how the fully assimilated 
come to believe the dubious claims of declining rates of crime, it should not be 
forgotten that the reason why they believe is grounded in a pragmatic choice to 
do so (Winlow and Hall 2013). Indeed they “believe what, at that moment, they 
find it convenient or necessary to believe” (Tudor 1972:123). Recall, for 
instance, Mark’s comments in chapter five regarding the expediency of 
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believing in the ‘crime decline’ and how it both functions to preserve a 
comforting ‘sense of reality’ and maintain inviolate participation in the rituals of 
capitalist life. Similar expressions of the efficacy of what amounts to belief 
before belief were documented in chapter five, perhaps demonstrating the 
proneness to self-deceit exhibited by the fully assimilated (Oborne 2005). By 
effectively choosing to be deceived they make themselves ‘willing dupes’, 
enthralled in a state of make-believe that secures for them the ability to “go 
about the everyday and not know” (Morrison 2014:193), or at least fetishistically 
disavow that they know (Tudor 1972). This is the blissful gift that only those who 
are assimilated within the dream myth are able to receive. 
 
Serving as the crucial protective and decorative ‘gift wrapping’ is the ostensible 
efficacy of the ‘hard’ machine’s maintenance of order. Indeed, as mentioned 
previously, it appears evident that for the fully assimilated the mere abstract 
presence of the ‘hard’ machine and its agents of control is sufficient to ensure 
that no ‘loss of reality’ is experienced (Žižek 1999). With their apparent success 
neatly stitched into the intricately woven statistical quilt, there is seemingly no 
need for panic, and certainly no need to disturb the comfort and complacency 
that accompanies entrance into the dream myth with thoughts to the contrary 
(Hall 2012d). Thus, devoid of having to confront capitalism’s obscene Real, the 
fully assimilated can continue dreaming comfortably, confident in the longevity 
of their ‘sense of reality’ and content with fetishistically disavowing the reality of 
crime and harm, as they habitually perform the rituals of a capitalist system in 
denial of its problems (Stiegler 2010).  
 
Things are, however, not so straightforward for the partially assimilated or 
episodically resistant. Indeed for this group of individuals, entrance into the 
dream myth is initially precluded by their relatively rich ‘event knowledge’ of, 
and closer proximity to, the experiential reality of crime and harm. Such 
negative situation and relevant epistemological effects serve in the first instance 
to guard against accepting broad-based suppositions of declining rates of crime 
(Flood 2013; Boudon 1989). Essentially, suppositions of this kind are difficult to 
immediately reconcile with informed perceptions of day-to-day life in areas such 
as Lake Town (Boudon 1989). It is therefore perhaps unsurprising that the 
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partially assimilated/episodically resistant’s initial reaction to what must appear 
as an absurd claim is often one of intense scepticism. 
 
However, perceptions often contain a certain degree of plasticity and are thus 
susceptible to distortion, modification and even relative supersession by the 
effects of cogent communication (Krauss 2005; Boudon 1989). As a result it 
was not uncommon to find amongst members of this group that experiential and 
normative wisdoms regarding crime and harm can be seemingly overridden by 
presenting countervailing statistical evidence ‘substantiating’ the ‘crime decline’ 
discourse. Of course, as with the fully assimilated, insufficient statistical pre-
knowledge and inadequate shares in the monopoly over ‘truth’ has an important 
role to play in this. The tentative acceptance of this information deemed to be of 
a higher order in the hierarchy of knowledge, since it emanates from 
authoritative ‘experts’ who have drawn upon ‘credible’ sources of data, appears 
to facilitate the partial internalisation of the articulated discourse despite the 
presence of seemingly insurmountable experiential contradictions (Flood 2013). 
 
This is not to suggest that all previous encounters with or experiences of crime 
and harm are evacuated from cognisance as if they had been completely 
cajoled by the discourse, for there always remains a residual awareness of the 
realities of crime and harm due to their relatively close proximity to their 
deleterious effects. Rather, participants in this group begin to simultaneously 
hold mutually contradictory views of crime and harm, therefore demonstrating a 
rather schizoid view of the ‘crime decline’ (Flood 2013). That is to say they 
retain residual cognitive schemata of the deleterious effects of the dominant 
sociosymbolic order’s actualised structures and processes whilst demonstrably 
‘believing’ that crime has declined. In other words, this is the point at which 
partial assimilation into the dream myth is achieved.  
 
Evidently, entrance into modernity’s dream myth is secured for the partially 
assimilated/episodically resistant only once the negative situation effects, that 
derive from a relatively close proximity to crime and harm, have been 
sufficiently diluted via the authoritative communication of a ‘crime decline’ 
supported by ‘higher order’ statistical knowledge. Crucial in this regard is the 
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tendency, despite retaining a certain degree of scepticism, to be more accepting 
of “numbers that seem to support what we’d like to think” (Best 2005:211). 
Again, this tends to suggest that when confronted with contradictory 
perspectives individuals often ‘believe’ what seems most desirable rather than 
what is objectively valid (Boudon 1989). In this regard even partial assimilation 
within the dream myth can be seen as offering the requisite pseudo-
explanations necessary to fetishistically disavow observed discrepancies 
between the liberal progressive discourse of the ‘crime decline’ and external 
reality (Johnston 2013a).  
 
Perhaps to a greater degree than their fully assimilated counterparts, the 
partially assimilated/episodically resistant represent typical postmodern subjects 
in that they demonstrate an “apparently contradictory coupling of cynicism and 
belief” (Myers 2003:57). Indeed, due to their retention of a relatively close 
proximity to crime and harm these individuals know full well the experiential 
reality of their deleterious effects and that the ‘official’ version of events is 
significantly distorted (Myers 2003; Žižek 1994a). Nevertheless, they do not 
readily seek to dispense with this distorted view having been presented with it 
but rather insist upon it, openly welcoming the dilutive effects of cogently 
communicated accounts of declining rates of crime (Myers 2003; Žižek 1994a).  
 
What this essentially amounts to is cynical reasoning at work, whereby the 
distance between reality and the distorted version of it is recognised and taken 
into account in advance of reasons being forged to accept the distortion (Žižek 
1994a). The result is not naïve surrender to ideological mystification but the 
emergence of a self–deceiving cynical distance between the articulated 
discourse and their lived reality. Ironically, it is precisely the maintenance of this 
cynical distance that allows the partially assimilated/episodically resistant to 
‘believe’ for more than just a fleeting moment in the ‘crime decline’ discourse, 
since participation in the rituals of belief can be justified simply by not taking the 
discourse too seriously (Žižek 1994a). In other words, as long as they can tell 
themselves that they don’t take it all that seriously, it’s okay to stay tuned into 
the ‘crime decline’ discourse (Jeffery 2011). 
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It can therefore perhaps be argued that the partially assimilated/episodically 
resistant accept the ‘crime decline’ discourse not because the effects of its 
cogent communication function to completely override experiential and 
normative wisdoms, but rather because no complete overruling of this kind 
takes place. Therefore the partially assimilated/episodically resistant can 
superficially internalise the articulated discourse precisely because a cynical 
distance is maintained between what is being communicated and their 
experiential contradictions, and thus between their social action and their ‘event 
knowledge’ (Winlow and Hall 2012). They can, in other words, participate in the 
rituals of belief by demonstrably acting as if they believe whilst retaining 
detailed, if diluted, schemata of crime and harm continuously informed by 
maintaining a relatively close proximity to their deleterious effects.  
 
Of course this does not preclude the fact that whilst participating in the rituals of 
belief the partially assimilated/episodically resistants’ relatively close proximity 
to crime and harm, and thus with inconsistencies indicative of an encounter with 
capitalism’s obscene Real, will precipitate episodic spells of resistance to the 
‘crime decline’ discourse (Wood 2012). When these eruptions of close 
encounters with capitalism’s obscene Real occur, the subjects’ cynical distance 
and partial assimilation is momentarily threatened as external stimuli bombard 
the senses with inconvenient truths. However, this only endures until the 
appropriate distance can be recovered via re-immersion within the requisite 
placatory discourse that serves to dilute, but never dispel, the traumatic kernel 
of capitalism’s Real.  
 
In dream myth parlance, these individuals can be analogously thought of as 
sleepwalkers. They ostensibly ‘believe’ the myth of the ‘crime decline’ enough to 
remain partially encompassed within the culturally induced sleep sustained by 
the lucid dream state, whilst still retaining the experientially informed scepticism 
necessary to maintain some capacity for resistant movement or thought 
(Hobson 2005). In this sense they are hybrids exhibiting features of both waking 
knowledge and sleeping belief as if the split between the two were intermittently 
rekindled (Hobson 2005; Žižek 1992). 
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Congruent with their fully assimilated counterparts, the reason for these 
individuals’ adherence, partial as it may be, to modernity’s dream myth is 
grounded in a pragmatic choice to become enthralled in a state of make-believe 
(Winlow and Hall 2013; Tudor 1972). By making themselves ‘willing dupes’ they 
are able to secure a ‘sense of reality’ far more secure and serene than the one 
they necessarily occupy (Becker 2011). Crucially, it is this ‘sense of reality’ that 
facilitates the repression of sociosymbolic inconsistencies and antagonisms 
produced by the Real of capitalism, to which prolonged over-proximity would 
result in the disintegration of their symbolic reality, propelling them into the 
realm of the unassimilated (Wood 2012). 
 
For those who constitute the unassimilated, their over-proximity to the 
deleterious effects of crime and harm serves to completely foreclose their 
entrance into modernity’s dream myth. Indeed, because prolonged over-
proximity to the obscene Real of capitalism results in the total disintegration of 
symbolic reality (Wood 2012), no access to the comforting ‘sense of reality’ 
secured by the myth-sustaining dream can be attained. In other words, constant 
exposure to crime and harm makes it impossible to experience the 
phantasmatically constituted social reality that modernity’s dream myth helps to 
maintain. Fundamentally the unassimilated both see and know ‘too much’ to be 
enthralled by the dream myth, as manifest discrepancies and antagonisms 
produced by the Real of capitalism constantly erupt upon their senses (Žižek 
1992; Wood 2012). Bereft of any shielding provided by fantasies of consistent 
wholeness that cover over traumatic cracks in the sociosymbolic framework, the 
unassimilated are confronted with the terrifying full visibility of the world as it 
really is (Wood 2012; Becker 2011). 
 
Whilst the comparatively intermittent exposure to the realities of crime and harm 
experienced by the partially assimilated can to some extent be mitigated by the 
dilutive effects of authoritative and cogent communication of the ‘crime decline’ 
discourse, no degree of communication effects can nullify the sheer magnitude 
of negative situation effects encountered by the unassimilated (Boudon 1989). 
Indeed, not only does the possession of rich ‘event knowledge’ serve to 
undermine the validity and legitimacy of the ‘crime decline’ discourse, but the 
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prolonged exposure to such negative situation effects often ensures that the 
unassimilated consider themselves to be suitably placed to make more 
informed judgements about trends in crime (Flood 2013).  
 
Consequently, as demonstrated in chapter five, it was not uncommon to find 
amongst individuals of this group ardent and indignant denouncements of both 
the ‘crime decline’ discourse and the statistical evidence upon which it was 
thought to have been based. Instead of scepticism, this absurd assertion, 
deemed out of sync with their lived reality of crime and harm, was met with 
disdain and was thought to be, like so many other political myths, an 
intentionally misleading narrative articulated by untrustworthy and politically 
biased individuals (Flood 2013). Therefore, rather than the effects of a cogently 
communicated ‘crime decline’ discourse serving some placatory or mitigating 
function, for the unassimilated they achieve little more than to reaffirm that 
which they already know. That the ‘truth’ of the so called ‘crime decline’ is, to 
somewhat de-contextually borrow from Wood (2012:308), “located in the 
experiences of those who are systematically excluded and made abject by the 
hegemonic ideology”. It is only from their unassimilated position that the 
concrete universal truth of crime and harm is accessible, for they represent the 
return of the repressed Real, intruding upon the ‘sense of reality’ maintained by 
the dream myth by revealing its inherent inconsistencies (Wood 2012).  
 
The fundamental upshot is that the degree of assimilation into modernity’s 
dream myth is predicated upon the variable interplay between a range of 
proximity/situation, epistemological and communication effects (Boudon 1989). 
That is between one’s proximity to, and ‘event knowledge’ of, the negative 
effects of the dominant sociosymbolic order’s actualised structures and 
processes, and the amount of stock placed in the authoritative communication 
of the liberal progressive ‘crime decline’ discourse. Whilst there are no definitive 
boundaries permanently separating the three groups it is impossible for any one 
individual to fall within more than one group at any one moment in time. In a 
similar way to which Žižek (2002) notes, in relation to liberal-democratic 
ideology, that one individual cannot combine the features of conviction of belief, 
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intelligence, and honesty so is it the case that one cannot simultaneously be 
unassimilated, partially assimilated and assimilated to modernity’s dream myth.  
 
Essentially, what the theory of the dream myth helps to explain is how, why and 
to what extent individuals choose to act as if they believe in the demonstrably 
incorrect ‘crime decline’ discourse. To briefly recapitulate, partial or full 
assimilation into the dream myth serves to help maintain a comforting ‘sense of 
reality’ within which the deleterious effects and anthropocentric dimensions of 
crime and harm can be fetishistically disavowed, whilst participation in the 
rituals of a capitalist system in denial of its problems remains inviolate (Žižek 
2011; Stiegler 2010). Indeed, insulated from the burden of ‘excessive 
knowledge’ and full visibility of capitalism’s obscene Real, those who adhere to 
the dream myth can continue dreaming comfortably, confident in the ostensible 
longevity of their ‘sense of reality’ and the imagined infallibility of the world 
around them as they sleepwalk to disaster (Merton 1968; Becker 2011; Hall 
2012b).  
 
It is however time to wake up from the myth-sustaining dream. Traumatic as it 
may be, we must take a good look through unveiled eyes at the world as it 
really is and begin to confront the reality of our times. Certainly, as Thomas 
Hardy eloquently noted, “if a way to the better there be, it lies in taking a full 
look at the worst” (cited in Becker 1975:xi). Accordingly the task we must set 
ourselves is to stay awake to the reality of the world without descending into 
despair (Jeffery 2011). To succeed in this task it is essential that discourses 
laden with incautious and unqualified optimism that edit out “the parts of living 
no one wants to hear about” are dispensed with (Jeffery 2011:90). It is within 
this vacated space that the ‘truth’ about crime and harm can be approached 
from the unassimilated position of those excluded and made abject by the 
dominant negative ideology of capitalist realism (Wood 2012; Fisher 2009).  
 
By openly approaching this ‘truth’ it is possible to participate in a gesture of 
refusal to enjoy the comforting liberal progressive myth of the ‘crime decline’ 
and perform a more honest appraisal of our current condition (Wood 2012; 
Žižek 2009b). It is precisely such a gesture of refusal that this thesis has sought 
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to mobilise by offering the reader a more accurate account of the purported 
‘international crime decline’ and the traumatic experiences endured by those 
who encounter the neatly omitted dimensions of crime and harm. Perhaps all 
that remains for this thesis is to conclude by recapitulating the most salient 
points of this more accurate account, and offering a view as to why its potential 
to ignite a gesture of refusal to enjoy the ‘crime decline’ is so important.   
Justin Kotzé  PhD Thesis 
229 
 
Conclusion: 
 
In contrast to the dubious claims of ‘universally declining’ rates of crime and 
other ‘delusions of peace’ articulated by those with buried heads (van Kesteren 
et al 2014; Gray 2011; Stiegler 2010), this thesis has argued that crime may not 
have miraculously declined but has perhaps instead mutated in ways that 
current indicators have been unable to adequately capture (Farrell et al 2010). 
Indeed, the development and innovative application of technological advances 
has facilitated the creation of both adaptive and new forms of crime, as well as 
having stimulated the waning into obsolescence of some forms of ordinary 
crime and certain adaptations (McQuade 2006; Sacco 2005). This co-
evolutionary process of technologically driven criminal innovation, mutation and 
obsolescence has changed both the nature and broad landscape of crime 
resulting in the rapid transformation of the traditional criminal marketplace 
(McQuade 2006; Treadwell 2011). So profound have these developments been 
that conventional categories of crime and criminality are to a large extent now 
completely inadequate (Sandywell 2010). As this criminal terrain evolves a 
process of technology-mediated criminal transference occurs, whereby 
individuals become increasingly involved in adaptive and new forms of crime 
which are poorly, if at all, measured. This ‘mass migration’ towards forms of 
crime that fall outside the narrowly focused ‘crime decline tunnel of vision’ 
creates the statistical illusion of declining rates of crime (See figures 1 and 2).  
 
Unable or unwilling to chart the fluidity and rapidity with which crime and the 
terrain upon which it is perpetrated changes, the ‘crime decline’ discourse’s 
methodological champion, the ICVS, has resigned itself to the measurement of 
criminal obsolesce. Committed to an incessant drive for standardisation 
(Walklate 2008), the ICVS maintains a static and non-dynamic definition of 
crime and victimisation, concerning itself only with ‘ideal’ victims who have 
experienced one or more of a limited number of ‘conventional’ crimes (Kirchhoff 
2010; van Dijk 2011). This has resulted in an analytically myopic tunnel vision 
whereby only that which can be easily measured and quantified is explored at 
the expense of any meaningful investigation of ‘non-conventional’ crimes and 
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non-ideal victims (Lomell 2010; van Dijk and Shaw 2009; Carrabine et al 2009). 
Accordingly rather than having identified a ‘universal’ downward trajectory in 
crime trends, the ICVS has simply captured the waning into obsolescence of 
those crimes upon which it disproportionally focuses, whilst omitting from its 
view those which have mutated and transcended their terrestrial boundaries. 
 
The fundamental upshot is that, marred by methodological naivety and 
positivistic oversimplification (Young 2003; Heidensohn 2008), the ICVS and its 
embedded congregation of scholars, who now constitute the dominant voices in 
the ‘international crime decline’ discourse, have produced and enunciated an 
absurd assertion based upon insufficient data. Certainly there is little doubt that, 
as conceded by van Dijk and Mayhew (1992:53), “sceptics have room for 
argument about the quality of data from the IC[V]S, and these cannot be readily 
dismissed”. In short their attempts to extrapolate from a limited number of 
countries overgeneralised assertions of declining rates of crime, in an effort to 
paint a better picture of the ‘universal’ by excluding the ‘global’, serve only to 
play down the world’s “true crime story” (Zvekic 1996:15). 
 
Indeed, little regard is paid to the incessant mass production of ‘wasted 
humans’ by a global socio-economic system that requires only a mere twenty 
percent of the world’s population to perform all necessary work (Bauman 2004; 
Žižek 2011). Within such a precarious milieu large masses uncomfortably 
oscillate between states of unemployment and underemployment as they 
become embroiled in an endless battle to secure even the most tenuous scraps 
of work (Shildrick et al 2012; Southwood 2011). Whilst the ‘winners’ of this 
competitive race to the bottom receive only temporary economic relief, the so 
called ‘losers’ are reduced to nothing more than an excessive redundancy 
devoid of recognition and condemned to poverty, insecurity, victimisation and 
vagabondage (Southwood 2011; Bauman 2004). Yet in the face of this 
pervasive precarity and systemic violence we are repeatedly told that we now 
enjoy an era of unprecedented peace demonstrated by ‘universally’ declining 
rates of crime (Pinker 2012; van Kesteren et al 2014).  
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As this thesis has demonstrated, however, this utopic sketching of the world is 
far from representative of external reality. Indeed, the current research has 
uncovered glimpses of experiential lived realities of crime and harm far removed 
from the idyllic image painted by these baseless discourses. The reality is that 
we now occupy a latently criminogenic socio-cultural milieu within which fragile 
and differentiated pseudo-pacified normative strategies, geared more towards 
stimulating rather than attenuating the worst excesses of capitalism, have been 
purposefully cultivated (Hall et al 2008; Horsley et al 2015). In this socially 
atomised and hyper-competitive society of enemies there is an abundance of 
opportunities created by the globalisation process for illicit conduct, to which 
enormous populations have become equally susceptible for criminal recruitment 
and/or victimisation (Hall 2012d; Passas 2000).  
 
Certainly, it is undeniable that the criminal fraternity have been among the major 
beneficiaries of this process (Shelley 2011). They have consistently proven 
themselves to be considerably adroit in assimilating the schematic knowledge 
required to successfully navigate the technologically sophisticated contours of a 
globalising world (Thachuk 2007; Williams and Baudin-O’Hayon 2002). Imbued 
with technologically augmented entrepreneurial instincts and an increasingly 
porous terrain upon which to operate, criminal undertakers ply their trade 
beneath the statistical radar more ruthlessly and effectively than ever before as 
authorities struggle to keep up (Hall 2012b; Williams and Baudin-O’Hayon 2002; 
Viano 1999). 
 
Often manifesting itself in precarious ‘glocal nodes’ such as Lake Town, such 
deviant entrepreneurship simultaneously serves as both the patchwork and 
cause of further lacerations in an already tattered social fabric (Hall 2012b; Lea 
2002). In many ways glocalized forms of crime serve as adulterated means of 
re-energizing local and regional opportunities for economic activity in 
deindustrialised wastelands languishing in a state of permanent recession (Hall 
2012b; Hall et al 2008). Yet at the same time this ostensibly ‘social’ activity 
constitutes nothing less than dangerous parasitic practices that feed off those 
who already find themselves at the bottom of the socio-economic hierarchy 
(Matthews 2009). Involvement in deviant glocalization is shot through with 
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dangers and social harms for both criminal entrepreneurs and their community 
beneficiaries, who are all forced to acquire their modicum of symbolic 
recognition via illicit means. However, for many of those who occupy the 
remains of communities hollowed out by the processes of neoliberal 
globalisation, such involvement is often necessary for survival (Lea 1999, 
2002).  
 
It is within a precarious milieu such as this that the majority of those who 
participated in this research find themselves. Battling to sustain lives deemed 
unworthy of recognition and actionable positive rights (Bauman 2004; Fredman 
2008; Halstead 2008), these individuals endure numerous forms of crime and 
harm unamenable to the rigid counting frame of reference adhered to by the 
survey methodology informing the prematurely triumphal ‘crime decline’ 
discourse (Genn 1988; van Dijk 2007a). Despite optimistic claims of statistical 
reductions in crime, everyday life for many of those with whom the researcher 
spoke continues to be blighted by socio-economic impoverishment, fear and a 
raft of unreported and unrecorded harms and illegalities.  Indeed, not only has 
the methodological champion of this discourse helped to maintain the invisibility 
of many serious global crimes and harms by granting them a state of exception 
via the designation ‘non-conventional’ (van Dijk and Shaw 2009; van Dijk 
2007a), but it has failed to adequately plumb the depths of the hidden 
landscape of ‘conventional’ everyday crime.  
 
The ICVS’s itemised counting frame of reference is a relatively well-known 
hindrance to the solicitation of information pertaining to experiences of crime 
and harm that form persistent and largely ‘normalised’ undercurrents beneath 
many individuals’ daily lives (Genn 1988; Spalek 2006). The ‘numbing’ effect of 
constant exposure to such turbulent undercurrents and their deleterious 
consequences, experienced by a number of those with whom the researcher 
spoke, undoubtedly served to preclude them from reporting such happenings to 
anyone or anything resembling officialdom. Moreover, a necessarily strict 
adherence to the ‘no-grassing rule’ and the overarching ‘code of the street’ 
ensure that residents ‘see but don’t see’ (Anderson 2000). Again, the 
methodological naivety of the ICVS is striking, for not many would risk the 
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consequences of breaking this sacred taboo to answer the probing questions of 
a stranger on the other end of an unsolicited telephone call.  
 
Serious doubt must therefore be cast over the validity of the ‘crime decline’ 
discourse, when one considers that large sections of the population most at risk 
of being victims of crime and harm lie beyond the sampling boundaries of its 
methodological champion. Indeed as discussed in chapter three, most serious 
crime is perpetrated against non-ideal victims, such as the homeless and those 
involved in various forms of crime, who despite often being victimised 
disproportionately remain shadowy silhouettes conveniently situated just 
beyond the range of the ICVS’s statistical radar (Topalli et al 2002; Rosenfeld et 
al 2003; Lee and Schreck 2005). Additionally, for those who have little choice 
but to offset their socio-economic redundancy by becoming complicit 
beneficiaries of burgeoning criminal markets, there is no benefit to furnishing 
those resembling officialdom with information likely to disrupt the vestigial 
‘social’ functionality of such activity (Lea 2002).  
 
What has been made strikingly clear is that the ‘crime decline’ discourse and 
the data that underpins it have very little understanding of the reality of life in 
high crime areas such as Lake Town and others like it around the world. There 
appears to be no consideration for the relentless toil of having to routinely 
navigate with constant vigilance the thinly delineated border between ‘social’ 
and ‘asocial’ activity (Lea 1999, 2002). Nor is there anything like a clear 
conception of the plethora of dangers, harms, misfortunes and risks that form 
constituent components of everyday life for those who reside in these areas 
(Muncie 2000). Accordingly, there is undoubtedly a need to look beyond the 
narrow conceptualisation of ‘crime’ and ‘victimisation’ to which the ICVS and the 
assertions it helps support resolutely adhere. Indeed, it is clear that such a 
blinkered view omits a great many serious harms that cause considerable 
damage to the wider social body, and in so doing produces a distorted and 
misleading indication of the extent and nature of crime and other socially 
injurious events people endure (Hillyard and Tombs 2004, 2007). 
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This proclamation certainly resonates with those who have trumpeted a call to 
move entirely beyond the legalistic conceptualisation of ‘crime’ and the 
discipline of criminology towards the harm perspective of the new zemiological 
movement (Hillyard et al 2004). However, as this thesis has demonstrated we 
must remain cautious regarding the imposition of such dualistic false 
alternatives (Žižek 2000a). Although the harm perspective is capable of 
exploring wider aetiologies of harm production than its legalistically defined 
counterpart, and of taking full cognisance of a wide range of socio-structurally 
induced harms which remain otherwise opaque to the mainstream 
criminological canon (Pemberton 2007; Hillyard and Tombs 2007), one cannot 
naively assume that the category of ‘crime’ merely consists of ‘petty’ events and 
should therefore be dispensed with (Hillyard and Tombs 2004). Such an 
assertion pays no regard to the burdensome experiential reality of life for those 
who occupy locales blighted by a plethora of social issues among which ‘crime’ 
retains a salient position (Hall et al 2008). Nor does it acknowledge that ‘petty’ 
criminal offences co-exist alongside issues of socio-economic marginalisation, 
often intertwining with acts of violence and intimidation to form harmful and 
corrosive flows of under-reported and under-recorded crime and harm, 
frequently perpetrated by and against the powerless (Hall 2012b). 
 
The simple fact of the matter is that we cannot simply separate crime and harm 
as if the two were isolated problems, for their multifaceted complexities are 
intimately connected, as the findings from this research have demonstrated. 
Moreover, the true endeavour of the zemiological movement is not to promote 
the abandonment of criminology but to remove the constraining brackets 
surrounding the latter’s legitimate field of study (Muncie 2000; Hopkins Burke 
2014). In doing so the task has always been to help re-engage criminology’s 
dialectical energy in order to facilitate a more holistic exploration of both ‘crime’ 
and ‘harm’ (Hall and Winlow 2015). However, in order to be successful in this 
regard the rather nebulous concept of harm must be cleared of its ambiguities 
and lack of specificity and provided with a firm ontological anchorage grounded 
in reality (Yar 2012; Hall and Winlow 2015).  
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Whilst Yar (2012) has made strides towards this end by attempting to ground 
the concept of harm in the denial of recognition, it must be acknowledged that 
the simple restoration of inter-subjective recognition is insufficient to alleviate 
social harm (Hall 2012b). Rather, this thesis has advanced the position that the 
restoration of social recognition must be accompanied by a reinvigorated 
application of positive rights. In other words, renewed emphasis must be 
directed towards providing the requisite socio-structural conditions within which 
social recognition can be attained, actualised and exercised in meaningful 
ways. As discussed in chapter three, this exacts a combined implementation of 
transformative economic distribution, via the fundamental restructuring of the 
existing relations of production, and transformative recognition which will in turn 
restructure the current differentiation of social recognition (Fraser 1995). 
Essentially, this is the dual position upon which a revitalised and ontologically 
grounded social harm perspective can be established, from which we may 
begin to demarcate the consensual core of harm with more precision. It is 
however salient to note that this is but an initial intellectual ripple. Further work 
is required if the harm perspective is to generate the new waves necessary to 
fully re-engage criminology’s dialectical energy.  
 
Likewise, if we are to gain a more holistic understanding of crime and harm we 
must transcend the restrictive boundaries of the dominant and subdominant 
paradigmatic forces currently constraining the discipline of criminology. Their 
constraining presence has effectively marooned the discipline in an 
undialectical bind between crude positivism and equally crude social 
constructionism (Hall 2012b). This has precipitated a general intellectual 
standstill at the core of the criminological enterprise which effectively precludes 
penetrative research into important social issues (Winlow and Atkinson 2013). 
Indeed, within chapter six it was argued that both positivism and 
constructionism, particularly in their ‘hard/strong’ form, are inadequate positions 
from which to analyse the multifaceted complexities of crime and its purported 
decline. Nevertheless, any cursory glance over the voluminous ‘crime decline’ 
literature will reveal that its theoretical and empirical oeuvre is heavily informed 
and constrained by the dominant positivist paradigm and its attendant fidelity 
towards the fetishism of numbers (Young 2011).  
Justin Kotzé  PhD Thesis 
236 
 
Conversely, this research has approached the anomalous ‘international crime 
decline’ from a position unrestrained by the dominant and subdominant 
paradigmatic forces currently occluding criminology’s intellectual vitality. In 
addition to having articulated the potential promise of properly utilising what has 
been referred to in this thesis as ‘soft positivism’, one of the unique 
contributions of this research is that it constitutes the first study to explore in 
depth the purported ‘crime decline’, utilising cutting edge criminological theory 
and an innovative melding of zemiology, critical realism and transcendental 
materialism. As already demonstrated, this unique methodological and 
analytical framework facilitates a more accurate and holistic examination of the 
alleged ‘crime decline’.  
 
In addition to the aforementioned benefits of drawing upon an ontologically 
grounded harm perspective, the use of critical realism helps open up 
progressive intellectual space within which one can make an initial break from 
the correlationism that resides at the heart of both positivism and 
constructionism (Iosifides 2011b). Rather than simply dismissing any discussion 
of ‘reality’ as it exists independently of human access, critical realism maintains 
the tenability of capturing a glimpse of the real as it exists independently of our 
conceptions of it (Hall and Winlow 2015). However it is worth reiterating that if 
the tendency to separate structure and agency, that so often accompanies 
critical realism in its ‘stock form’, is not surmounted it remains unable to 
facilitate a holistic examination of the aetiological complexities of crime and 
harm or indeed the alleged ‘crime decline’. 
 
It is for this reason that this research opted to employ the use of a more robust 
philosophico-theoretical framework capable of augmenting the critical realist 
paradigm. Comprising the philosophical tradition of transcendental materialism 
and the theory of the pseudo-pacification process, this framework helps to 
explain how and why criminogenic subjectivities are cultivated and perpetuated 
(Hall and Winlow 2015). Indeed, it thoroughly unravels the creative stitching that 
binds liberal progressive assertions of a more peaceable society experiencing 
unprecedented reductions in crime by cogently conveying a simple yet 
uncomfortable truth. That is that we are fundamentally subjects of a 
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criminogenic negative ideology that purposively cultivates cynicism, competitive 
individualism, depoliticisation, anxiety, inequality, and socio-economic instability 
and insecurity which often foster criminal responses in either ameliorative or 
hyper-conformist capacities (Hall 2012b). Against this bleak yet accurate 
backdrop the claims of prolonged peace and internationally declining rates of 
crime are without doubt entirely untenable.     
 
What is more, the insulating capabilities of capitalism’s historical pseudo-
pacification process have all but been eroded. The process itself is collapsing 
into a state of disrepair as it stimulates more aggressive libidinal energy than it 
is capable of sublimating and pacifying (Hall and Winlow 2005b). Consequently, 
there has been an unrestrained dispersal throughout the social structure of 
dissociated subjects, imbued with a self-affirmed sense of special liberty and a 
willingness to do extreme harm to others in the process of acting out their 
overstimulated drives and desires (Hall 2015). This is the reality of our times 
and the shape of the criminogenic milieu we now inhabit, yet within which 
claims of a long peace and internationally declining rates of crime are 
emphatically trumpeted in an attempt to exude some semblance of security and 
serenity.  
 
Shorn of its actual ability to secure a serene reality by permanently managing 
the consequences of deaptation, the pseudo-pacification process must at least 
retain the appearance of success in this regard. It is with this placatory task that 
the carefully crafted dream myth and its intricately woven statistical quilt is of 
significant help. As alluded to at the end of chapter six, the dream myth 
functions in part to reaffirm the credibility of the pseudo-pacification process’s 
external systems of control, by crediting them with fabricated forms of success 
in the shape of the ‘crime decline’. At the same time it serves to obfuscate the 
processes’ inefficiency as a suitable means of insulating the overstimulated 
drives and desires that continue to propel capitalism forward. 
 
There is little doubt that we are in need of a clearer understanding of the 
multifaceted and overlapping complexities of crime and harm (Ellis 2015). Yet 
such an understanding will continue to elude us as long as we remain wedded 
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to the dominant and subdominant paradigmatic forces that currently constrain 
the discipline and marginalise the creative development of alternative positions 
(Hall and Winlow 2012; Sumner 2015). Rather than seeking to understand the 
stark realities of crime and harm, the mainstream criminological canon remains 
committed to re-producing quantitative accounts of certain forms of ‘crime’, as if 
the partial counting of such activity is somehow the inevitable step towards 
understanding the phenomenon in all its guises (Presdee 2004b; Pakes 2012). 
It is perhaps for this reason that the discipline of criminology has so far been 
unable to develop an empirically persuasive and theoretically nuanced 
explanation of the alleged ‘crime decline’ (Winlow 2014b).  
 
Developing both a clearer understanding of crime and harm and a more 
accurate and theoretically robust analysis of the ‘crime decline’ is precisely what 
this thesis has endeavoured to achieve. Certainly it has made a number of 
unique contributions towards this end, of which one of the most salient is the 
developing theory of the dream myth. Enunciated in detail in chapter seven, the 
theory of the dream myth helps to explain how, why and to what extent 
individuals choose to act as if they believe in the demonstrably erroneous ‘crime 
decline’ discourse. Perhaps best understood as a kind of palliative ‘opium of the 
people’ the dream myth keeps those who are partially or fully assimilated within 
it dreaming comfortably (Jeffery 2011). Indeed, it gifts to its adherents the 
symbolic means to fetishistically disavow with more ardency the obscene Real 
of capitalism and their anthropocentric complicity in criminogenesis.  
 
Embroiled in the formal features of a lucid dream state these individuals can 
retain uninhibited access to the protective fantasy construction that is ‘their 
reality’ and avoid confronting the reality of crime, harm and other inconvenient 
truths (Žižek 1994a). Crucially it is this lucid dream state, complete with its 
formal features, that sustains the comfortable myth of liberal progressivism and 
internationally declining rates of crime. Spared from encountering the hiatus that 
exists between these imagined ideals and reality (Žižek 2008a; Box 1981), the 
fully and partially assimilated can continue to participate in the capitalist rituals 
of everyday life (Myers 2003). Indeed, insulated from the burden of ‘excessive 
knowledge’ and full visibility of capitalism’s obscene Real, adherents of the 
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dream myth can remain confident in the ostensible longevity of their ‘sense of 
reality’ and the imagined infallibility of the world around them as they sleepwalk 
to disaster (Merton 1968; Becker 2011; Hall 2012b).   
 
However, if we are to stand any chance of ushering in true socio-economic 
transformation we must awake from the utopian dream that sustains the 
comforting myths and convenient ‘truths’ we so desperately cling to (Winlow 
and Hall 2013; Wood 2012). Certainly, before any attempt can be made to 
refashion the sociosymbolic and politico-economic structure in favour of 
securing for all the necessary actionable positive rights required to exercise 
one’s social recognition, we must take a full look at the worst. It is time for us to 
confront the reality of our times and acknowledge our anthropocentric complicity 
in fostering the zemiogenic and criminogenic state of our current social 
condition. Only by looking through unveiled eyes at the world as it really is can 
we hope to garner a greater understanding of all that ails it and its inhabitants. 
Traumatic as this may be, it is essential if we are to achieve more than the 
periodic implementation of minor policy tweaks and tokenistic gestures of 
charitable humanitarianism, which do little more than to postpone the inevitable 
crisis of the capitalist system by serving to conceal the perpetuation of 
economic exploitation and human suffering (Hall 2015; Žižek 2011, 2009a).  
 
Ultimately what is required of us is our participation in a gesture of refusal to 
enjoy immersing ourselves in discourses that promote baseless and incautious 
optimism by editing out the unsavoury facts of life that disturb our daily rhythms 
(Jeffery 2011; Winlow and Hall 2013). That is, to reject the comforting myths 
that help rationalise our fetishistic disavowal of the stark reality of the world as it 
is and our complicity in shaping its current configuration. Indeed, we must 
refuse to revel in and take undue comfort from the interrelated mythical 
proclamations of perpetual incremental liberal progressivism and ‘internationally 
declining’ rates of crime. Instead, we should begin to approach the truth about 
crime and harm from the unassimilated position of those excluded and made 
abject by the dominant negative ideology of capitalist realism (Wood 2012; 
Fisher 2009). Only by working our way from a state of denial to one of 
acceptance can we hope to break out of the convenient lie we are living and 
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fully live the traumatic truth required to stimulate genuine emancipatory 
enthusiasm and human flourishing (Wood 2012; Žižek 2011).  
 
This is not to suggest that we needlessly enter a state of unrestrained 
melancholy, or tread the dangerous path to alarmism and the state of exception 
(Agamben 2005), but to simply look at the world as it is without descending into 
debilitating despair (Jeffery 2011). Rather than recoiling behind carefully 
constructed statistical data that tells us precisely what we want to hear and 
enjoins us to celebrate the alleged reduction of a neat bundle of specially 
selected illegalities, a more honest appraisal of the extent and nature of crime 
and harm in our world today must be performed. Such an appraisal is precisely 
what this thesis has endeavoured to provide. It has sought to offer a more 
accurate and holistic account of the so-called ‘crime decline’, revealing that 
when stripped of its unintelligible assertions and selective caveats the enigma 
can be quite easily unravelled. Unsheathed from its protective statistical husk, 
the raw kernel of the ‘crime decline’ discourse has been laid bare displaying the 
naked truth of its essential being. That is, little more than misleading 
overgeneralised assertions based upon insufficient data articulated in a re-
assuredly ‘scientific’ manner complete with intra-scholarly cross-references 
which serve only to offer ‘proof by assertion’ (Aebi and Linde 2012b). 
 
Having interrogated the ‘international crime decline’ discourse, it is hoped that 
this thesis can facilitate participation in a gesture of refusal to enjoy the myth of 
the ‘crime decline’ and concomitant liberal progressive assertions. Only by 
taking this initial step can we hope to dispel the fetishistic disavowal and 
interpassivity that relieves us from having to take action to radically re-imagine 
and transform the coordinates of our deapted social system (Winlow 2013; 
Wood 2012). Fundamentally there is “no blueprint for the future” on offer here 
(Wood 2012:313), only a limited sketching of the actualised effects of liberal-
capitalism’s worst excesses informed by those made abject by them. There is 
undoubtedly a need for further research oriented towards adding layers of detail 
to this preliminary rough outlining. Indeed, whilst the findings of this research 
are analytically generalizable it would be beneficial for it to be replicated within 
similar locales and regions so as to facilitate a more comprehensive 
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examination of the extent and nature of crime and harm. Particular emphasis 
should be placed upon investigating those forms of crime and harm which 
remain unamenable to the rigid counting frames of reference and poorly 
conceptualised statistical counts favoured by the mainstream criminological 
canon (Hall and Winlow 2015).  
 
Future research should therefore be directed towards further illuminating the 
reality of crime and harm experienced by the ‘silent majority’ in an age of 
‘declining rates of crime’, and in doing so contribute towards furnishing us with a 
more honest appraisal of the reality of our times. There is scope for additional 
work to be done in order to help reframe and place the ‘international crime 
decline’ in context and thereby aid in the removal of the decorative and 
misleading trimmings currently surrounding the discourse (Krivo 2014). There is 
still undeniably a great deal of work to be done in an effort to develop a clearer 
understanding of the ‘crime decline’ phenomenon and the broader complexities 
of mutating forms of crime, stages of obsolesce and the emergence of new and 
technologically sophisticated criminal markets which, alongside overlapping 
social harms, should occupy a salient position as the focus of future research 
(Ellis 2015). In addition to such work, it would perhaps be beneficial to further 
develop and begin to apply the theoretical lens of the dream myth to the 
investigation and analysis of discourses that help sustain other salient social 
issues such as inequality and climate change.  
 
Essentially, the task we must set for ourselves as social scientists is clear; 
before embarking upon ambitious endeavours to reshape our socio-economic 
and politico-cultural landscape for the better, we must begin to open up 
progressive intellectual space within which new lines of thought can emerge 
and operate. Congruently, we must refocus our view of the world and recapture 
with clarity the uncomfortable truths hitherto pushed towards the periphery of 
our vision. Rather than seeking to mask the profound socio-economic 
turbulence we are currently living through with incautious optimism and 
baseless claims of unprecedented peace and internationally declining rates of 
crime, let us take a good look at the worst, take stock with honesty and 
adequately prepare for the future.   
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Appendices: 
 
Appendix 1: World map showing countries  (excluding Europe) that 
have participated in the ICVS at least once between 1989 and 2010.  
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Appendix 2: World map showing European countries that have 
participated in the ICVS at least once between 1989 and 2010.  
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Appendix 3: World map showing available ICVS trend data from 
countries that have participated in at least three sweeps of  the ICVS 
between 1989 and 2010. 
 
